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This thesis argues that the jurisdictiona l conflicts between the King’s Court 
and the government in Bombay in the 1820s led to the construction of a more 
despotic political structure of colonial India, in which the government 
retained the power of political intervention in judicial affairs in cases of 
emergency. The background was the political, economic and social crisis in 
the newly acquired territories in the Bombay presidency in the mid -1820s. 
The main concern of the government was the raids of the ‘wild tribes’ in the 
hills and their alliance with the princes in the plains. The government tried to 
deal with it by a form of indirect rule relying on Indian chiefs and aristocrats 
and implemented conciliation policies, among which their exemption from the 
Company’s judiciary was the most important. But the King’s Court obstructed 
this policy by issuing warrants and writs to the chiefs, which weakened their 
authority and respectability in local society. In addition, by overturning the 
decisions of the Company’s Court and trying and punishing governo rs and 
other officials, the King’s Court endangered the Company’s sovereignty in the 
mofussil. The government believed that the unitary judicial structure should 
be devised in India and the King’s Court should be subordinated to the 
government. This tension exploded in a case of habeas corpus in 1828. The 
King’s Court’s jurisdiction was disputed in Bombay, Calcutta, and London. As 
the result, the British parliament established a legislative council in India in 
the Company’s new charter in 1834, by which the King’s Court was 
subjugated to the governor general’s legislative authority. I contend that the 
driving force of the making of British despotism in early nineteenth -century 
India was Indian use of the King’s Court and the government’s anxiety of 
sovereignty in the aftermath of the conquest.  
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I. Theme, historiography, and argument 
 
The British empire in India might have been destroyed by lawyers. The 
government officials of the East India Company talked about the possibility 
for many years. They feared that the chieftains in the hills and mountains and 
the landed nobility in the plains had rallied around the Supreme Court, 
commonly called the King’s Court  (as it was established by a separate royal 
charter), and gone into the revolt. To attest their fear, the court even 
threatened to enlist the military’s help to enforce its orders, which was 
supported by many Indians in cities and the countryside. The cour t of law 
might have succeeded the Company as the next sovereign of the Indian 
subcontinent. 
The crisis reached a climax in a legal case in Bombay in 1828. The 
Supreme Court of Bombay issued a writ of habeas corpus to a nobleman of the 
former Maratha empire. This was an outright subversion of the government’s 
policy of conciliating ‘the natives of rank’. The government interfered and 
ordered the court to stop its proceedings. The result was an open collision 
between the two British authorities lasting for more than two years, which 
generated a sense of crisis among the government officials. John Malcolm, the 
governor of Bombay at that time, thought that the empire was on the brink of 
collapse: 
 
Our physical power in this country (as European nation) is nothin g. We 
stand solely upon that of opinion and above all that which attached to a 
belief of our complete union amongst ourselves & our consequent means 
of prompt combination to crush any opposition of unsupported princes 
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on divided tribes & nations. …. If an impression is once given that we 
are divided, as it must be if a collision of British authorities is apparent 
to the natives of our provinces, the latter ignorant and incapable of 
comprehending our system of law, its forms and its fictions will see 
nothing in the clashing of the warrants and writs of the Supreme Court 
with the rules and orders of the local government, but a struggle for 
power of the extent of which they are uninformed but which will be alike 
magnified by the fears of those who look for our support and the hopes 
of those who anticipate our downfall. In the progress of such 
impressions I repeat my opinion that there is more danger than in the 
defeat of our armies or the loss of provinces. Such misfortune may be 
recovered, but the charm of opinion and above all that which rests upon 
the supposed union and concord of the different branches of our rule, if 




Malcolm’s point was that the ‘system of law, its forms and its fictions’ were a 
hindrance to the ‘complete union amongst ourselves’ which was necessary ‘to 
crush any opposition of unsupported princes on divided tribes & nations’. 
This sense of danger was derived from the government officials’ basic logic or 
assumptions on colonial governance, which were diametrically opposed to 
those of the lawyers. As I shall explain in the next section, the different logics 
of governance in India—which I call ‘the logic of emergency’ and ‘the logic 
of law’—were based on different conceptions of politics, society, and law in 
India, which made it difficult for both the government and the King’s Court to 
conciliate with each other. 
The Bombay crisis is important because it was one of the decisive 
moments for the emergence of British despotism in India. Malcolm’s sense of 
danger was shared by the supreme government in Calcutta and the home 
authorities in London (the Court of Directors and the Board of Control). When 
                                                 
1
 British Library, London [hereafter BL], India Office Records [hereafter 
IOR] L/PJ/3/918, Bombay Judicial Letter [hereafter BJL], Government 
[hereafter Gov.] to Court of Directors [hereafter CoD], 27 Sep. 1828 , John 
Malcolm, minute, 24 Aug. 1828. 
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the EIC’s charter was renewed in 1834, they subjugated the King’ Court to the 
Company by vesting the governor general in Calcutta an all -India legislative 
power as the head of a legislative council. This meant that the British 
parliament exempted the colonial government in India from the rule of law.  
This thesis tries to understand the context, process, and result of this 
crisis in Bombay in the 1820s to understand the factors which suppressed the 
rule of law and facilitated the rise of despotism in colonial India. Scholars 
have argued that British colonialism became more despotic in the early 
nineteenth century. David Washbrook succinctly summarises it as follows:  
 
Here, as in the colonial Empire more generally, the idea of a rule of law 
became fatally confused with that of a rule by law under which ‘civil 
society’, while perhaps directed by general legal principles, is denied 
any part itself in formulating those principles; while the state may make 
law for its subjects, it posits itself as above that law and as 
unaccountable to it. British-Indian law became less a tool of liberty than 




Historians have pointed out that this was the result of the crucial 
transformation of British colonialism in India in the early nineteenth century 
from hybrid, plural and networked colonial politics centred on maritime 
coastal cities to a sovereign, bureaucratic and militarist territorial domination 
based on ‘colonial knowledge’.3 Legal historians have given a fresh insight to 
                                                 
2
 D. A. Washbrook, ‘India 1818–1860: The two faces of colonialism’, in 
Andrew Porter (ed.), The Oxford history of the British empire volume III: The 
nineteenth century (Oxford, 1999), 407.
 
3
 C. A. Bayly, Imperial meridian: The British empire and the world 
1780–1830 (Harlow, 1989); Douglas M. Peers, Between Mars and Mammon: 
Colonial armies and the garrison state in India 1819–1835 (London, 1995); 
Radhika Singha, A despotism of law: Crime and justice in early colonial Ind ia 
(Oxford, 1998); Robert Travers, Ideology and empire in eighteenth-century 
India: The British in Bengal (Cambridge, 2007); Jon E. Wilson, The 
domination of strangers: Modern governance in eastern India 1780 –1835 
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this by pointing out a parallel change from hybrid and multi -centred legal 
pluralism to a more state-centred sovereign form of justice in the early 
nineteenth century.
4
 Recent histories of ideas also point out that an earlier 
attitude of enlightenment universalism was replaced by utilitarian liberal 
authoritarianism which justified the colonial state’s unconstitutional regime of 
violence.
5
 Understanding the nature of this transition has been one of the 
most important themes of British imperial history.  
Legal historians have made distinctive contributions to this 
problematique, not least because they point out that the key to understanding 
the emergence of colonial despotism is the dilemma of the ‘rule of la w’ and 
‘emergency’. Political theorists and postcolonial scholars have pointed out 
that there was no rule of law in the colonies—colonialism was a ‘state of 
exception’ where the colonised was debased to the disposable and 
                                                                                                                                          
(Basingstoke, 2008); Philip J. Stern, ‘Rethinking institutional transformations 
in the making of modern empire: The East India Company in Madras’, Journal 
of Colonialism and Colonial History  9, 2 (2008); James Lees, 
‘Administrative-scholars and the writing of history in early British India: A 
review’, Modern Asian Studies, 48, 3 (2014), 826–43. 
4
 Lauren Benton, Law and colonial cultures: Legal regimes in world history 
1400–1900 (Cambridge, 2002); Arthur Mitchell Fraas, ‘They have travailed 
into a wrong latitude’: The laws of England, Indian settlements and the British 
imperial constitution 1726–1773’ (Duke Univ. Ph.D thesis, 2011); Gagan D. S. 
Sood, ‘Sovereign justice in precolonial maritime Asia: The case of Mayor’s 
Court of Bombay 1726–1798’, Itinerario 37, 2 (2013), 46–72; Kristen 
McKenzie, ‘“The laws of his own country”: Defamation, banishment and the 
problem of legal pluralism in the 1820s Cape Colony’, JICH, 43, 5 (2015), 
787–806. See also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting empire: New York and 
the transformation of constitutionalism in the Atlantic World 1664–1830 
(Chapel Hill, 2005); Lisa Ford, Settler sovereignty: Jurisdiction and 
indigenous people in America and Australia 1788–1836 (Cambridge, Mass, 
2010); Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (eds.), Legal pluralism and empires 
1500–1850 (New York, 2013). 
5
 Eric Stokes, The English utilitarians and India  (Oxford, 1959); Uday Singh 
Mehta, Liberalism and empire: A study in nineteenth-century British liberal 
thought (Chicago, 1999); Jennifer Pitts, A turn to empire: The rise of imperial 
liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005); Karuna Mantena,  Alibis of 
empire: Henry Maine and the ends of liberal imperialism (Princeton, NJ, 
2010). 
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exterminable ‘bare life’.6 While some historians of law and empire refute this 
thesis and argue that the rule of law actually reduced the coerciveness of the 
British colonial rule,
7
 others defend it by emphasising the vast amount of 
evidence of everyday violence.
8
 A more persuasive line of argument is 
offered by Nasser Hussain, who examines the cases of martial law and 
suspension of habeas corpus in colonial India and argues that the state of 
emergency was not outside the rule of law but constitutive of it.
9
 Lauren 
Benton and Mark Condos elaborate this by arguing that the logic of war and 
emergency was incorporated into a new conception of the rule of law in 
nineteenth-century colonies; the state of exception in times of conquest was 
institutionalised in colonial regimes in times of peace.
10
 
These works are particularly important as they direct our attention to 
the relationship between the Indians’ use of law and the changes in the 
                                                 
6
 Johan Geertsema, ‘Exception, Bare Life and Colonialism’, in  Victor V. 
Ramraj (ed.), Emergencies and the limits of legality (Cambridge, 2008), 
337–59. 
7
 R. W. Kostal, Jurisprudence of power: Victorian empire and the rule of law  
(Oxford, 2005); Martin J. Wiener, An empire on trial: Race, murder and 
justice under British rule 1870–1935 (Cambridge, 2009). 
8
 Sylvia Vatuk, ‘Bharattee’s death: Domestic slave -women in 
nineteenth-century Madras’, in Indrani Chatterjee and Richard M. Eaton (eds.), 
Slavery and south Asian history  (Bloomington, 2006), 210–33; Steven Pierce 
and Anupama Rao (eds.), Discipline and the other body: Correction, 
corporeality, colonialism (Durham, NC, 2006); Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial 
justice in Britain: White violence and the rule of law  (Cambridge, 2010); 
Jonathan Saha, Law, disorder and the colonial state: Corruption in Burma 
c.1900 (Basingstoke, 2013); Deana Heath, ‘Bureaucracy, power and violence 
in colonial India’, in Peter Crooks and Tim Parsons, (eds.), Empires and 
bureaucracy from late antiquity to the modern world  (Cambridge, 2016 
forthcoming), 180–210. 
9
 Nasser Hussain, The Jurisprudence of emergency: Colonialism and the rule 
of law (Ann, Arbor 2003). 
10
 Lauren Benton, A search for sovereignty: Law and geography in European 
empires 1400–1900 (Cambridge, 2010); Mark Nicholas Condos, ‘British 
military ideology and practice in Punjab c.1849-1920’ (Cambridge Univ. Ph.D 
thesis, 2013). See also Samera Esmeir, ‘On the coloniality of modern law’, 
Critical Analysis of Law, 2, 1 (2015), 19–41. 
12 
colonial institutions. Recent studies of the social history of law attest its 
importance.
11
 Local people’s active appropriation of available legal forums 
and authorities was the common feature in Mughal India.
12
 It continued to be 
so under the British rule. The Indians actively used the court of law in 
business and demanded new legislations, which led to the remodellin g of 
social and economic institutions.
13
 The British court was popular as a means 
of dispute resolution because the British judges could not understand the 
details of the cases and the Indian litigants could easily manipulate the 
result.
14
 Thus, the social policy of the colonial government often involved 
complex and protracted negotiations with the Indian groups, particularly in 
the realms of family, property, charity and caste.
15
 The everyday legal 
practices of Indians shaped the political culture of particular legal institutions 
                                                 
11
 In addition to works cited below, see Mitra Sharafi’s masterful review of 
historiography. Mitra Sharafi, ‘South Asian legal history’, Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science, 11 (2015), 309–36. 
12
 Farhat Hasan, State and locality in Mughal India: Power relations in 
western India c. 1572–1730 (Cambridge, 2004), especially chapters 5–6. 
13
 Niles Brimnes, ‘Beyond colonial law: Indigenous litigation and the 
contestation of property in the Mayor’s Court in late eighteenth -century 
Madras’, Modern Asian Studies, 37, 3 (2003), 513–50; Tirthankar Roy, 
‘Indigo and law in colonial India’,  Economic History Review , 64, S1 (2011), 
60–75. 
14
 Pamela G. Price, ‘The “popularity” of the imperial courts of law: Three 
views of the Anglo-Indian legal encounter’, in W. J. Mommsen and J. A. De 
Moor (eds.), European expansion and law: The encounter of European and 




-century Africa and Asia (Oxford, 1992), 
179–200. 
15
 Ritu Birla, Stages of capital: Law, culture and market governance in late 
colonial India (Durham, 2009); Hiroyuki Kotani, Indo shakai bunkashi ron: 
Dento shakai kara shokuminchi teki kindai e [Social and cultural history of 
India: From ‘traditional’ society to colonial modernity] (Tokyo, 2010); Rachel 
L. Sturman, The government of social life in colonial India: Liberalism, 
religious law and women’s rights (Cambridge, 2012). Through these practices, 
the identity of the Indians was reshaped. Mattison Mines, ‘Courts of laws and 
styles of self in eighteenth-century Madras: From hybrid to colonial self’, 
Modern Asian Studies, 35, 1 (2001), 33–74; Chandra Mallampalli, Race, 
religion and law in colonial India: Trials of an interracial family  (Cambridge, 
2011); Mitra Sharafi, Law and identity in colonial south Asia: Parsi legal 
culture 1772–1947 (Cambridge, 2014). 
13 
such as the High Court or the panchayat (indigenous arbitration courts).
16
 
Attention to forms of agency has shifted the focus of historians from the 
traditional debate about whether the law was a tool of domination or 
resistance to the discussion of legal pluralism. Scholars have examined 
various modes of ‘jurisdictional jockeying’: to resort to another legal 
authority with overlapping jurisdiction to overturn previous legal decisions . 
The British officials often conceptualised these at tempts as legal ‘abuse’ or 
‘corruption’, but scholars have recognised that these acts were also based on 
indigenous people’s alternative visions of legal orders. 17 In summary, the 
social, economic and political life of Indians was deeply embedded in the 
colonial state’s legal framework, and the active participation of the Indians in 




The problem of this historiography is that the study of emergency and 
exception is not well connected to the study of the social history of law. The 
latter works pay detailed attention to the political nature of everyday legal 
practices in private spheres, but its relationship with state -level institutional 
changes is not always explored. As a result, the relationship between the rule 
of law and emergency has not been sufficiently contextualised, and the driving 
                                                 
16
 Abhinav Chandrachud, An independent, colonial judiciary: A history of the 
Bombay High Court during the British raj 1862–1947 (Oxford, 2015); James 
Jaffe, Ironies of colonial governance: Law, custom and justice in colonial 
India (Cambridge, 2015). 
17
 Taylor C. Sherman, State violence and punishment in India  (London, 
2010); Sandra den Otter, ‘Law, authority and colonial rule’, in Douglas M. 
Peers and Nandini Gooptu (eds.),  India and the British empire (Oxford, 2012); 
Saha, Law, disorder and the colonial state; Nandini Chatterjee and Lakshmi 
Subramanian, ‘Law and the spaces of empire: Introduction to the special 
issue’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History,  15, 1 (2014). 
18
 Zoë Laidlaw, ‘Breaking Britannia’s bounds? Law,  settlers, and space in 
Britain’s imperial historiography’, Historical Journal, 55, 3 (2012), 807–30, 
quotation at 822. 
14 
force of the transformation remains unclear. For example, it has been 
discussed that the colonial government had a desire to retain the power of 
discretionary intervention in an emergency, but this is often just assumed by 
referring to abstract theories of state and state -formation.
19
 Some works point 
out the exceptional difficulty in dealing with ‘criminal tribes’ in Punjab or the 
North Western Provinces as the context,
20
 and certainly, as I also argue in this 
thesis, the control of tribes was one of the most important kinds of 
emergencies. But the government’s antipathy to the law was not limited to 
these overtly exceptional situations but permeated with the everyday civil 
administration. Relatedly, while Foucauldian scholars have produced rich 
scholarship on colonial governmentality (internal exertion of power through 
knowledge), this should not divert our attention from the dimension  of 
sovereignty (external exertion of power through coercion) and officials’ 
anxiety about it.
21
 The British authority was unstable and fractured in this 
period, and the conflict within the British was as important as the conflict 




                                                 
19
 Hussain, Jurisprudence of emergency ; Mithi Mukherjee, India in the 
shadows of empire: A legend and political history 1774–1950 (Oxford, 2009). 
20
 Condos, ‘British military ideology’; Elizabeth Kolsky, ‘The colonial rule of 
law and the legal regime of exception: Frontier “fanaticism” and state 
violence in British India’, American Historical Review 120/4, 2015, 1218–46. 
21
 Deana Heath, ‘Bureaucracy, power and violence in colonial India’, in Peter 
Crooks and Tim Parsons (eds.), Empires and bureaucracy from late antiquity 
to the modern world (Cambridge, 2016 forthcoming), 180–210; Jon Wilson, 
‘The Temperament of empire: Law and conquest in late nineteenth century 
India’, in Gunnel Cederlof and Sanjukta Das Gupta (eds.),  Subject, citizens 
and law: Colonial and postcolonial India (London, 2016 forthcoming). 
22
 Wilson, Domination of strangers; Andrew Sartori, ‘The British empire and 
its liberal mission’, Journal of Modern History, 78, 3 (2006), 623–42; 
Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds.), Tensions of empire: Colonial 
cultures in a bourgeois world (Berkeley, CA, 1997); Laidlaw, Zoë, Colonial 
connections 1815–45: Patronage, the information revolution and colonial 
government (Manchester, 2005). 
15 
Particularly problematic is that few studies discuss the relationship 
between the indigenous participation in jurisdictional jockeying in ordinary 
society and the institutional changes of the rule of law and emergency. Lauren 
Benton, the most important scholar on this topic, has pointed out this new 
direction of study. But regional historians have failed to take up this point 
seriously and have not engaged in more localised projects of examining the 
chronological development of jurisdictional politics in particular colonies, 
which Benton inevitably had to abandon because of the global perspective of 
her study. As a consequence, the study on the relationship between law, 
agency, and emergency remains insufficient and the limits of Benton’s case 
studies—for example, she has not pinpointed the reason why the government 
officials desired to retain the power of discretion in mid-nineteenth-century 
western India, only suggesting that it was related to ‘representa tions of 
wilderness and disorder’ and ‘imagined legal primitiveness’ of the Indian 
states—remained unexplored.23 Following recent attempts to connect local 
practices with intellectual history,
24
 this thesis tries to fill this gap between 
the study of the change of legal structure and that of everyday legal practices.  
Early nineteenth century Bombay is an ideal example to study this 
theme, as its King’s Court was an institutional embodiment of legal pluralism. 
It allows us to examine colonial judicial politics from the perspective of 
interactions between agency and structural change. The K ing’s Court was 
                                                 
23
 Lauren Benton, ‘From international law to imperial constitutions: The 
problem of quasi-sovereignty 1870–1900’, Law and History Review, 26, 3 
(2008), 612; Benton, Search for Sovereingty, chapter 5. 
24
 Wilson, Domination of strangers; Andrew Sartori, Bengal in global 
concept history: Culturalism in the age of capital  (Chicago, 2008); C. A. 
Bayly, Recovering liberties: Indian thought in the age of liberalism and 
empire (Cambridge, 2012); Andrew Sartori, Liberalism in empire: An 
alternative history (Berkeley, 2014); Vikram Visana. ‘Vernacular liberalism, 
capitalism, and anti-imperialism in the political thought of Dadabhai Naoroji’, 
Historical Journal, FirstView article (Jan. 2016), 1–23. 
16 
independent of the East India Company. It had jurisdiction over Europeans 
and Indians in the presidency town of Bombay, while the rural districts 
(mofussil) were under the jurisdiction of the Company’s Court. But the King’s 
Court sometimes insisted on their extended jurisdiction in the mofussil and 
conflicted with the Company’s judicial authority. Indians actively used the 
King’s Court to challenge the government and, by doing so, buttressed the 
court’s legitimacy. The jurisdictional battle between the King’s Court and the 
local government was common in the early nineteenth century in the EIC’s 
presidencies of Calcutta, Madras and the Prince of Wales Island (Penang).
25
 
The conflict between the government of Warren Hastings and Elijah Impey’s 
Supreme Court in Calcutta in the 1770s was particularly notorious. But, even 
if the structure of conflict was already manifested in Calcutta in the eighteenth 
century, I suggest that the conflict in Bombay in the 1820s had the formative 
effect on the mode of government in India in the rest of the nineteenth century, 
as it directly stimulated the ministers as well as the Company’s directors in 
London to make a more despotic rule in India. 
The central argument of this thesis is that the Indian legal practices of 
appropriating the jurisdictional conflict led the government to construct a 
unitary and hierarchical judicial structure, in which the government retained 
the power of political intervention in judicial affairs in cases of emergency. 
The background was the political, economic, and social crisis in the mofussil 
in the 1820s. The main concern of the government in this period was the raid 
and rebellion of the ‘wild tribes’ in the  hills and their collaboration with the 
                                                 
25
 For Calcutta, see Travers, Ideology and empire, chapter 5; Mukherjee, 
India in the shadows of empire , chapters 1–2. For Madras, see Brimnes, 
‘Beyond colonial law’; Mines, ‘Courts of laws and styles of self’. For the 
Prince of Wales Island, see Nurfadzilah Yahaya, ‘Legal pluralism and the 
English East India Company in the Straits of Malacca during the early 
nineteenth century’, Law and History Review, 33, 4 (2015), 945–64. 
17 
Indian princes in the plains. The government tried to deal with it by a form of 
indirect rule relying on Indian chiefs and aristocrats in the mofussil. But the 
King’s Court obstructed this policy because their subjugat ion to the court’s 
warrants and writs weakened the authority of the chiefs in local society. 
Moreover, by overturning the decisions of the Company’s Court and trying 
and punishing governors and other Company officials, the King’s Court 
endangered the Company’s authority and sovereignty in the mofussil. The 
government believed that the King’s Court should be subordinated to the 
paramountcy of the government and the unitary judicial structure should be 
devised in India. This tension exploded in the habeas corpus case in 1828 and 
resulted in the official recognition of the Company’s despotism in the 1834 
charter renewal. 
In other words, I contend that the driving force of the transition from 
hybrid to government-centred colonialism in early nineteenth-century western 
India was Indian use of the King’s Court and the government’s anxiety of 
sovereignty in the aftermath of the conquest. I suggest that the Bombay case 
represented the pattern of judicial politics in nineteenth -century India, where 
the British government was involved in the incessant process of conquest, 
settlement, and strengthening of logic of emergency. The need to cope with 
the crises at the frontiers of empire put the colonial government under the 
constant pressure to be ready for emergency measures, which made the overall 
tenor of the British domination more despotic and emergency-oriented. 
The thesis makes the argument in seven chapters. The first two chapters 
deal with the conflict in Bombay city, and the rest of the chapters examine that 
in the mofussil, or the provinces of the Deccan, Konkan, and Gujarat. Chapter 
1, 4, 5 and 6 relate to criminal justice and police, and Chapter 2 and 3 to civil 
judicature. By looking at both the presidency towns and the mofussil, and the 
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civil and the criminal justice, I deal with the problem of the King’s Court as 
broadly as possible. 
Chapter 1 examines the emerging structure of conflict between the 
government and the King’s Court by discussing Bombay city’s municipal 
governance, particularly the police. The King’s Court exhibited its critical 
attitude towards the government’s arbitrary management of the police. The 
judges condemned the illegal conviction and punishment by the government’s 
police officers. The government, on the other hand, vindicated the harsh 
measures by deploying the logic of expediency. It also looks at a similar 
conflict over the freedom of the press, in which the government’s militarist 
logic of necessity was refuted by the King’s Court’s civilian perspective of 
law and society. 
Chapter 2 analyses two legal cases in the King’s Court in which the 
government was sued by Indian merchants in Bombay city. The King’s Court 
provided the arena for the Indians to demand the protection of property rights 
from the government’s expropriation. In these two cases, the King’s Court 
judged in favour of the Indian merchants. The government appealed to the 
Privy Council. The merchants were vehemently defended by radicals in 
London. But the decisions were reversed. In these cases, the King’s Court 
exhibited a civilian view of Indian society, in which the law and the court held 
a paramount power, and rebutted the government’s militarist perspective of 
state necessity in times of emergency.  
Chapter 3 examines the King’s Court’s problems in the mofussil. 
Although its jurisdiction was limited to the presidency town, the King’s Court 
caused various problems in the mofussil. The summons of the Company’s 
district officials hindered their ordinary business. The sheriff’s execution of 
the writs caused disturbances in the mofussil. The most problematic was the 
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King’s Court’s interference in the Company’s revenue administration. The 
revenue defaulters used the King’s Court to overturn the decree of the 
Company’s Court. The government officials strongly censured the King’s 
Court not only because it disrupted their revenue collection, but also because 
it meant the denial of the Company’s sovereignty embodied in its revenue 
administration. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the Bombay government’s security concerns 
in the mofussil caused by the jurisdictional expansion of the King’s Court. 
Chapter 4 discusses the government’s policy towards the Indian armed gentry 
(called the sardars), particularly focusing on the issues of policing in the 
mofussil. The 1820s was the period of raids and rebellions. Even a British 
collector was killed in a rebellion in the Deccan in 1824. These insurrections 
indicated that the troubles were caused by the alliance of ‘wild tribes’ in the 
hills with the sardars in the plains. In order to deal with it, the government 
vested the sardars with police authority to deal with the raiders. In order to 
uphold the sardars’ social influence, the government also exempted them from 
the Company’s Court. By these measures, the government constructed a 
system of indirect rule in which the affairs of the sardars were excluded from 
the realm of law and put under the government’s exclusive control.  
Chapter 5 discusses the way in which the government’s policy towards 
the sardars was obstructed by the King’s Court. First, I analyse the cases in 
which the sardars were subjected to the process of the King’s Court by means 
of summonses and attachments of persons and properties including alienated 
lands. The sardars complained that they were injurious to their respectability. 
The government was concerned about the destabilisation of the provinces in 
which the sardars had curtailed the threat of tribal raids. Second, to make 
matters worse, the independent princes of Kolhapur, Satara and Baroda started 
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to rely on the authority of the King’s Court to extract political concessions 
from the government, which meant that the government’s paramountcy over 
these internal and external allies was jeopardised by the King’s Court.  
Chapter 6 examines the cases of habeas corpus in 1828, which were the 
culmination of the developments discussed in previous chapters. These cases 
developed into an open conflict between the two authorities, and the 
jurisdictional problem was disputed in Bombay, Calcutta , and London. In one 
case, the writ of habeas corpus was issued to an influential sardar in Poona. In 
the other case, a revenue defaulter was released from the gaol by the habeas 
corpus. The government sent a letter to the King’s Court to stop the 
proceedings, while the judges petitioned the Privy Council in Brita in to 
complain about the government’s political interference. This event 
strengthened the government’s sense of danger about the King’s Court’s 
encroachment on sovereignty in the mofussil. The Bombay government urged 
the supreme government in Calcutta and the home authorities in London to 
make a new, unified judicial order in which the judiciary was subjugated to 
the executive. 
Chapter 7 discusses the wider impact of the Bombay cases on the future 
shape of the Indian governance. The Bombay government’s sense of danger 
was shared by the Company’s officials in Calcutta, who had experienced 
similar conflicts with the King’s Court and even with the Company’s Court in 
the 1820s. As the solution, they proposed the establishment of the legislative 
council in the East India Company’s new charter in 1834. The Calcutta judges 
of the King’s Court resisted the diminution of their power, but the home 
authorities sanctioned it in the debate in London. This was an important 
moment. The King’s Court’s power of judicial check  was officially curtailed, 
and the EIC’s government was vested with an exclusive and supreme authority 
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in determining the political affairs in times of emergency.  
In the concluding chapter, I consider wider implications of the 
jurisdictional conflict in India in later years of the nineteenth century. My 
contention is that the pattern set by the Bombay cases recurred in the later 
years. The government’s sense of danger was always high about the political 
interference by the judiciary and the Indians’ appropr iation of it against the 
backdrop of the repeated process of conquest and post -war settlement in the 
frontiers. Based on the logic of emergency, the government justified the 
supremacy of the executive and the subjugation of the judiciary. Furthermore, 
in order to accommodate the constant state necessities in the frontiers, the 
government’s legal authorities redefined the rule of law itself to be conducive 
to the state necessity. This further consolidated the subjugation of the realm of 
law to the realm of politics. At the same time, though, the conflict between the 
executive and the judiciary never disappeared because they were rooted in the 
Indians’ legal practices.  
The main primary sources of this study are the government records 
(judicial, general/public, revenue, political, and military departments) in the 
India Office Records, the British Library. They are supplemented by the 
department files in the Maharashtra State Archives. These records are used to 
reconstruct the political process in Bombay and to analyse the government’s 
discourse. I also use periodicals and newspapers such as the Bombay Gazette, 
Bombay Courier, Oriental Herald and Asiatic Journal, and other printed 
sources such as the Privy Council Printed Papers (the British Library), the 
Selections of the Records of the Bombay Government , British Parliamentary 
Papers and Parliamentary Debates. The High Court Records in the 
Maharashtra State Archives (the Recorder’s Court Diary and Supreme Court 
Diary), which contain the proceedings of everyday business in the courts, 
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could not be consulted. They are not catalogued and currently not accessible 
to the researchers. Because of this, even such basic information as the number 
of cases filed in the court is only partially known from some indirect evidence 
in the government records.
26
 On the other hand, the information on the more 
narrowly ‘political’ problems involving the King’s Court exists in the 
government records and is fully used in this study.  
 
II. The logic of law and the logic of emergency 
 
The Bombay controversy highlighted the conflict between the King’s Court’s 
logic of law and the government’s logic of emergency. I pay a special 
attention to this conflict in this thesis. Many scholars have applied their 
definitions of the rule of law and emergency to British India.
27
 Mithi 
Mukherjee analyses similar contrasting views between what she calls ‘the 
imperial’ and ‘the colonial’.28 My contention is that these legal concepts 
should be put in historical contexts and considered with reference to 
contemporary usages. The following is a summary of the conflicting logics of 
the government and the King’s Court in Bombay in the 1820s.  
The logic of law was the judges’ discourse of legality based on which 
they claimed the power to check the government’s conduct. It  required the 
government to be ‘lawful’, ‘regular’, and ‘constitutional’. It was based on the 
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court’s exercise of ordinary jurisdiction, and the logic of constitutional check 
and balance derived from the British idea of mixed constitution. First, the 
King’s Court assumed the power of trying the Company and its officers as the 
defendant in an ordinary civil case. Its fundamental assumption was that 
Indian society was in a civilian, not military, state, one in which the municipal 
court could exercise its jurisdiction. The judges did not deny the existence of 
state necessity and emergency in which they did not have jurisdiction, but 
they assumed that such a situation was extremely rare and insisted that it was 
not the government but the court that could decide whether a situation was an 
emergency or not. As a corollary, though they admitted that there might be 
limitations of political liberty of the Indians, their personal liberty should 
always be protected by the regular court. The government’s liability was 
claimed by relying on such precedents as Mansfield’s judgment in Mostyn v. 
Fabrigas (1775). 
This rigid dichotomy between the civil and the military state of society 
was based on the judges’ clear distinction between pre -conquest Indian India 
and post-conquest British India. They interpreted that once territories were 
conquered, the state of war ended and the juridical sovereignty of the courts of 
law was established. Their notion of the law did not allow the in -between state 
of society between war and peace. By assuming this abrupt transformation 
from war to peace or from Indian to British society, the judges could argue 
that the laws of England, alongside with the customs and usages, were 
immediately applicable to the newly conquered territories. They asserte d that 
Indian society in conquered provinces was an orderly society in which the 
regular courts of law should dominate, as opposed to the government officials’ 
view of frontiers in which the government should always retain the power of 
emergency intervention outside the judicial processes.  
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In addition to the ‘ordinary’ jurisdiction, the King’s Court also claimed 
its ‘extraordinary’ power to check the government. It was called the ‘potestas 
imperii’, or a ministerial or mandatorial power of the sovereign to rectify 
judicial errors and misdemeanours. Its foundation was the assumption that the 
royal charter conferred the judges with the power and authority of the Court of 
the King’s Bench in Britain. It was exercised by issuing the king’s prerogative 
writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, or procedendo. By 
this means, the King’s Court reviewed and overturned the government and the 
Company’s Court’s decisions. The prerogative powers of the King’s Court 
were vindicated by referring to precedents and legal authorities in the English 
common law tradition. It included the opinion of Edward Coke in Calvin’s 
Case (1608) and his Institutes of the Lawes of England (1628–44). This was 
supplemented by later authorities such as Mansfield in  R. v. Cowle (1759) or 
Eldon in Crowley’s Case (1818), together with the Indian judgements such as 
R. v. Monisse (1810). 
The judges’ chief weapon against the government was their ‘judicial 
discretion’ in controlling the procedures in the court. As Michael Lobban 
shows, the lawyers in the eighteenth century conceived the common law 
primarily as a system of remedies based on reasoning rather than a set of rules 
based on theory. They asserted the central importance of the legal procedures, 
based on which they could deny the validity of plea or reject evidence. 
Besides, the judges could resort to the reasoning from inside (the most 
important of which was the precedent) and outside the law (such as public 
convenience or policy) based on their decision in each case. Their contro l of 
the case was strengthened by the fact that the doctrine of stare decisis or the 





The government employed the logic of ‘state necessity’, ‘emergency’, 
or ‘reason of state’ in its contest with the King’s Court. It was a logic of 
‘danger’ and ‘self-preservation’, which enabled the government to act freely 
in times of emergency without constraints by the judiciary. In this sense, it 
was firmly embedded in a Western tradition of the idea of reason of state.
30
 
But the officials’ concern was derived from the crises on the spot.  Its 
backdrop was their belief in the weakness rather than the strength of the 
British rule in India. They felt the danger in a very tangible way. They thought 
that they were always jeopardised by not only the Indian rebels but also its 
sepoys, disobedient native servants, revenue defaulters or even by European 
settlers and lawyers. For the officials, India was always in a state of crisis.  
The officials’ anxiety reflected their assumption that boundaries meant 
little in India. There were no clear boundaries between war, rebellion , and raid, 
for, as we shall see in Chapter 4, the gathering of the raiders was often the 
first step for larger rebellions, which invited the intervention of the foreign 
princes. The boundary between Indian India and British India was also thin. 
The British territories were permeated with the internal frontiers, in which the 
armed rural bosses, in the same way as the foreign rajas, could exert their 
social control in defiance of the control of the Company’s revenue officers. 31 
The boundary between rural areas (mofussil) and cities, even the presidency 
towns, was also not so clear, because the latter were also always threated by 
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the possibility of riots and robberies.
32
 In consequence, there was no 
boundary between war and peace, or that between military and civil societies.  
In such a situation, the government officials were concerned about its 
sovereignty in Karl Schmitt’s sense: sovereignty ‘not as the monopoly to 
coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide’. 33 They assumed that the 
boundaries in society must be determined only by the government. The 
political matters such as concluding treaties with Indian princes or intro ducing 
a separate judiciary in the post-war settlement should be solely decided by the 
government in reference to ‘state policy’. The courts of law should not have 
any say about them. The government did not deny the role of law 
altogether—the separate judiciary was necessary to absolve collectors from 
judicial businesses and to ensure efficient revenue collection. The political 
liberty of the Indians might be utterly denied, but their personal liberty might 
or might not be limited by the government in reference to necessities. What 
was problematic was that the government’s political decisions were hindered 
by the judges’ power to try and decide politically important cases in the court.  
Because of this, the government officials disliked the common law’s 
technicalities of procedures and precedents, which were the source of the 
judges’ power to control the court. So, it was natural for them to resort to the  
other major source of law: legislation.
34
 Mountstuart Elphinstone, the 
governor of Bombay, was clearly a Benthamite in this sense.
35
 He compiled a 
comprehensive set of regulations, commonly called the Elphinstone code, 
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comprising constitutional, civil, criminal, revenue and military 
branches—Bombay’s pannomion. It contained stipulations clearly referring to 
the ‘reasons of state’. The next governor John Malcolm also advocated this 
code. By this means, the government tried to limit the role of the judges to the 
simple application of the code and to assert its superiority to the King’s Court 
without overtly denying the importance of the law in colonial governance. 
From this perspective, the government’s deployment of the logic of state 
necessity was a Hobbesian moment in Indian history because, as opposed to 
Coke’s and the King’s Court’s view of law as reason and remedy, the 
government’s view of law was similar to that of Hobbes: the law as the 
command of the sovereign.
36
 At the same time, though, it should be 
emphasised that the government officials’ sense of crisis and their solutions 
were more influenced by the local conditions of Indian society and their 
experience of governing them than by their understanding of Coke, Hobbes, or 
Bentham. 
Because of this deep divide between the two logics, the conflict 
between the King’s Court and the government transcended the boundary of 
Bombay and provoked an imperial dispute on the law and politics in the 
British colonial governance. 
 
III. The structure of the King’s Court and the conflicts in the eighteenth 
century 
 
The rest of this Introduction describes the basic structure and actors of the 
King’s Court and the Company’s Court, and the prehistory of the judicial 
politics in Bombay in the early nineteenth century.  
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The jurisdictions of the King’s Court and the Company’s Court were 
demarcated geographically and personally. The King’s Court, situated in the 
present-day Hornby House, Apollo Street, had jurisdiction over the British 
subjects in Bombay city and in the mofussil and Indians in Bombay city. The 
Indians employed by the Europeans or by the Company were also amenable to 
the King’s Court. The Indians in the mofussil were under the jurisdiction of 
the Company’s Court. The King’s Court applied English common and statute 
laws. It also applied Hindu or Muslim private laws when the defendant of civil 
actions was a Hindu or a Muslim inhabitant. The Company’s Court applied 
‘regulations’ legislated by the governor in council, Hindu and Muslim civil 
laws in cases between Hindu or Muslim parties, and other laws of customs in 
cases of other Indian subjects.
37
 A case could be appealed to the Privy 
Council in Britain from both of the courts.  
     The King’s Court was characterised by its multiplicity of jurisdictions. 
The court functioned as the common law court, the equity court, the 
ecclesiastical court, and the admiralty court. It also constituted the small 
cause court and the court of enquiry. A chief justice and two puisne judges 
were appointed by the royal charter. They were entitled to a pension in Britain 
after five, seven or ten years’ service, though they usually died too quickly to  
receive it.
38
 The salary of the chief justice and puisne judge were Rs 60,000 
and 50,000 per annum in 1827, which was higher than any of the civil officers 
in the presidency other than the governor and the members of the council.
39
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 The governor was paid Rs 1,43,500 per annum, the commander in chief Rs 
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They were sometimes accompanied by their relatives and exchanged personal 
correspondence with judges in other presidencies.
40
 
The court was given civil, criminal and ecclesiastical jurisdictions in 
Bombay city. A legal year comprised 4 terms (5–26 February, 1–21 April, 20 
June–11 July and 10 September–1 October) of 19 days each, excluding 
Sundays, Thursdays, alternate Mondays and Hindu holidays. The court had 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases of Company’s servants and all other British 
subjects as a court of oyer and terminer (i.e. vested with the power to try 
treason and felony), and gaol delivery (empowered to try every prisoner in 
gaol). The criminal sessions were also held four times a year (26 January, 25 
April, 24 July and 14 October), for about 8 days each.
41
 The charter provided 
that a ‘convenient number’ of jurors sat at the sessions of oyer and terminer 
and gaol delivery as the grand jury, which investigated the evidence and 
decided whether accused was to be indicted or not. It was summoned by the 
sheriff from the British inhabitants of Bombay city. In 1828, for example, it 
was composed of 22 or 23 jurors, of which 10–14 were private merchants, 4–8 
were EIC’s civil servants, and 2–6 were from the military (all from the 
Bombay Marine).
42
 Each session tried about 7–14 cases of indictment.43 The 
sheriff also summoned the petit jury, which heard the evidence and gave 
verdict that the accused was guilty or not guilty. The governor, members of 
the council and other government officers were exempted from summonses 
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when the jury trial in civil cases was introduced by the Juries in India Act of 
1828.
44
 As we saw in Chapter 3, this government officers’ summons to the 
juries became a major point of conflict between the government and the court 
in the 1820s. 
The writ of the court was executed by the sheriff and his officers in the 
same way as in Britain. The sheriff was appointed yearly by the governor and 
council.
45
 Sheriff’s gaol or criminal department was composed of a deputy 
sheriff, a gaoler, a deputy gaoler, and peons and other native o fficers, and his 
civil department was of a bailiff and peons and other native officers.
46
 In the 
following chapter’s cases, his officers’ activities in the mofussil were the 
focus of officials’ resentment. On a complaint of anyone against a person in 
the court’s jurisdiction, the court issued a summons to appear at a given time 
and place. In default of appearance, the court issued a warrant to the sheriff to 
bring the defendant before the court. The defendant was to be detained in 
custody, unless bail might be allowed. Then, after the judgement was given, 
the defendant was imprisoned until the judgement was fulfilled.
47
 Apart from 
ordinary writ processes in civil and criminal judicature, as already pointed out, 




     The number of cases tried in the Supreme Court seems to have been 
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 The yearly average number of cases filed in the plea side 
of the court in the 1830s was 24.4.
50
 The number of defended and undefended 
cases (ex-parte and cognovits) tried on the plea side and in the small cause 




Plea side   1840 1841 1842 
 Defended cases
52
  27 23 42 
 Undefended cases 7 9 13 
  Total  34 32 55 
 
Small cause court 1840 1841 1842 
 Defended cases  116 98 87 
 Undefended cases 527 555 560 
  Total  643 653 647 
 
The small cause court was used more frequently in the 1820s. In the four years 
between 1824 and 1827 the court took total 5,465 cases, the annual average of 
which (1,366) was twice higher than the above.
53
 The number of decrees 




Equity side  1840 1841 1842 
 Decree on agreement 7 18 15 
 Decree by consent 6 - 3 
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  Total  13 18 18 
 
The cost of making suits in the court could be expensive. It was often pointed 
out by contemporaries that the fees were high, especially in cases of equity 
where large sums of money were involved.
55
 Fees were noticed in periodicals 
such as the Bombay Calendar and Almanac. Between 1840 and 1842, the 
average costs of suing on the plea side were about Rs 1,200 for defended cases 
and 450 and 189 for ex-parte and cognovits causes.
56
 The cases in the small 
cause court cost average Rs 37 for plaintiff and Rs 13 for defendant in 
defended cases and Rs 41 and 12 in undefended cases.
57
 
The court was run by 20–30 European officers.58 They were highly paid, 
as they could expect a large amount of fees and charges in addition to 
salaries.
59
 For example, Barrister William Fenwick could earn fees average 
Rs 30,000 per annum in the late 1820s as the master of inquiry and the clerk 
of the small cause court in addition to the salaries of Rs 6,300 and 1,200 
respectively. Martin West earned fees and emoluments Rs 27,500 per annum 
as the registrar of the ecclesiastical side and Rs 6,100 as the sealer in addition 
to the salary Rs 4,000 as the examiner on the equity side and as the deputy 
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clerk of the court.
60
 So the court officials were among the most affluent 
Europeans in the presidency town. Besides these highly paid European 
officials, the court also employed a large number of Indian officials. The 
number of Indian clerks, writers and servants counted 630 in 1827.
61
 Some of 
them were well paid. For example, the native assistant translator in Gujarati, 
Marathi and Marwari was paid Rs 4,080 per annum, the assistant translator in 
Arabic and Persian Rs. 1,200/a, the native transcriber Rs 360/a. Peons were 
paid Rs 7/m or 84/a.
62
 
The judges were somewhat isolated figures in the presidency town. This 
was especially so in the Recorder’s Court, in which the single judge could not 
expect support from his fellow judges as in Calcutta.
63
 The experience of the 
recorder James Mackintosh attests this. He arrived at Bombay in 1804. He was 
eager for reforms of police, penal law and prison in Bombay a s well as in 
Britain. But this reformist outlook, particularly his opposition to death penalty, 
offended the British residents.
64
 The trial of Robert Henshaw in 1805 had 
widened the gap between him and the locals.
65
 Robert Henshaw, the custom 
master of the Bombay government, was responsible for controlling the 
embargo of grain during the famine of 1802–4 as a member of the 
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government’s Grain Committee. But he was accused of granting illegal 
permits to import greater amounts of grains and to export from the Company’s 
stock, and of having received Rs 4,000 as a present. Mackintosh judged him 
guilty, but the decision was widely resented by the British public of Bombay 
city.
66
 He loathed the factious nature of the small society, and felt that the 
distance between ‘the sentiments of the people here and mine are so great that 
I see no means of doing good. I came with an enthusiastic hope of doing 
something beneficial. But I am thwarted in everything and I must content 
myself with the bare performance of my duty’. 67 He recollected that he was 
treated ‘in the grossest manner. There was no liberal public opinion to support 
me, and no firm government to frown down indecent reflections on the 
administration of justice. All this … disgusted and almost silenced me for a 
time…’.68 
All barristers and solicitors in Bombay city in this period were 
Europeans. Before 1834, they needed to acquire a licence from  the Court of 
Directors to enter and practice as a lawyer in India. The barristers came from 
Inns of Court in London, while there was no qualification for solicitors. Their 
number was small, though the late 1820s were marked by the increase of the 
number of attorneys, probably the reflection of the expanding prospect of 
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1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 
Barrister 3 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 
Attorney 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 
 
1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 
Barrister 7 7 8 8 9 9 8 8 
Attorney 10 14 16 15 14 15 11 11 
 
Part of the government’s legal business was conducted by the lawyers 
employed among these private lawyers. The Bombay government employed 
two legal officers as its legal agent in the court as well as for their legal 
knowledge. One was the Advocate General (called the Company’s Standing 
Counsel till 1806) employed from the barristers in the presidency. He 
represented the Company when it was civilly sued in the King’s Court. He 
also filed criminal information to prosecute the suspects in the King’s Court. 
The first Advocate General was Stuart Moncrieff Threipland appointed in 
1807.
70
 The other was the Company’s Solicitor. In addition to duties as a 
solicitor to the Company as a party in a suit, he mediated communication 
between the Company and the Advocate General at an early stage. Their 
salaries were Rs 19,200 and 14,400 respectively in 1830.
71
 It was not 
self-evident that they were all pro-government. For example, such Advocates 
General as Ollyet Woodhouse or George Macklin were sometimes critical of 
the government’s judicial policy. More generally, it is  often difficult to 
assume that a particular opinion expressed in the court reflected the political 
beliefs of the lawyer.
72
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Nonetheless, a cleavage appeared between the barristers and the 
attorneys in the 1820s. The majority of the barristers led by Advoca te 
Generals George Norton and G. C. Irwin were firmly in support of the 
government. Barrister James Morley was the important exception, who 
constantly annoyed the government. He was the only barrister who had not 
been called to an inn of court. On the other hand, the attorneys of the court 
were often in support of the recorder/chief justice. Most conspicuous among 
them were Frederick Ayrton, Thomas W. Browne and William Fenwick.  
The conflict became manifest when the barristers submitted a memorial 
criticising the recorder in 1823, and the recorder suspended the barristers from 
appearing in the court. The barristers criticised the recorder’s management of 
the small cause court, in which the attorneys were allowed to act as barristers 
and the parties could plead their cause by themselves to reduce the litigants’ 
cost. The barristers criticised that this was the infringement of their right and 
doubted the legality of the court itself. They submitted a memorial to the court 
containing some insinuation on the ‘most unworthy motives’ of the recorder 
not to abolish the court. The court unanimously suspended the five barristers 
(i.e. all the barristers in Bombay except James Morley) who signed the 
memorial for six months.
73
 This conflict between the government and 
barristers, on the one hand, and the King’s Court and its attorneys, on the 




It is convenient here to pay attention to the structure of the Company’s Court. 
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In the 1820s, there were broadly two types of Company’s legal system. I first 
explain the system in the Old Provinces of Gujarat and the Konkan and then 
the Deccan system. In the Old Provinces, the Company’s Court had 
jurisdiction in the mofussil, or the provinces outside Bombay ci ty. Its 
European judges were the Company’s civil servants. The structure of the  
Company’s Court was three-tiered. The panchayat was at the bottom of the 
mofussil justice. The second tier was the zilla court presided by the European 
judicial officers of the Company. The final courts of justice in Bombay were 
the sadr diwani adalat (civil) and the sadr foujdari adalat (criminal). An appeal 
was allowed from there to the Privy Council.  
The sadr adalat was run by three or more judges, a register, assistant 
registers, and Hindu and Muslim law officers. Until 1821, the governor and 
the member of the council had been the final tribunal of the civil and criminal 
appeal cases. The separation of the executive and the judiciary occurred in 
that year when Elphinstone recommended the split in order to relieve the 
judicial burden on the executive.
75
 At that time, the location of the sadr adalat 
was moved from Bombay to Surat in 1821, but it was returned from Surat to 
Bombay in 1828. The zilla court of civil, criminal and pol ice jurisdictions was 
filled with Company officials appointed as a judge (denominated as a criminal 
judge in the criminal court), a senior assistant judge, a junior assistant judge, a 
register, an assistant register, sadr ameens and native commissioners. Each 
establishment held 500–2,500 Indian servants, which was generally larger 
than that of the collectors’ .76 
There were 6 districts or zillas in the presidency which were 
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incorporated in the jurisdiction of the Company’s Court between 1818 and 
1826: Surat, Broach (incorporated in Surat and Kaira in 1827), Kaira (Eastern 
Zilla North of the Myhee), Ahmedabad (Western Zilla North of the Myhee), 
Northern Konkan, and Southern Konkan. The court of circuit was held at each 
sadr stations by one of sadr judges in rotation to try serious crimes. It was 
held quarterly in Surat and half-yearly in other zillas.
77
 The court was kept 
open on all days except on Sundays and Christian, Hindu, and Muslim 
holidays. In the presidency town of Bombay, the Company’s senior magistrate  
of police also exercised revenue jurisdiction.
78
 The arbitration panchayat 
could be presided over by anyone, but the head of village, Indian revenue 
officers and the native commissioners of the zilla courts could not decline it. 
The collector was vested with jurisdiction over the revenue matters, which 
was appealable to the zilla judges. This system was introduced in the Konkan 
and Gujarat immediately after the conquest of these territories.  
The Deccan had a different system. First, the Bombay government tr ied 
to retain the Maratha system of justice intact as far as possible. The focus of 
this effort was the traditional village arbitration court called panchayat. 
Elphinstone ordered that all civil cases were to be referred to the panchayat, 
whose decision was final unless there was gross error or corruption. But, as 
James Jaffe shows, its inefficiency soon became clear. It procedures were 
dilatory, its members were difficult to find, and it was plagued by bribery and 
corruption. As a result, the cases decided in the panchayat comprised less than 
5 percent of the total cases in 1819–27, and its status was eventually 
downgraded to an investigatory body assisting the judges.
79
 The role of the 
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panchayat was being replaced by more regular works of Indian subordinate  
judges and magistrates. 
Second, the commissioner, collectors and their subordinate Indian 
officers all combined the executive, judicial and magisterial duties in the 
Deccan. In other words, the rule of law in terms of the separation of the 
judiciary from the executive was not introduced in the Deccan after the 
conquest in 1818. In the rural areas, the mamlatdars (Indian revenue officers) 
were in charge of minor civil and criminal cases. In urban areas, civil 
magistrates called amins and munsifs tried similar small cases. The collectors 
tried serious crimes aided by Hindu law officers (shastris) and appeal cases 
from Indian subordinate judges. The Deccan Commissioner supervised all of 
this judicial apparatus in the Deccan. He received appeals from the collectors’ 
courts and solely in charge of the claims against the sardars.
80
 But the judicial 
business put pressure on the officers’ revenue collection, and the government 
needed to think about introducing a separate judiciary. Eventually, judges 
were introduced and Zillas of Ahmednagar (including Khandesh) and Poona 
(including Sholapur) were established in 1825 and the Commissioner was 
abolished in 1826.
81
 The debate on the transfer to the civil government was, 
as we shall see in Chapter 4, much influenced by the social and political crises 
of the mid-1820s. 
 
The King’s Court emerged out of the necessity of commerce at the presidency 
towns. The Company needed a court in which the Company could sue and be 
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sued for its commercial transactions.
82
 Moreover, the servants of the EIC 
could derive benefit from such a court of law in their commercial transactions 
as private ‘country’ traders.83 The Royal Charter of 1726 empowered the 
Company to establish new courts of law with civil jurisdiction in Calcutta, 
Madras and Bombay, and accordingly the Company established the Mayor’s 
Courts in the presidency towns.
84
 It was a court of record, composed of a 
mayor and nine aldermen.
85
 It had civil jurisdiction of all cases in Bombay 
city, including the cases between Indians. The court wa s used by both 
European and Indian merchants in their business transactions. Indian business 
of community of all descriptions—Hindus, Muslims, and especially the 
Parsis—proved very adept at using the court in their business of 
money-lending or long-distant trade with Bengal or China. They used the 
court to recover debts, to retain their assets, to restore reputation and to 
prevent division of business property, as well as simply to harass their rivals, 
despite the fact that the court’s orders such as to produce account books or to 
deposit a large amount of bail were potentially harmful to their 
creditworthiness.
86
 A significant context was the insecurity of coastal trade 
due to piratical raids by northern and southern coastal chieftains, which 
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increased cases of insurance and ‘respondentia’ (loan upon cargoes to be paid 
only when the goods arrived safely).
87
 
The King’s Court caused frictions in Bombay in the eighteenth century, 
reflecting the Company’s unstable relationship with the private merchants. In 
the eighteenth century, the government could not monopol ise the political 
authority in the face of the powerful British private merchants in the port 
city.
88
 In the Mayor’s Court, the amateur ‘merchant -judges’ represented the 
commercial interests and asserted their independence from the government, 
and a series of conflicts ensued.
89
 Even in the early nineteenth century, 
though no more ‘a puppet in the hands of the great “country” traders’, 90 the 
governorship of Jonathan Duncan (1795–1811) was still characterised by its 
weakness and concession to the private merchants.
91
 The King’s Court 
represented the voices of merchants who asserted their autonomy from the 
government.
92
 Besides, the King’s Court jeopardised the Company’s rule by 
enforcing English court procedures in defiance of Indian religions and 
customs and provoking resentment among the Indian population. For example, 
in 1730, a Hindu woman, who converted to Christianity and whose son fled to 
a relative, sued the relative in the court. The relative complained to the 
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governor. The governor warned the court that it could not take cognizance of 
affairs of religion and caste, but the court strongly protested that it could.
93
 
The Hindu sensitivity was also injured by the so-called ‘cow-oath’, by which 
all Hindu witnesses were made to take hold of a cow’s tail and swear to tell 
the truth in the court.
94
 The conflict ensued, and eventually, the Charter of 
1756 weakened the Mayor’s Court by giving the governor and council the 
power to nominate the mayor and aldermen and depriving it of its jurisdiction 
over the cases between the Indians.
95
 
The conflict between the court and the government was exacerbated in 
the late eighteenth century. The amateur merchant -judges of the Mayor’s 
Court could not deal with legally intricate issues which were increased by the 
growth of population and trade of the presidency towns of Bombay and 
Madras. The need of professional judges was petitioned by the Madras 
government to the Court of Directors in 1791, and the British parliament 
enacted an Act (37 Geo. 3, c.142) enabling the Crown to establish a new court 
of law in the presidency towns. Accordingly, the Recorder’s Courts at Bombay 
and Madras were established in 1798 by a royal charter. It was also composed 
of a mayor and three aldermen, but presided over by a Recorder, a 
professional barrister of five or more years’ experience. The court was vested 
with civil, criminal, ecclesiastical and admiralty (but not revenue) 
jurisdictions over all the inhabitants in the presidency towns and over the 
Europeans in the mofussil, except the governor and the council.
96
 The court 
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soon started insisting on its role as a constitutional check against the East 
India Company. 
The battle between the government and the Recorder’s Court was part 
of a wider conflict between the executive and the judiciary over the King’s 
Court’s jurisdiction in the mofussil, in which the ideas of the rule of law and 
emergency became conspicuously conflicted with each other. As Stern argues, 
the Company had developed an idea that oriental despotism rather than the 
British rule of law was a fit mode of justice in India even in the seventeenth 
and early-eighteenth centuries, chiefly in its battle with maritime 
interlopers.
97
 But the territorial acquisition of the Company after the grant of 
diwani in Bengal in 1765 significantly strengthened this tendency. Naturally, 
the problem became manifested first in Bengal, which is examined in detail by 
such scholars as Robert Travers and M. P. Jain. The Supreme Court of 
Calcutta was established in 1774, and it immediately started to interfere in the 
Company’s governance in the mofussil. The Supreme Court took cognizance 
of Indians’ complaints against the servants of Nawab Nizam and the Nawab 
himself; it also took cognizance of complaints against the Compan y’s revenue 
officers and issued writs of habeas corpus to liberate those who were confined 
for non-payment of revenue. The conflict in Calcutta exploded in the so -called 
Patna case of 1779, in which the Supreme Court overturned the decree of the 
Company’s Court and ruled in favour of a widow of a zamindar who filed a 
suit against the Company’s Muslim law officers. The Patna case was followed 
by a more open conflict in a banker’s case against the zamindar of Cossijurah, 
in which the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the banker, issued writs of 
                                                                                                                                          
Nov. 1810. 
97
 Philip J. Stern, The company-state: Corporate sovereignty and the early 
modern foundations of the British empire in India  (New York, 2011). 
44 
capias and sequestration against the zamindar, and sent a small force to 
execute the writ. The government also sent an army and prevented it. These 
conflicts exposed the problem of the Supreme Court’s interference in the  
mofussil, and the Act of Settlement in 1781 (21 Geo. 3, c. 70) provided that 
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the revenue affairs, over the 
zamindars or revenue farmers, and over the official duties of the Company’s 
servants.
98
 These Bengal conflicts were exported to Britain by Edmund Burke 
as his impeachment trial of Warren Hastings. Burke attacked Hastings by 
vindicating the Indian law, property and nobility—in the same way as he did 
in his defence of the British constitution in the aftermath of the French 




In Bombay, this conflict became apparent when the government 
acquired territories in the mofussil in the early nineteenth century. In the 
eighteenth century, the Company was dominated by the political, social and 
economic influence of the European and Indian merchants. For example, as 
Lakshmi Subramanian shows, the powerful merchants could compel the 
government to protect them in the Mayor’s Court. 100 But, the acquisition of 
the inner territories, first in Gujarat in 1803–5 and then in the Deccan in 
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1817–8, meant that the government could expect land revenue which would be 
the basis of their financial autonomy and independence from the merchants. 
These were the moments of Bombay’s transformation from ‘city state to 
capital city’.101 The important shift relating this was that the EIC’s officials 
were prohibited from trading in their private capacity in 1806. This changed 
the relationship between the government and the court. Thereafter, the 
Company officials were to deal with the King’s Court only in their official 
capacity and therefore not to derive benefit of the court as private merchants. 
Territorial administration became the main duty of the Company, and they 
needed to deal with Indian magnates in villages, hills and mountains in the 
mofussil, rather than the British and Indian merchants in the presidency town. 
A new pattern of politics had emerged in Bombay city. Rather than the 
commercial conflict between the government and the private merchants, that 
between the government and the King’s Court over political affairs in the 
mofussil became the basic framework of politics in the presidency until 1834.  
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The role of the King’s Court as the constitutional check of the EIC’s local 
government emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It 
was related to the shifting power balance between the Bombay government 
and the British private merchants, which highlighted the conflict between the 
King’s Court’s logic of law and the government’s logic of necessity. In the 
eighteenth century, as Holden Furber, Pamela Nightingale and Lakshmi 
Subramanian show, the Company’s policies were domina ted by the interests of 
these merchants engaging in the country trade with Bengal and China and 
holding important offices such as the custom master. They could exert their 
political power and demand favourable commercial dealings. For example, the 
commercial interest of the cotton merchants was the chief motive of the 
Company’s ‘thrust to the North’, or the acquisition of cotton lands in Gujarat 
and Baroda after the second Maratha war in 1803–5, and, resenting the 
Company’s own purchase of cotton, they could compel the government to 
restrain the purchase of cotton for a season in the year in 1809 –10 despite the 
opposition of the Court of Directors.
1
 
But, as we saw in the last part of Introduction, the autonomy of the 
government from the control of merchants gradually increased as the result of 
the expansion of British power in the mofussil. The power of the British 
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merchants was further curtailed by unfavourable economic conditions in the 
early nineteenth century. Due to the depression in the China trade and the poor 
communication with the newly acquired hinterland, the economy of the 
presidency was unstable until the 1830s, when the trade of cotton and opium 
started to boost its economy.
2
 
The rise of the government’s influence caused frictions with the 
European merchants, in which the King’s Court’s logic of law was given an 
important role. The case in point was the conflict between the government and 
the merchants over the municipal governance of Bombay city. Even after 150 
years had passed since the first acquisition of the town and island of Bombay 
from the Portuguese in 1662, the municipal institutions of Bombay city were 
still in their fledging stage. But, as Mariam Dossal shows, improvements in 
Bombay’s civic infrastructure were necessitated by the rapid urban 
development in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.
3
 The improvements 
were discussed under the heading of ‘police’, meaning ‘the regulation and 
control of a community; the maintenance of law and order, provision of public 
amenities, et cetera’.4 Because it embraced such a wide variety of activities, 
an everyday issue in the community could be easily escalated to a conflict 
over the police authority between the government and the British merchants. 
This chapter examines two examples of conflict  over the urban policing 
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in the 1810s and 1820s. In the first one, the government’s increasing influence 
over the municipal governance was checked by the justices of the peace (JPs) 
in alliance with the King’s Court. In the second conflict, the King’s Cour t’s 
judges criticised the government’s ‘despotic’ police administration. In both 
cases, the government tried to vindicate its discretionary interventions based 
on the logic of state necessity, but this was criticised by the King’s Court’s 
alternative vision of urban governance ruled by the regular laws of the 
municipal courts. 
Before beginning the analysis, it is necessary to look at the early history 
of police in eighteenth-century Bombay city as the background. The conflict 
between the government and European merchants characterised the earlier 
period as well. The first attempt of policing commenced in the seventeenth 
century when the governor of Bombay Gerald Aungier (1669–77) created a 
native police force called the Bhandari militia. It was primarily aimed at a 
military protection against the Marathas, the Siddis and other foreign enemies, 
but it conducted the duty of civil police in the city as well. It was commanded 
by the Indian officers and chiefly composed by the Bhandaris, a toddy 
drawing Hindu caste famous for their military character. The number of the 
militias was 600 in 1760 and 800 in 1770, and in 1771 it was reorganised as a 
battalion consisting of 48 officers and 400 privates. They were directed to 
keep the peace by pursuing and arresting rioters, robbers, housebreakers and 
runaway slaves as well as Europeans without valid passes during the night.
5
 
The government needed to pay attention to the control of the Bhandari police 
themselves. The political and military status of Bombay city was still insecure 
in the eighteenth century. The government had to rely on the Bhandaris as 
they were ‘a military caste and ready to serve the Company in defence of the 
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island upon any emergency’. The government took a conciliatory policy 
towards the Bhandaris by admitting the arrack farm, because it was feared that 
the Marathas or the French must try to shake off their allegiance.
6
 
Reflecting this, the police in Bombay was controlled in a military style. 
Until 1779, the issues of policing were directly dealt with by the governor in 
council and the militia was commanded by military officers. In that year, 
when a civilian James Tod was appointed the head of the police, he was still 
styled the Lieutenant of Police.
7
 The semi-military character of police was 
unpopular among Bombay’s non-official community. It not only hurt the 
sensibility of the Englishmen but was particularly problematic because the 
Lieutenant of Police’s salary and other costs of policing were paid by the 
assessment tax levied on all houses in the city.
8
 The grand jury, dominated by 
European merchants, criticised that the ‘office of Police [was] of a most 
dangerous tendency … fit only for a despotic Government, where a Bastile 
[sic] is at hand to enforce its authority’. 9 
Beside the grand jury, the bench of justices of the peace gave another 
institutional platform for the merchants’ criticism of the government. The 
Charter Act of 1793 enabled the governor general in Calcutta to appoint JPs at 
the presidency towns. As well as judicial duties of committing criminals, the 
JPs were authorised to collect an assessment tax for the purpose of ‘clearing, 
watching and repairing’ the roads. The assessment was made in the general or 
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quarter sessions of the peace. Its jurisdiction included executive duties such as 
the collection of wheel tax, regulation of marketplaces, and repair work of the 
roads.
10
 The collection of the assessment tax for the purpose of policing was 
one of the most important duties. In 1798, there were nine JPs in the island 
other than the governor and the members of the council who were ex officio 
JPs.
11
 The JPs in Bombay were composed of merchants, lawyers and military 
and civil servants of the Company. In 1804, for example, there were 3 civil 
servants, 4 merchants, 1 lawyer, and Superintendent and Deputy 
Superintendent of Police.
12
 The point was that the government’s 
semi-military police was criticised by the merchants’ civilian perspective. 
This demand for a more civilian and independent police was the context in 
which the King’s Court’s logic of law  was highlighted as opposed to the 
government’s logic of necessity.  
 
II. Merchants and authority in Bombay city police 1808–12 
 
The conflict between the two logics was observed first in a conflict over the 
urban police between the JPs and the government in  1808–12, which resulted 
in the formation of Rule, Ordinance and Regulation I of 1812, ‘the basis of the 
police administration of Bombay until 1856’. 13 The voluminous 
correspondence
14
 between JPs, government and the King’s Court reveals that 
the King’s Court represented the British merchants’ sense of danger about the 
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government’s arbitrary police administration. The central problem was the 
government’s control of the market by means of the police. As scholars have 
pointed out, the marketplace was the site of contestation for ‘power, authority 
and status’ as well as of business transactions, especially in relation to their 
regulations by means of the court of law and the police.
15
 In Bombay the 
issue of market and the police provoked a severe conflict between the 
government and the dominant European merchants in the city. It was in this 
conflict over the municipal authority that the King’s Court proclaimed the role 
of constitutional check against the government’s despotism.  
The background of these conflicts was the increasing influence of the 
East India Company’s government on municipal governance. A significant 
change in JPs’ status happened in 1807, when the power to appoint them was 
transferred from the governor general in Calcutta to the governor of Bombay 
(47 Geo. 3, c.68).
16
 By this measure, the government was empowered to 
appoint district magistrates in the newly acquired territories in Gujarat.
17
 It 
also altered the composition of the JPs in Bombay city. The number of civil 
servants increased from one to five, and three were added from military 
officers.
18
 This significantly weakened the dominance of merchants on the 
bench of JPs. Besides, the responsibility of the chief police officer of the 
government, the superintendent of police, increased dramatically. It  
                                                 
15
 Rajat Datta, ‘From medieval to colonial: Markets, territoriality and the 
transition in eighteenth century Bengal’, Medieval History Journal , 2, 1 
(1999), 143–67; Kaustubh Mani Sengupta, ‘Bazaars, landlords and the 
Company government in late eighteenth-century Calcutta’, IESHR, 52, 2 
(2015), 121–46, quotation at 128; Tilottama Mukherjee, ‘Markets in 
eighteenth century Bengal economy’, The Indian Economic and Social 
History Review, 48, 2 (2011), 143–76. 
16
 Peter Benson Maxwell, An introduction to the duties of magistrates and 
Justices of the Peace (Calcutta, 1871), 2. 
17
 Seven magistrates were appointed. East India register and directory for 
1809. 
18
 Ibid.; East India register and directory for 1808.  
52 
incorporated the office of the surveyor of roads in 1797, the clerk of the 
market, who was responsible for the weights, measures and the market prices, 
in 1800, and the chief police officer of Mahim division in 1801.
19
 
The JPs’ resistance to the expanding control of the government began as 
their inquiry into the state of market in 1808. In that year, Charles Joseph 
Briscoe, the superintendent of police and the clerk of the market, and Peter P. 
Travers, the custom master, anticipated the price rise and recommended 
embargo of grain, wheat, oil and ghee during the monsoon. This was agreed 
by Governor Jonathan Duncan but objected to by Robert Rickards, a member 
of the council and a staunch free trader. They disputed over the adaptability of 
laissez-faire principles in Bombay.
20
 Duncan and Briscoe’s view was based 
on their logic of emergency. They were of opinion that the ‘general principles 
assumed in Doctor Smith’s work’ could not be applied to Bombay because 
there were contingencies in which the temporary embargo was ‘not only 
advisable but also necessary’ to prepare for ‘a crisis’ such as a sudden 
withdrawal of grain supply. The government was particularly concerned about 
the ‘contingent and hazardous’ provision of meat, which was monopolised by 
a handful of private dealers. From this view, the government wished the JPs to 
examine the state of the marketplaces in the island. The JPs reported that there 
were only three small markets in Bombay city and no public market of beef 
and fish, and recommended that a vegetable and fruit market, two beef and 
mutton markets, and a fish market should be erected.
21
 It was approved by the 
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 But the mode of controlling them caused a large-scale conflict 
between the government and the JPs.  
Discussing the new markets, the JPs criticised the government’s 
arbitrary policing in the market. Particularly problematic were the undue 
levies collected by the superintendent and his subordinates in the name of the 
clerk of the market. The market committee comprised John Fell, William 
Crawford, and Luke Ashburner, the latter two being the merchants of agency 
houses. They criticised that ‘every peon of the police establishment 
considered himself now as vested with a certain power over all those people 
who resort to the markets or contribute to their master’s pecuniary 
advantages’. In consequence, the superintendent was not like a British 
magistrate but ‘the Cutwall of a native city’. The JPs demanded the separation 
of the clerk of the market and the superintendent of police because the 
former’s collection of fees should be checked by and appealed to the latter. 
The fees collected by the superintendent, ‘not to fall short of 8,000 rupees’, 
should be used for constructing the new markets.
23
 
In a similar vein, the JPs also criticised the superintendent’s annexation 
of the surveyor of the roads and the collector of the wheel tax. Although 
sufficient tax was collected for the repair of the roads, the superintendent’s 
management of the fund was ‘radically defective’ and many roads were left 
unattended. Barrister James Morley was at the forefront of this inquiry and 
repeatedly interrogated Briscoe in the road committee.
24
 Morley was also the 
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secretary for the Market Committee and the Deputy Superintendent of 
Police.
25
 The issue was further disputed when another case against a levy in 
the market was discovered by the JPs in January 1809. The JPs recommended 
various measures to deal with the problem. First, they demanded that the 
government issue a proclamation that the government was determined ‘to 
prevent such an intolerable grievance and the exercise of all improper 
influence on authority over the markets’ with the table of fees which were 
authorised to be collected in the market.
26
 The government accepted the 
measure and issued it as hand bills and in the Bombay Courier.
27
 
Second, the JPs demanded the reform of the assessment tax, which was 
used for the disbursement of the police establishment. They appointed a 
committee to inquire into the use of the tax. The committee pointed out that 
the tax was in deficit because it was used for various purposes other than ‘the 
repairing, watching, and cleansing the streets’ as stipulated in the law. They 
claimed that the government should refund these costs charged against the 
assessment fund as they should have been paid by the government. For 
example, a constable employed under the clerk of the market at Rs 7.2 per 
month by the order of the JPs on 1 November 1796 was not legally chargeable 
on the assessment tax and therefore should be refunded by the government.
28
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The JPs also suggested two plans of reducing the establishment of day and 
night patrol for the purpose of retrenchment. The police establishment at that 
time was 1 inspector, 38 constables, 3 havildars, 4 naiques and 202 peons. 
Morley’s plan recommended reducing it to 3 constables and 125 peons. This 
was approved by the other six JPs in the committee except Money and Briscoe, 
who suggested a more moderate reduction to 1 inspector, 28 or 29 constables, 
3 havildars, 4 naiques, and 152 peons.
29
 Third, they suggested that the 
government should use its profit from the sale of rice during the famine of 
1803–5 for the purpose of constructing and improving the new markets, roads, 
and tanks, because the European and Indian inhabitants were suffering from 
unfavourable conditions of trade, the damage of the fire of 1803, and the 
‘heavy revenue collected in duties, assessments, and other taxes’. 30 
 
This proposal infuriated the government officials. Their response was 
expressed by a Police Committee appointed by the government in order to 
investigate the issue. It was composed of Francis Warden, the chief secretary, 
John Hungerford, the Company’s Solicitor, and Briscoe, the superintendent of 
police.
31
 The committee rejected the JPs’ demands and made a counter claim 
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for damage Rs 1,35,800 for the government’s disbursement which should have 
been paid by the assessment fund.
32
 This strong reaction was not because the 
government was opposed to the retrenchment. The committee suggested that 
the police establishment should be reduced to 24 constables 3 havildars, 4 
naiques and 92 peons, which was even smaller than Morley’s plan. 33 The real 
cause of the government’s reaction was related to the problem of authority in 
regard to the city’s policing. This was clearly stated in the police committee’s 
report on 15 Nov. 1810 written by Francis Warden.  
Warden stated that the JPs’ proposals endangered ‘the dignity and 
authority of the government’. They exceeded the limit of their judicial power 
in that they acted as if they had a right to modify or veto the governor’s 
legislation. The legislative authority was exclusively given to the governor. 
While the general and quarter sessions of the JPs were responsible for 
collecting the assessment tax, their sessions could modify the police 
establishment only when the governor participated in it as the ex-officio JP: 
‘His Majesty’s Justices of the Peace, or a Bench of them, have no voice 
whatever in the enactment of these rules and ordinances, but only in their 
enforcements and due operation’.34 
Warden was particularly concerned about a proper hierarchy in the 
administration of police, in which the government -appointed superintendent 
should have the supreme authority. This anxiety was caused by a recent 
conflict between Briscoe and Morley, the deputy superintendent of police. 
Briscoe complained that Morley ‘has been anxiously and arduously employed’ 
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to lessen ‘the respectability of [Briscoe’s] situation in the eyes of the natives 
and to reduce [his] authority into contempt’. He explained that because the 
superintendent was also a high constable, who was to execute the warrants 
issued by the bench of JPs, Morley as a JP issued a warrant to command 
Briscoe to arrest a person. In other words, it was feared that the executive 
looked subjected to the order of the judiciary.
35
 Briscoe said that this 
subversion of hierarchy was inimical to the proper prosecution of the duty as 
the head of police department. He solicited the government to remove Morley 
from the office of deputy superintendent. Briscoe emphasised that the 
hierarchy of authority was ‘absolutely indispensable in an office like mine, to 
which the native population of this island in particular, have long been 
accustomed to look up, and through which the protecting arm of government 
has been extended over them’.36 The government even discussed depriving 
Morley of his commission of the peace, though it was not realised.
37
 
In order to consolidate the clear hierarchy of police authority, Warden 
proposed the introduction of the stipendiary magistrates. Here Warden 
consciously followed the example of London, where the stipendiaries were 
introduced for the purpose of centralisation of the police.
38
 Relying on 
Patrick Colquhoun’s practice on the London police, Warden proposed that 
there should be two (senior and junior) stipendiary magistrates, who would 
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hear and determine criminal cases in summary proceedings and send felony 
cases to the superior court. Their duties also included the collection of 
assessment and wheel taxes and the authorisation of their disbursements.
39
 By 
this means, the government tried to increase its control over the municipal 
governance and police. Thus, Warden’s report was boiled down to an attempt 
to criticise the JPs and to establish the superior authority of the government in 
municipal governance. He referred to the police system of Calcutta, which, 
according to him, had become less efficient because of ‘the extension of 
powers granted to Justices of the Peace’. In a determined tone, he cautioned 
that ‘the existence of any subordinate authority tha t is likely in the slightest 
degree to derogate from the power and dignity of the executive Government, I 
consider dangerous to the constitution of Colonial Governments’. 40 In this 
way, the issue of the assessment tax escalated to an open political conflict  
between the government and the JPs over the legitimacy in the municipal 
governance. 
It is worth noting here that, although the government’s particular 
apprehension was the problem of authority, the issue of urban policing sheds 
light on another, more general difficulty experienced by the colonial 
government. Warden in his 1810 report lamented frequent gang robberies in 
and around Bombay city. He reported examples such as the raid of freebooters 
in 1793 and 1806–7 and ‘the recent attack of the Cossids [couriers]’.41 The 
situation was further exacerbated in the next year when, in the midst of the 
negotiation between the JPs and the government, the Bhandari caused a riot 
protesting the abkaree (liquor) tax. The background of the rebellion was the 
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change of government policy towards the Bhandaris in the early nineteenth 
century. When the three-year contract was expired in 1807, the government 
abolished the farming and introduced the abkari tax collected by the collector. 
The policy was aimed at removing monopoly,  increasing revenue and 
preserving ‘the morals and health of the lesser classes of the inhabitants’. 42 
This raised great discontent among the Bhandaris. They complained of the 
revenue officials’ inflexible and rigorous collection. Furthermore, the 
government raised the tax from 1 January 1811, which led to widespread 
rioting through 1811 and 1812. The caste headmen (mukaddams, choglas and 
patils), some of whom were government payrolls, instigated rather than 
restrained the rioters. The riot was soon quieted and the leaders were expelled 
or punished, but the collector’s difficulty in collecting the tax continued after 
the riot.
43
 The 1811 Bhandari riot suggests a fundamental difficulty at the 
heart of colonial domination: the government had to rely on the Indians to 
make an effective and economical system of administration, but it should 
always retain the power to control them. As we shall see in the following 
chapters, this problem of right balance between conciliation and control was 
also experienced in the mofussil, suggesting that the government officials 
experienced the same issue of enlisting and controlling potential criminals as 
the police both in towns and provinces. 
 
The correspondence between the JPs and the government continued, which 
revolved around the amount of compensation. The government only admitted 
the refund of Rs. 15,300 which was derived from ‘an oversight’, whilst the JPs 
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demanded the sum of Rs 1,85,000.
44
 They could not find a point of 
compromise and agreed to refer the case to arbitration of James Mackintosh, 
the recorder of Bombay (1804–11).45 Mackintosh decided in favour of the JPs 
and ruled that the government should adjudge Rs 42,156 to the assessment 
fund, which was larger than the government’s claim but much smaller than 
that of the JPs.
46




This event induced Mackintosh to write a report on the reform of the 
Bombay police in 1811. He must have been impressed about the corruption of 
police by the arrest of Briscoe, who allegedly sheltered a murderer in 
November 1810. Mackintosh tried and sentenced him for 12 months’ 
imprisonment. The governor and the council were opposed to the trial, but 
Bombay merchants demanded it. After the sentence and conviction, 
Mackintosh was thanked by the grand jury.
48
 But his criticism also emanated 
from his whiggish antipathy to the despotic tendencies of the police:  
 
A precipitate, clandestine, and arbitrary jurisdiction: a power of trying as 
a Judge pleases, of convicting for what crime he pleases, and 
condemning to what punishment he pleases, without responsibility to his 
superior’s restrains from law, or check from public opinion; would be a 
situation of danger to the highest human virtue, and is perfectly sure to 
                                                 
44
 BL, IOR F/4/350/8170, 149–50, Warden’s summary, n.d.; BL, 
IOR/F/4/348/8167, 19A–E, Bombay Public/General Letter [hereafter BGL], 
Gov. to CoD, 30 Oct. 1811. 
45
 He arrived in Bombay in 1804, with his general concern in the reform of 
police, penal law and prison. He had already established his fame a prominent 
Whig in Britain by attacking Edmund Burke in his Vindiciae Gallicae (1791). 
46
 BL, IOR F/4/350/8170, 294–7, BGC 28 Oct 1811, W. A. Morgan to Gov., 
26 Oct. 1811. 
47
 BL, IOR F/4/348/8167, 19A–E, BGL, Gov. to CoD, 30 Oct. 1811. 
48
 Jane Rendall, The political ideas and activities of Sir James Mackintosh 
(1765–1832): A study in whiggism between 1789 and 1832 (London Univ. 
Ph.D thesis, 1972), 188. 
61 




He pinpointed the arbitrariness and illegality of the superintendent’s summary 
conviction and punishment at the police office. He gave four reasons: because 
they were inflicted under rules which were not approved by the Court of 
Directors or registered to the Recorder’s Court; because the suspects were 
convicted by a single justice not restrained by his colleagues or by the 
‘public’; because many of these cases were felonies, which could not be 
summarily convicted; and because punishments such as banishment or hard 
labour in chain were too harsh to be sentenced without a trial by jury.
50
 These 
were, Mackintosh added, not ‘moderate and reasonable corporal punishment’ 
allowed in the law, but were equal to the punishment of galley slaves utilised 
‘in the most despotic countries’.51 It was the infringement of ‘the legal 
privileges of British subjects’ that ‘a Superintendent of Police may arrest forty 
men in the morning; he may try, convict, and condemn them in forenoon; and 
he may close the day by exercising the Royal prerogative of pardon towards 
them all’.52 A ‘system of vexatious inquisitions into private concerns of every 
individual’ would debase human mind and increase rather than decrease the 
crimes. The real energy of the police should be employed not ‘for the 
purposes of state’ but ‘for the security of society’. 53 
Based on this antipathy against the arbitrariness, he recommended the 
abolition of the superintendent of police and its replacement with a new court 
of petty sessions composed of two stipendiary and one lay magistrate.
54
 He 
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was emphatic about the importance of lay magistrates. He said that the 
merchants should be the JPs in a commercial empire like the British. In the 
same vein, contrary to Warden, he highly evaluated the police in Calcutta 
where the power of the JPs was as strong as in the City of London.
55
 On the 
other hand, stipendiaries were not allowed to inflict summary punishment as 
single justice.
56
 The point was that ‘nothing should be left upon the vague and 
precarious tenure of usage, but that every necessary authority should be 
clearly defined and effectually conferred’. 57 Furthermore, in order to make 
the officers comply with the law, Mackintosh compiled the previously existing 
regulations and specified the constitutive elements of various crimes and the 
proper conducts police officers to deal with them. These proposals by 
Mackintosh were adopted by the government as Rule, Ordinance and 
Regulation I of 1812, which was passed by the governor in council on 25 
March 1812 and registered in the Recorder’s Court on 20 May 1812.  
In this way, the conflict between the government and the JPs was settled 
by the arbitration of the recorder. It gave him a chance to articulate his whig 
idea about the proper mode of policing in the city.
58
 Why such a critical 
proposal was accepted by the government was difficult to know, but it is 
important to note that his principles of legislation were not so remote from 
that of the government. At the core of Mackintosh’s juridical view was the 
conviction that ‘A law is a command’: 
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Its language ought to be clear and short, quickly understood and easily 
remembered: its excellence is that imperative brevity which leaves no 
pretext for doubt and no excuse for disobedience. The perfection of the 
language of command is to be found in military orders; nor is this 
wonderful, for it is in war that any defect in the expression of a 
command may be attended with the most immediate, extensive, and 
irreparable mischiefs. The complexity of civil affairs will not suffer us to 
attain this point of perfection; we can make only distant approaches to it; 





Mackintosh wrote this passage to protect the Indians from the arbitrary 
measures of the government’s police officers by subjecting the latter to the 
law, but in the latter part of the above passage he himself slipped into seeing 
the law as a tool of domination over the Indians’ civil affairs. This ambivalent 
view about law as a means of judicial check and that of the executive’s 
command was of central importance for the construction of the conflicting 
logics of law and emergency. As we shall see later, the utilitarian command 
theory of law would be strongly associated with the government’s logic of 
emergency, while the natural law theory of common law was tied to the King’s 
Court’s logic of law. Indeed, as the next section’s case shall show, 
Mackintosh’s political and military view of the law was appropriated by the 
government to claim the necessity of strong police measures. 
Another important factor which facilitated the conciliation of the 
government and the recorder was Mackintosh’s personal influence and social 
network in the government circle. He was at the centre of Bombay’s pubic life 
as the founder of the Bombay Literary Society (1804), whose members 
included Governor Duncan and members of the council Rickards and 
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 Furthermore, he had good relationships with the would-be 
Bombay governors Mountstuart Elphinstone and John Malcolm. They often 
dined together in 1811 and exchanged ideas on philosophy, history and 
colonial governance.
61
 Mackintosh, born in Scotland, had studied among the 
prominent Scottish intellectuals such as Adam Ferguson and Dugald Stuart. 
He shared the background of Scottish enlightenment with Elphinstone and 
Malcolm, the scholar administrators.
62
 Their amity was nurtured by their 
shared historical interest, which was indicated by the fact that Elphinstone 
decided to write his Account of the kingdom of Caubul  (1815) by 
Mackintosh’s suggestion.63 However, though mitigated by Mackintosh’s 
vision of law and sociability, the conflict in 1808–12 suggested that the King’s 
Court could be used for criticising the government.  
 
The relationship between the King’s Court and the government deteriorated in  
the rest of the 1810s. The conflict became manifest under the recordership of 
Alexander Anstruther (1812–9), ‘a conscientious lawyer, jealous of his 
position and independence’.64 The government tried to curtail the Recorder’s 
Court’s independence by interfering in the selections of its three 
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aldermen-judges. In 1814, Anstruther complained that the government 
encouraged the aldermen-judges to reject his advice, which was ‘most 
objectionable in its content and most insulting to me in my judicial character’. 
He sent several letters of complaint to the Privy Council, the Lord Chancellor, 
and the Court of Directors.
65
 Anstruther explained that the government 
started to appoint new aldermen-judges without consulting the recorder. He 
complained that the government’s Advocate General ‘upon almost every 
occasion in which he had felt any interest, addressed himself to the aldermen, 
calling upon them to exercise their own individual judgements, even on mere 
points of law relating to the practice of the court’. 66 
The issue of urban policing remained the focus of conflict between the 
King’s Court and the government. In 1817, Anstruther doubted the validity of 
conviction of the Indians under Rule, Ordinance and Regulation I of 1812 
which was not yet translated into the Indian languages. He said that the 
conviction was illegal, though Nepean and Macklin vindicated the legality. 
Anstruther denounced that ‘the due promulgation of the laws cannot be 
viewed as an act of favour at all nor discretion in the government, as might 
suit its convenience’.67 Anstruther and the JPs also criticised the 
government’s measure when it extended the areas of assessment tax in 
Regulations IX of 1815 and III of 1817.
68
 
Such conflicts gradually re-organised the tripartite structure of 
Bombay’s politics into a bi-polar one. The above conflict over the 
untranslated police regulation exhibited the sign of that change. The JPs also 
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lamented the problem in 1819, but, contrary to the conflict on assessment tax 
in 1808–12, they did not send it to the recorder’s  arbitration. They explained 
that it was because it would certainly be harmful to Indians’ confidence for the 
British government if the legal conflict occurred between the British 
authorities in the city.
69
 This indicates that the centre of civil protest against 
the government shifted from the European merchants to the King’s Court. 
Likewise the JPs acquiesced in the government’s demand when it requested 
that JPs agree with the extension of the area of assessment tax in 1824 and 
1826.
70
 This tendency became clearer in the conflicts between the governor 
Mountstuart Elphinstone and the chief justice Edward West on the police in 
the 1820s, which is the topic of the rest of this chapter.  
 
III. Necessity of discretion in urban policing in the 1820s 
 
Edward West was the recorder of Bombay (1823) and the first chief justice of 
the Bombay Supreme Court (1823–8). He was a major character in the conflict 
between the government and the King’s Court in Bombay in the 1820s. While 
he is well known as a political economist who theorised the principle of 
diminishing returns at about the same time as David Ricardo did,
71
 his Indian 
career has been understudied, and his evaluation has been divided between 
those who support his reformist outlook and those who criticised his 
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opposition to the government.
72
 His conflict with the governor Mountstuart 
Elphinstone in the 1820s is still regarded as the expression of their personal 
enmity and mutual misunderstanding. This was true to some extent. Unlike 
Mackintosh, West was not the member of the Bombay Literary Society, a 
centre of Elphinstone’s social circle. A small misunderstanding between  the 
two almost led them to engage in a duel.
73
 
But the conflict was structural as well as personal. At the core of this 
rivalry were the different perspectives on the judicial administration in the 
presidency town: the government insisted on the need for it to act with 
discretion; the judges demanded strict adherence to rules and procedures. It 
was shown in 1823 when the chief justice held a special court  ‘for the purpose 
of publicly reprehending’ William Erskine, Elphinstone’s protégé, for frauds 
and extortions. He was judged guilty and dismissed from the offices of the 
master in inquiry and the clerk of the small cause court.
74
 Erskine, a 
renowned orientalist scholar, was a member of the regulation committee in 
charge of compiling Elphinstone’s new regulations. This issue became a 
subject of a press war between the judge and the government. The government 
claimed that ‘informalities in pleading or in technical forms’ were necessary. 
By contrast, West supported legality rather than discretion, emphasising that 




West’s criticism of the government’s illegal discretion led h im to 
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frequently criticise the police in Bombay city. In 1825, he gave a long charge 
to the grand jury on the issue, declaring that the system of Bombay police was 
‘a system of discretion, and never a system of law’.  West frequently quoted 
from Mackintosh’s report on the police as an authority. Like Mackintosh, West 
singled out the arbitrary use of banishment and flogging, which were 
unproportionally severe rather than ‘reasonable and moderate’ as stipulated in 
the law. Particularly problematic was that the prisoners were denied the 
chance to petition the King’s Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He also 
followed Mackintosh in criticising the single magistrate’s trying, flogging and 
banishing of felons.
76
 West concluded that ‘the whole system of the police 
was illegal, it must be entirely eradicated, and a new system must be adopted’. 
This was accompanied by his assertion of the Supreme Court’s sovereign 
status in the matter of police: ‘no other authority than this court has any, the 
least, control over [the justices of the peace]’.77 
The grand jury denied the need for reform based on the logic of 
expediency. The foreman was the government’s secretary Charles Norris. He 
answered that, on the ground of ‘expediency alone, and not the legality of the 
Police Regulations’ and ‘considering the peculiar circumstances of Bombay, 
… any reduction of power of the police magistrates ... would be attended with 
the greatest danger, and would add much to the increase of crime’. They added 
that the removal of aliens and the punishment of flogging should be continued 
with the same frequency and severity, and that the examples of flogging 
mentioned in West’s charge, ‘(however it might shock the feelings of a 
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gentleman unaccustomed to such sights), was moderate in every respect’. 78 
     The members of the governor’s council also strongly reacted against 
West’s police charge based on the logic of state necessity. Richard T. Goodwin 
vindicated the conduct of the previous police superintendents, including 
Briscoe, and argued that the summary conviction and punishment was ‘not 
only salutary, but also absolutely necessary in many cases for the peace, 
controul, security and convenience of the community’. 79 Francis Warden, 
now a member of the council, also claimed the usefulness of the summary 
justice in such places as Bombay and commented that West (as did 
Mackintosh) intended to ‘calculate to disseminate an impression that the 
duties of the police and all punishments were discharged and inflicted by an 
arbitrary agent, unchecked and uncontrol led’.80 Reflecting these, the 
government communicated to the Supreme Court that any ‘radical’ reform was 
unnecessary, explaining that the problem was rather a want of energy than the 
excessiveness or illegality of the police.
81
 
Government officials’ sense of crisis was based on their concern about 
the problems caused by the city’s vagrant and alien population. There was a 
large floating population of 10,000 or 20,000 in Bombay city in 1826.
82
 Like 
other regions, the city was troubled by the banjaras, fakirs and gosains.
83
 Its 
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bazaars were often disturbed by ‘fanaticism’ caused by them. 84 Warden 
explained that as Bombay was surrounded by foreign powers, the inhabitants 
were naturally suspicious of the inflow of vagrants and religious mendicants. 
He wanted to deport vagrants who had no regular means of subsistence. This 
might be contrary to the laws of England but was ‘justified by the laws of 
expediency’.85 In 1826, the Indian inhabitants in Bombay city petitioned the 
government to strengthen the police to deal with  frequent robberies, pointing 
out that the effects of wars in adjacent countries resulted in the increase of 
immigration in Bombay. They added that robbers avoided punishment by 
employing attorneys and barristers.
86
 
After West’s 1825 charge, the conflict be tween the government and the 
Supreme Court escalated. The government proposed a new police regulation 
to suppress robberies more efficiently.
87
 West replied that the deteriorating 
order was not due to police regulations but to the inefficiency of the 
government’s police magistrates, and that the new regulation could not be 
admitted in the form proposed by the government.
88
 The government replied 
that the present mode of summary conviction and punishment was necessary 
in Bombay.
89
 The judges repeated their points, and Elphinstone only 
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suggested not provoking the judges.
90
 
Frustrated, Elphinstone decided to end the correspondence with the 
judges. He proposed to make the draft of the new regulation and consulted the 
Advocate General George Norton.
91
 Norton replied that the police 
jurisdiction over the felonies was not admitted in England and would be 
judged illegal.
92
 However, Elphinstone insisted on the need of strong police 
force. He replied that the police should be authorised to try felons and, if it 
was not admitted in England, its expediency should be articulated in the 
preamble of the new regulation.
93
 Norton modified the draft and sent it to the 
Supreme Court for registration.
94
 
In the end, West rejected the registration in March 1827, exercising the 
King’s Court’s power to do so.95 He repeated his criticism that the power of 
summary conviction and punishment was not properly defined in the 
regulation. He concluded that he would ‘never sanction this system of 
supplying the defect of vigilance in the police’ which a llowed ‘the 
extraordinary powers with which the regulations would vest the 
magistrates’.96 The government ordered the Advocate General to amend the 
regulation.
97
 The chief justice’s criticism of the police was also reported in 
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 and soon reached Britain, and the London radicals used it as an 
example of the Bombay government’s arbitrary and inhuman administration in 
the sub-continent.
99
 This cooperation between the judges in Bombay and the 
radicals in London was also a recurrent feature of our story.  
 
It is convenient here to look at another cause of the reform public, the freedom 
of the press, in which the government’s logic of emergency was further 
criticised by the King’s Court’s logic of law. The issue is important because it 
shows that the government’s attitude to the urban reform culture was related 
to its sense of crisis in the mofussil. It was represented in Governor 
Elphinstone’s comment on the press. In 1824, Elphinstone expressed his 
concern that ‘some of the natives at the Residencies now read  our papers, have 
papers of their own, talk of liberty and Whigs and Tories’, and, though the 
vast mass of Indians remained ‘in their original ignorance’ and blindly looked 
up to the British government, all of them, especially the sepoys, were ‘ready 
to trample on it if they see it despised by their superiors’. 100 This comment 
suggests that Elphinstone saw the problem of the freedom of the press chiefly 
from the viewpoint of the security in the mofussil.  
His concern was shared by many of the Company’s officia ls. As 
Douglas Peers argues, the government in 1820s India was a beleaguered 
garrison state soaked with military ideology and preoccupied with ‘security, 
financial solvency, and political legitimacy’. 101 This was most strongly 
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expressed by the administrators called Wellesley’s Kindergarten, the most 
prominent of which included the 1820s Bombay governors Mountstuart 
Elphinstone and John Malcolm. Malcolm epitomised the essence of the 
ideology as follows: ‘The only safe view that Britain can take of her empire i n 
India is to consider it (as it really is) always in a state of danger …’. 102 This 
Anglo-Indian militarism permeated both in EIC’s civilian institutions and the 
military, as the existence of the former was thought to depend on the latter. 
Constant preparedness of the army was essential not only to deal with 
emergencies but also to convince the Indians of the futility of resistance.
103
 
Malcolm explained that the British empire was ‘the empire of opinion’:  
 
[T]here can be no doubt that empire is held solely by opinion; or, in 
other words, by that respect and awe with which the comparative 
superiority of our knowledge, justice, and system of rule, have inspired 
the inhabitants of our own territories; and that confidence in our truth, 
reliance on our faith, and dread of our armies, which is impressed on 




As we shall see in later chapters, this ideology was most strongly articulated 
in relation with the raids and rebellions in the mofussil, but the officials’ sense 
of crisis also influenced their attitude towards the reforms in the presidency 
towns. 
Contrasted with this view, the importance of the King’s Court in 
Bombay’s reformist culture originated in its distinctively civilian perspective 
for society ruled by the regular courts of law, as opposed to the government’s 
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political interpretation of it which justified the necessity of exceptional 
measures. This became apparent when the government’s restriction of the 
freedom of the press provoked a dispute between the government and the 
King’s Court in Bombay in 1825. The origin of the issue was Governor 
General John Adam’s licencing regulation for Calcutta in 1823. 105 This was 
criticised by reformer James Silk Buckingham, but his petition to the Privy 
Council was rejected, encouraging the Court of Di rectors to order the Bombay 
government to pass a regulation similar to the one in Calcutta. It was aimed 
‘for the prevention of the printing and circulating in newspapers ... matters 
tending to bring the Government of this country ... into hatred and conte mpt, 
and to disturb the peace, harmony, and good order of society’. 106 The Bombay 
government submitted it as Rule, Ordinance and Regulation I of 1826 to the 
Supreme Court for registration.
107
 
The judges criticised the government’s attempt to generalise the 
legislation which was initially intended to deal with a particular problem in 
Calcutta. In other words, the judges rejected the government’s intention to 
normalise the emergency measure in times of peace. West said that there was 
not a similarly urgent situation in Bombay which justified the enactment in 
Calcutta. Charles Chambers, the puisne judge, also denied the existence of 
state necessity by saying that to introduce the measure at a ‘time of perfect 
tranquillity’ and ‘not as a remedy for any existing or imminent evil but as a 
general and permanent act of legislation’ was ‘most prejudicial to the 
independence and good spirit of the community’. 108 In consequence, on 10 
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July 1826, the Supreme Court refused to register the press regulation.
109
 
The judges assumed that the press should be subjected only to the 
regular courts of law and not to the government’s discretionary control. From 
this perspective, West also criticised a member of the council Francis 
Warden’s proprietorship of the Bombay Courier and the Bombay Gazette. 
West explained that, although a proprietor was civilly and criminally 
answerable for the contents of the papers, Warden was exempted from it 
because the members of the council were not criminally amenable to the 
court.
110
 This protest resulted in Rule, Ordinance and Regulation I of 1825 
which ordered the registration of all the names of the proprietors of public 






At the centre of these two cases of conflict over urban policing was the King’s 
Court’s insistence  that the police administration should be managed by the 
legal procedures stipulated in the law and answerable to the judiciary, not by 
the discretion of the police officers. The arbitrariness of the po lice became a 
staple ingredient of the King’s Court’s attack on the government in subsequent 
years. For example, in 1828, Puisne Judge John Peter Grant gave his charge to 
the grand jury on the issue of police. He criticised illegal summary 
convictions and harsh punishments by the Company’s magistrates, which was 
now familiar both to the grand jury and to the government:  
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We are told that you are living under the laws of England. The only 
answer is that it is impossible. What has been administered till within a 
few years back has not been the law of England, nor has it been 




This rhetoric was emulated in Britain. In 1831, Charles Forbes, a radical MP 
who had been the head of the powerful agency house, criticised the governor 
of Bombay in parliament for arbitrarily imprisoning criminals and denying 
them resort to habeas corpus of the King’s Court. 113 The King’s Court’s logic 
of law provided a convenient tool to criticise the government’s claim of state 
necessity. 
Another important point was that the King’s Court’s civilian view of 
law and society was sharply contrasted with the government’s political and 
militarist one. This contrast was especially important in Bombay in the 1820s 
when, as we shall see in Chapter 4, the government was still engaging in 
suppressing raids and rebellions in the mofussil. It was because of this 
difference of general vision of society that the King’s Court could become the 
medium of criticising the government. This point became manifested not only 
in various reform movements, but also in ordinary proceedings of the suits in 
the court. The government and its officials could be sued as the defendant in 
civil suits in the King’s Court. The court promulgated its identity as the 
constitutional check against the government through these cases, which are 
the theme of the next chapter.  
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In the 1820s, the presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were 
becoming the centre of the ‘reform public’. As C. A. Bayly, Partha Chatterjee 
and others have shown, the ‘respectable’ Indian residents delivered their 
voices to the governments on a wide variety of topics ranging from its conduct 
of war to everyday commercial and ecclesiastical issues through the press, 
public meetings and petitions.
1
 The British and the Indian population in 
1820s and 30s presidency towns even briefly envisioned a participatory 
constitution based on the language of English liberty and through institutions 
of the free press and jury trials.
2
 
The reform culture was most noticeable in Calcutta, which held a large 
number of Indian middle classes as well as Europeans, but that of Bombay 
was no less remarkable. The city developed its own cosmopolitan and 
reformist atmosphere which was distinctive to Calcutta and Madras. It was 
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based on the mixture of Hindu, Muslim, Parsi and Portuguese Christian 
merchants and their diaspora, and on the inheritance of bureaucratic and 
statistical skills of the Brahman elites of the Maratha empire.
3
 Its public 
sphere was buttressed by the Indian intelligentsia which graduated from the 
Elphinstone College, originally established as the Bombay Native Education 
Society in 1824, and was coloured by the statistical and ethnographical 
discussions in the Bombay Literary Society (later the Bombay Branch of the 
Royal Asiatic Society).
4
 The Bombay Courier (since 1790) and the Bombay 
Gazette (since 1791) were the two major English newspapers which contained 
advertisements, news on the arrival and departure of ships, correspondence on 
political and social issues, and the proceedings of the law courts. Its first 
Gujarati weekly newspapers Bombay Samachar was established in 1822 by 
the city’s first vernacular printing press (est. 1812) held by Parsi printer 
Fardunji Marzaban. Its Marathi counterpart, Bombay Darpan, started in 1832.
5
 
The judges of the King’s Court in the 1820s, particularly Edward West 
and Charles Chambers, were sympathetic to the causes of reform. In addition 
to the reform of the police and the press, which we saw in Chapter 1, they 
supported, for example, the movement demanding Indians’ participation in the 
grand jury. It was promoted in 1820s by reformers such as Rammohan Roy, 
Dwarkanath Tagore and Ram Raz in India and Joseph Hume and James Silk 
Buckingham in Britain, who were unsatisfied with the Indian Jury Act of 1826 
by which Hindus, Muslims and Parsis were denied the ability to be grand 
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jurors and only admitted to be petit jurors when both parties were 
non-Christians.
6
 Under this restricted situation, the Bombay judges t ried to 
conciliate the leaders of these religious groups as far as possible by asking 
them to present their suggestions on the duties and mode of selection of the 
petit jurors and to furnish lists of eligible persons to be selected.
7
 
This chapter considers the role of the King’s Court in Bombay’s reform 
culture further by examining the court’s protection of Indian property from the 
government’s expropriation in times of war. There were two important cases 
in Bombay in the 1820s. In the first case, a Parsi merchant sued the 
government for breach of contract during the Second Maratha War (1803–5). 
In the second case, a Hindu merchant filed a suit to recover personal property 
that was confiscated as wartime booty in the Third Maratha War (1817–8). In 
both cases, the King’s Court ruled in favour of the merchants. The government 
appealed to the Privy Council in London, the final tribunal of the appeal from 
the colonies. Tories and radicals in London disputed the cases, and the 
fluctuating party politics of the late 1820s and the early 1830s in Britain 
affected their result. In the end, the King’s Court’s decisions in Bombay were 
overturned in London. Nonetheless, the effect of these cases was not small. 
The Indians became confident that the King’s Court would suppo rt their 
claims, while the government feared that their authority would be impaired 
and a huge amount of losses would be incurred for compensation in the future. 
These cases not only testify the fragility of property right in India in the face 
of expropriation,
8
 but also clearly indicate that the King’s Court’s civilian 
                                                 
6
 Lynn Zastoupil, Rammohan Roy and the making of Victorian Britain  
(Basingstoke, 2010), 117; Bayly, Recovering liberties, 61–71. 
7
 Frederic Dawtrey Drewitt, Bombay in the days of George IV: Memoirs of Sir 
Edward West, with hitherto unpublished documents  (second edition, London, 
1935), 248–52. 
8
 Cf. Mariam Dossal, Theatre of conflict, city of hope: Mumbai 1660 to 
80 
criticism was problematic for the government which was anxious to retain the 
power of military discretion in times of war and emergency. Because of this, 
the cases developed into an overt conflict between the King’s Court’s 
commercial and liberal constitutionalism and the government’s garrison state 
militarism. 
 
II. Jurisdictional jockeying of Bombay merchants : The case of Cursetjee 
Manockjee 
 
The first case is Cursetjee Manockjee v. EIC.
9
 Manockjee, a Parsi merchant, 
became the government contractor for the provision of rice in December 1802. 
In the next year, the Second Maratha War broke out. Arthur Wellesley (later 
Duke of Wellington) requested the Bombay government to supply rice by for 
his Madras army, then stationed at Poona. Manockjee sold rice at the market 
rate, which was two rupees per bag cheaper than the contract rate, because he 
was told that it was not for public use. However, he later realised that the rice 
was being supplied to the army and demanded compensation in 1804. This 
conflict, known as ‘the rice case’, continued for more than 25 years.  
Cursetjee Manockjee was an important figure in the government’s war 
efforts. In addition to rice, he was in charge of supplying clothes, food, 
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military goods and ballast to various government departments.
10
 As Randolph 
Cooper has shown, the EIC’s military logistics increasingly relied on 
Indian-based military manufacturing, and the government had to be sensitive 
to its relationship with civilian contractors such as Manockjee.
11
 Furthermore, 
he was also important as a leader of the Parsis in Bombay, who dominated the 
city’s commercial activities, such as shipbuilding and cotton, silk and opium 
trade with China.
12
 He was a member of the Parsi Panchayat (‘council of 
elders’) which governed their social and religious life between 1818 and 1845. 
So the government’s relationship with the business community was also 
potentially destabilised by this prolonged conflict.  
Manockjee resorted to the King’s Court when his claim was repeatedly 
rejected by the government. He sent several petitions to the government 
demanding for the principal sum of Rs 1,48,000. The Bombay government 
only admitted Rs 12,500. Manockjee also sent a petition to the Court of 
Directors in 1809, but they just increased the amount to Rs 43,500 in 1814. 
Manockjee finally instituted a suit in the Recorder’s Court in 1820. 13 
Cursetjee’s clash with the government was not confined to the rice case. He 
used multiple legal methods to realise his demands. First, he filed an equity 
suit in the Recorder’s Court for his distillery claim, which was settled in his 
favour.
14
 Second, he claimed compensation for barracks which he built during 
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the Second Maratha War. This was settled in 1825 by arbitration  and the 
government paid Rs 2,40,000, including 6% compound interest.
15
 Third, he 
filed a suit in the Recorder’s Court against the government for his provision of 
sandals during the war. He demanded Rs 15,000, but the ruling was in favour 
of the EIC.
16
 Manockjee’s legal cases show that the colonial court of law 
often combining multiple jurisdictions (or ‘sides’ such as plea or civil side, 
crown or criminal side, ecclesiastical side, equity side and admiralty side) 
allowed Indians to forum shop, in addition to the jurisdictional jockeying 
between different courts of law (the EIC court, panchayat, or the King’s 
Court). 
The point is that Manockjee was well acquainted with British legal 
procedures. He could use various legal tools to claim his demands both inside 
and outside the court. He filed his claims in multiple divisions in the 
Recorder’s Court, and at the same time he sought alternative dispute 
resolutions outside the court. Arbitration was his preferred method. In the 
barrack claim, he proposed that he would accept a pension instead of reducing 
the rate of interest. In the rice case, he proposed that he would accept the 
result of the trial if the government would abandon their appeal to the Privy 
Council. In these endeavours, Manockjee worked with his attorney, Frederick 
Ayrton, whose critical attitude towards the government was notorious.  
Manockjee succeeded in the Recorder’s Court, but only the second time. 
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The case was first examined by Recorder Anthony Buller in 1822. Buller did 
not admit compensation for supply to the Madras army and awarded Rs 47,000 
with 6% simple interest, or a total of Rs 1,00,000. Manockjee applied for a 
new trial. It was held in 1823 before Edward West, the newly arrived recorder. 
In the trial, West overturned all objections of the government and judged in 
favour of Manockjee.
17
 He awarded the full principal of Rs 1,48,000 with 9% 
compound interest, which amounted to Rs 5,27,000 in total. It was 
significantly higher than Buller’s former award. 18 
The judgement was characterised by two points. First, West presented 
the King’s Court as the defender of Indians from the oppression of the 
government. He suggested that the government treated Manockjee ‘throughout 
the whole of the business most unjustly … [and] shamefully’. He emphasised 
the timidity of Indians facing the tyranny of the EIC. For them, the 
‘government and despot are synonymous’; he could ‘readily believe that 
nothing but the severe distress, or the grossest injustice’ drove him to legal 
actions.
19
 In such a situation, the raison d’être of the King’s Court was as 
follows: 
 
I cannot allow it to be supposed for a moment that in this Court, the 
King’s Court instituted as it has been by the Crown and Legislature of 
Great Britain, mainly for the very purpose of giving the natives of this  
country redress against the Company and the Company’s servants, I say I 
cannot allow it to be surmised that the meanest or poorest native would 
not at any period of the existence of this Court obtain a full measure of 
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This formulation of the court’s role as the constitutional check against the 
government’s oppression of the Indians became the ideological basis of the 
judicial review over the conduct of the government in the 1820s.  
However, this did not mean that West was totally in favour of 
Manockjee. Manockjee explained that the delay in filing the suit was partly 
due to his having sought redress from the Court of Directors in Britain. He 
tried to use every means to recover his damages and did not regard the King’s 
Court as the only means of redress. Rather, the structure of dual or multiple 
powers was essential for his judicial and political manoeuvring, because he 
could resort to an authority to challenge another. However, the jud ge criticised 
his jurisdictional jockeying, saying ‘this Court was always open to him’.21 In 
contrast to Manockjee’s judicial pluralism, West insisted that the King’s Court 
was the only supreme tribunal in the presidency. West’s conception of the 
King’s Court as the defender of natives was accompanied by his assertion that 
the King’s Court held sovereign status in the presidency.  
But West’s assertion of the court’s sovereignty was followed by his 
limitation of English law. West based his argument on Indian practices and 
usages, rather than English precedents. The issue was concerned with 
Manockjee’s claim on the interest on unliquidated damages. According to 
English case law, he was not entitled to the interest, but West articulated that 
the court of law in India should not be hindered by English precedent, 
‘especially as a very different practice has prevailed in the Courts of India’. 22 
West in fact went further and criticised the English practice of distinguishing 
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the liquidated and unliquidated damages; he said such distinction originated 
more in technical forms of action, rather than difference in principle.
23
 In this 
sense, West’s judgement tried to revise and reform the English legal practice 
by referring to the Indian usages, and, in effect, advocated a system of Indian 
common law, distinct from the English one, which was to be formed by the 
King’s Court. 
This attitude was supported by the non-official community in Bombay. 
The other two aldermen judges, Benjamin Philipps and William Ashburner, 
decided more favourably than West on the matter of interest.
24
 British 
merchants and lawyers testified in favour of Manockjee.
25
 But, at the same 
time, it is possible that this kind of assertion of the role of the court stemmed 
as much from the judges’ anxiety that the court should always impress and 
conciliate the powerful merchants—both Indian and British—of the 
presidency town, one of the main users and audiences of the King’s Court.  
Government officials expressed several concerns about the judgement. 
First, they argued that the trouble was caused by the ‘litigiousness’ of the 
Indians. Francis Warden, a member of the governor’s council, commented that 
the Indians were not timid in making lawsuits against the government, as the 
chief justice claimed; on the contrary, they had well understood the value of 
the King’s Court and had fearlessly gone to the court and made suits against 
the government in the same way as against a private individual.
26
 Second, the 
officials were cautioned by the court’s power to make a precedent. West’s 
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award of compound interest consisting of one fourth of the total sum was 
problematic because, as the government’s solicitor W. A. Morgan explained, 
the same high rate of interest would be awarded by the judge in other claims 
of Manockjee. Considering this, he recommended the government to settle the 




But the government was most alarmed by the King’s Court’s 
interference in the military operation of the government in a time of war. The 
government contended that a contract made before war broke out should not 
be extended to the emergency supplies in a time of war. Manockjee insisted 
that the terms of contract should be broadly interpreted as including the 
supply in wartime and the government should compensate it, which meant that 
the King’s Court could review the government’s military discretion in times of 
emergency and order compensation retrospectively. Then, West’s support for 
Manockjee’s case would eventually check and weaken the power of the 
government to make any emergency interventions in times of war.  
To make matters worse, the officials conceived that the judge had an 
erroneous understanding of the military constitution. Warden explained that, 
while the three presidencies were totally independent in terms of military 
command and economy and therefore the Bombay government was not 
responsible for any supply to the other presidencies, West assumed that the 
Indian army was one and the same and the damages incurred from supply to 
any army in any presidency should be compensated by the uniformly 
conceived ‘British government’ in India.28 
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On a deeper level, this different recognition of the military constitution 
indicates that the King’s Court and the government had different views on the 
British sovereignty in India. West regarded that the governments in different 
presidencies constituting a unitary polity governing all over India. Further the 
government of India was identical with the government of England, and thus 
the territorial sovereignty of the British had already been established. Within 
that territory, the sovereign justice of the King’s Court should be available for 
all King’s subjects. On the other hand, the government’s understanding of the 
British constitution in India was plural. The Bombay government was 
distinguished from the other governments of Madras and Calcutta. This 
assumption of plurality was related to the officials’ view of Indian politics in 
general. It was based on the idea that the British government was essentially a 
regional power among other chiefs and sardars. It should certainly retain the 
paramountcy as the head of the confederacy, but the judicial system should be 
arranged in reference to the shared mode of sovereignty.  
In order to deny the merchant’s claim for interest and to retain its power 
of discretion in cases of emergency, the government prepared to appeal to the 
Privy Council, the final court of colonial legal affairs. The Privy Council’s 
Appeals Committee consisted of all the members of the Council. The quorum 
was the Master of the Rolls and two other members. Its decision was 
promulgated by an Order in Council.
29
 In the appeal paper, the government 
insisted that the terms of the contract could not be applied to ‘an extraordinary 
and accidental supply of rice’ to the Madras army. The judgement was 
‘contrary to the established rules of the law of England respecting the 
allowance of interest’ as it awarded the compensation for the unliquidated 
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The appeal was granted in the Recorder’s Court in June 1823 , but the 
debate in the Privy Council did not start until June 1828. During the interval, 
Manockjee continued his negotiation with the government. First, Manockjee 
published an open letter to the governor of Bombay in the Oriental Herald to 
abandon the appeal, and also proposed lowering the rate of interest if the 
government would not appeal.
31
 After these attempts failed and the appeal 
was lodged, he published an open letter to the Court of Directors in the 
Oriental Herald in December 1826. Manockjee actually demanded more in the 
letter. He requested that they order the Bombay government to pay the 
additional five years’ interest, which was not awarded by the King’s Court. 32 
Manockjee was trying to pit the Company against the King’s Court to increase 
the amount of compensation. Manockjee also tried to get support from a 
director of the EIC, John Morris, a former Bombay civil servant, though the 
letter was not answered.
33
 On the government’s part, the EIC’s solicitor in 
London, Edward Lawford, was preparing with James Melville, clerk to 




Meanwhile, radicals in London picked up the case as an example of the 
Company’s oppression of the Indians. The main organ of their cr iticism was 
the Oriental Herald, a monthly journal edited by James Silk Buckingham, a 
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central figure of colonial reformers in this period.
35
 It reported West’s 
judgement and Manockjee’s open letter, and the editor also published an 
article titled ‘Fraudulent and Disgraceful Transaction of the Bombay 
Government’, in which he linked Manockjee’s case with his cause of the 
freedom of the press in India.
36
 As a response, Major Edward Moor, the 
garrison store keeper, defended his conduct in the next issue. His argument 
was based on the logic of state necessity. He emphasised that he could not 
deal with Cursetjee in the ordinary manner: the purpose of purchasing rice 
should be kept secret, as it was related with the movement of the army to 
Poona, enemy’s capital, during the war.37 In this way, Manockjee’s case 
gradually became famous in London as well as in Bombay. In such a situation, 
the discussion in the Privy Council was held before Judge John Leach, whig 
Master of the Rolls. 
First, it is important to note that the government’s claim of military 
emergency was rejected by the court. It shows that the Privy Council cannot 
simply be equated with the ‘colonial state’. J. B. Bosanquet, the EIC’s 
standing counsel, emphasised that there was certainly ‘a stipulation that th e 
contractor shall not be bound in the case of such a sudden emergency to 
provide for such an extraordinary demand’. 38 But Judge Leach rejected the 
view, as it was not supported by the evidence submitted to the court.
39
 He 
decided that Manockjee was entitled to full compensation for the principal.
40
 
As for the interest, however, the Privy Council reversed the decision of 
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the Recorder’s Court. The debate in the chamber was decidedly moralistic on 
this matter, chiefly due to the speech of Thomas Denman, counsel for 
Manockjee, who embodied the age of reform in the legal world.
41
 He 
criticised the case for being detrimental to the confidence of Indians towards 
the British legal system, stating that ‘the forbearing creditor’ should be 
compensated by ‘the fraudulent debtor’, or otherwise it would induce 
creditors to instantly resort to a legal action without giving their opponents a 
chance to settle the issue.
42
 But Judge Leach was not persuaded. He argued 
that the interest on the unliquidated damages should not be allo wed, because  
 
if such a usage had prevailed, it is the duty of this court as the court of 
ultimate Appeal from India, to reform that usage and to declare that 
without the special authority of the Legislature in this country such a 




This self-proclaimed role as the reformer of Indian legal practice led the Privy 
Council to reject the Manockjee’s argument. Leach was not an enthusiastic 
reformer in Britain,
44
 but his whiggish defence of British legal practice 
resulted in the reform of Indian practice. This Privy Council decision relieved 
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the Court of Directors, who were anxious about West’s judgement which was 
‘a doctrine of such dangerous tendency and so subversive of all the means of 
check and controul established by the constitution’.45 As a result of the 
decision, compensation for Manockjee was reduced from Rs 5,27,000 to Rs 
1,48,000. Manockjee petitioned to the next governor, John Malcolm, to 
reverse the Privy Council’s decision, as it was ‘given either in total ignorance 
or direct disregard of the established usage and practice’. However, the 
governor did not listen and decided that Manockjee should refund the money 
to the government in 18 years with annual payments of Rs 25,000.
46
 
Despite the failure of realising its claim, the case of Cursetjee 
Manockjee was important as an initial attempt of Bombay merchants’ 
resorting to the King’s Court to challenge the government. It heightened the 
government’s anxiety about the King’s Court’s interference, especially 
because they feared that their conduct in wartime would be shackled by the 
independent civil authority’s inspection. This contrast of civil and military 
visions of Indian politics was more noticeably disputed in the next case 
between another Bombay merchant and the government. 
 
III. Refuting the government’s militarist logic of emergency: The case of 
Amerchund Bedreechund 
 
The other notable case in which a Bombay merchant/banker sued the EIC and 
its higher officials was the case of Amerchund Bedreechund v. Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, Henry Dundas Robertson and the East India Company . The 
                                                 
45
 BL, IOR L/L/Box 620 (92), CoD to Gov., 15 Oct. 1828.  
46
 BL, IOR L/L/7/761, C. Monackjee to Gov., 8 July 1829, and C. Monackjee 
to CoD, 23 Aug. 1831. 
92 
process was similar to the Manockjee case: the native merchant petitioned the 
government to realise his demand; the government rejected it; the merchant 
resorted to the King’s Court; the King’s Court decided in favour of the 
merchant; the government appealed to the Privy Council; the Privy Council 
reversed the decision of the King’s Court. The King’s Court’s interference in 
the military affairs was also the main issue of dispute.  The contrasting visions 
of Indian society became a focus of debate in the court room, and the 
government’s military conception of society was challenged by the King’s 
Court’s civilian perspective.  
The case originated in the capture of a peshwa’s treasurer during the 
Third Maratha War (1817–18). In 1817, Narroba Outia, the treasurer, was in 
charge of the fort at Rhygur when it was besieged by British troops. Narroba 
agreed to the terms of capitulation and surrendered the fort; the treasure was 
captured by the British army. However, Captain Robertson, the collector, 
judge and magistrate of Poona, suspected that Narroba hid some of the 
treasure in his house at Poona. Robertson searched Narroba’s house and found 
a large sum of gold. Robertson seized it as booty of war. Narroba claimed it 
was his private property, demanded compensation and started to complain 
about the harsh treatment he received from Robertson. Narroba sent petitions 
to the Deccan Commissioner, William Chaplin, who made an inquiry in 
November 1819 and rejected Narroba’s claim. Narroba filed a suit in the 
Recorder’s Court in 1822 but died soon afterwards and the case was not heard. 
His trustee, Ameerchund Bedreechund, sued the EIC in the Supreme Court in 
1826. Bedreechund was a Hindu banker and merchant dealing with piece 
goods, joys, jewels and precious stones both in Bombay and Poona.
47
 He was 
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the agent of the peshwa sent to Bombay to purchase grain in the famine of 
1803–4.48 
There were two separate cases in the King’s Court, both judged in 
favour of Bedreechund. One was the case of criminal prosecution of 
Bedreechund. It was a long-pending case. In 1820, the Advocate General, 
Ollyett Woodhouse, exhibited an criminal information, on behalf of the king, 
against Amerchund, to recover the damage of principal sum of Rs 48,00,000, 
which was alleged to have been deposited to Amerchund by the peshwa before 
the war. In April 1825, Judge West rejected the government’s allegation and 
gave a verdict in favour of Amerchund.
49
 
The decision of King v. Bedreechund shows one prominent feature of 
the conflict between the government and the King’s Court: the King’s Court 
judges fully utilised their power to admit or reject the evidence. The formal 
allegations of the prosecutor were all disapproved by the court. These 
included the allegation that a war existed between the Company and the 
Peishwa; that ‘the Peishwa held the sovereign power over a large part of the 
Deccan, a country situated within the peninsula of India, and adjacent 
territories’ of the Company; that ‘the whole of his territories, and all his rights 
of sovereignty, were, by conquest and right of war, transferred to the King of 
Great Britain’. West explained the procedural justice of the court in admitting 
or rejecting the evidence: 
 
It is quite clear, that the rules of law require that all facts should be 
proved, of which the Court cannot take judicial notice, however 
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notorious those facts may be. … Nothing, indeed, would produce greater 
uncertainty and more confusion than to allow Judges to take judicial 




But this was not a mere machination of the judge. The requirement of 
precision was, according to Lobban, an essential tradition of the common law 
as a system of remedies.
51
 West further argued that as the judges perform the 
role of a jury as well as a court, they alone were competent to decide upon the 
credibility of witnesses and other facts upon which the verdict of a jury is 
final.
52
 The judges employed this ruling of their sole authority to decide o n 
evidence in the main trover case.  
The trial of Amerchund Bedreechund v. Elphinstone, Robertson and the 
EIC was decided in favour of the plaintiff. Bedreechund employed James 
Morley, notorious for his anti-government attitude, and G. F. Parry as his 
counsel. The Company was defended by George Norton, Advocate General, G. 
I. Irwin (the next Advocate General), and A. S. Le Messurier. This meant that 
five out of the seven barristers in Bombay were involved in the case. The 
judgement was given in November 1826. Morley argued that the defendants 
were guilty of exercising illegal authority; Robertson’s atrocity was 
comparable to the deputies of the French Revolution. However, he continued, 
this trial would prove that the Supreme Court had the authority to redress the ir 
injustice; hundreds of similar cases were to be applied and thousands of 
people would come to complain their torts against the Company, even from 
the independent princes of Hyderabad and Nagpur.
53
 Morley’s hostile speech 
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openly denying the government’s judicial authority worried the government, 
especially because it was made in a court full of Indian inhabitants. But 
Edward West, the chief justice, and Charles Chambers, the puisne judge, 
endorsed this view and gave a judgement in favour of Bedreechund. The court 
ordered the defendants to pay Rs 17,50,000, with costs of Rs 16,000.
54
 
The judgement was based on the judge’s logic of law as opposed to the 
government’s militarism. West argued that the government’s seizure of 
Narroba and his property occurred after the end of the war. Citing Lord 
Mansfield, West argued that Poona was already in a state of peace because: (1) 
a proclamation had been issued by Governor Elphinstone, which promised that 
‘all property, real or personal, will be secure’, and (2) the court s of justice had 
been introduced embodied in the person of Robertson, who was appointed the 
judge of the Company. Therefore, Narroba had ceased to be an alien enemy 
when he was captured, and thus he should have been under the protection of 
the government as a King’s subject. West added that the seizure was not based 
on jure belli, since Naroba was under the protection of the conqueror, and 




The judges’ most important argument was that the King’s Court had 
jurisdiction over the government’s military operation. West articulated that the 
acts of a government were subject to the jurisdiction of municipal courts. In 
order to emphasise the tyrannical nature of the claim of the government , he 
quoted Mansfield’s judgement in Fabrigas v. Mostyn, which stated that ‘to 
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maintain here that every governor, in every place, can act absolutely; that he 
may spoil, plunder, affect their bodies and their liberty, and is accountable to 
nobody, is a doctrine not to be maintained’.56 
Judge Chambers went further to insist that it was not the government 
but the King’s Court that had the power to decide ‘exceptions’ from ordinary 
laws. He admitted that the officers should be allowed latitude of conduct in 
times of war, but this should not be applied in every case: ‘such exceptions, 
however, when they occur, must be shown to rest upon their proper and 
distinct grounds, and cannot be presumed to be right unless the particular 
expediency or necessity is pointed out’.57 In other words, if the King’s Court 
declared so, any acts of the government in times of war could be amenable to 
its jurisdiction. These arguments by West and Chambers were important, as 
they would enable the King’s Court to check the government’s war time 
activities retrospectively. This assertion of military jurisdiction generated a 
strong sense of danger among the government officials.  
The problem was that, as in the case of Manockjee, the government 
could not prove that a state of war existed accord ing to the court’s rulings of 
evidence, and therefore could not protect its officers from the suit in the 
King’s Court. Advocate General Norton reported that much of the defendant’s 
evidence was unfairly rejected by the court. For example, the correspondence 
of the government officials and even the government’s proclamation in the 
Deccan were rejected because the originals were not produced, while that of 
the plaintiff, such as John Malcolm’s despatch to notice the surrender of the 
peshwa, was admitted. He explained that since it was almost impossible to 
prove the very existence of war, and thus the rights of war and conquest, all 
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future proceedings of the EIC servants in these emergencies were to be judged 
by the mere municipal law, rather than as acts of state in bona fide execution 
of the rights of war.
58
 
Furthermore, Elphinstone had to worry about a more direct surveillance 
of the military operation, as Bedreechund demanded the government produce 
its confidential papers relating to the war as evidence. Elphinstone cautioned 
that ‘if the records of every department are once placed at the mercy of every 
attorney who makes an application to the Supreme Court, there can be no 
secrecy in any affair, foreign and domestic, and no confidence in our own 
deliberations, or in the persons with whom we have to communicate in any 
transaction’.59 Elphinstone’s anxiety was based on his understanding that the 
Deccan was still in a state of war. He pointed out that the judges had a false 
view of the state of Poona. It was ‘the  turbulent capital of a country of which 
the conquest was still in progress’.60 In such a situation, the priority of the 
government in the area was to maintain its tranquillity, and thus the 
government’s military operation should be free from the vigilant e yes of the 
King’s Court. 
Elphinstone anticipated a difficult situation in which the government 
officials would be involved in the future. He vindicated Roberson’s conduct in 
the ‘arduous situation at a season between war and peace when he was neither 
safe from the plots of the enemy nor from the scrutiny of a municipal 
court—he had not regulations to direct him and is attacked for following the 
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practice of the Marrattas by which alone he could be guided’. 61 In other 
words, if they could not sufficiently enforce their military control, they would 
be preyed on by their enemies; but if they were too vigilant and too strict in 
following the military (Maratha) way of rule, they could be prosecuted in the 
King’s Court. Elphinstone feared this legal anomaly in which  the government 




The case of Amerchund Bedreechund raised another important concern 
among the government officials which was not observed in the case of 
Cursetjee Manockjee: the summons of witnesses from the mofussil to Bombay 
city. First, the summonses were disliked by the Indian witnesses as they were 
costly and inconvenient. The total cost incurred by witnesses amounted to Rs 
13,000, which was to be paid by the government. Besides, they experienced 
‘much personal inconvenience from being removed from their homes in the 
rains, and obliged to live for two months in a place where they were strangers 
and whose climate and impurities those of them who were Bramin s greatly 
disliked’.63 Also problematic was the summonses of the government officials, 
which was disruptive of their duties in the mofussil. Norton reported that after 
the collector of Sholapore was examined by the court, he applied to return to 
his station, but West refused to grant permission.
64
 
But the government was most alarmed by the summons of the sardars 
(Indian aristocrats). As we shall see in Chapter 4, the government exempted 
them from the Company’s Court. But in the case of Bedreechund, the King’s  
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Court summoned the sardars and their subordinates to Bombay, including the 
most powerful of them, Chintaman Rao Patwardhan.
65
 If they refused to 
attend, they might be prosecuted for contempt of court. The government was 
particularly concerned about the complaints made by the rajas of Satara, the 
descendant of the Chatrapati Sivaji, and Vinchorekur, the most important 
sardar in the Deccan Khandesh. When the servants of the raja of Satara were 
summoned, the raja expressed his surprise that it was issued without any 
previous intimation. The government stated that it would prevent its 
recurrence and solicited him to send the witnesses to Bombay. The raja did so, 
but further complained that the judicial business in his court was delayed by 
it.
66
 The raja of Vinchorekur was also told by the agent of Bedreechund that 
he himself would be summoned. He complained to the government that ‘this 
was a great innovation, and that the chief’s dignity would be entirely ruined in 
the world should he be obliged to appear at the bar of the court at Bombay’.67 
Eventually the agents of Amerchund said they would summon not the raja 
himself but only two of his karkoons. The raja sent another presentment to the 
government, in which he stated that ‘I am not in the situation of a private 
individual, but a Sirdar, such being the case, should such proceedings 
continue to be adopted towards me, then how will  my respectability be 
preserved’?68 
Receiving these reports, Elphinstone expressed his grave sense of 
danger. He said these proceedings would certainly convince the sardars that 
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the Supreme Court could threaten them and the government had no power to 
prevent it. In consequence, he continued, chiefs would feel considerable 
uneasiness at the Supreme Court’s ‘exercise of sovereignty’ within thei r 
territories and think that the King’s Court was equal to the government. He 
concluded that ‘a good deal of the ferment in the Deckan was produced by the 
general circulation of these summonses’. But, at the same time, he could do 
nothing but recommend the sardars to obey the summonses, as these 
summonses were ‘issued as a mere matter of course by an officer of the court 
without the judges having the least control over the issue of them and that this 
is the established practice of the court’.69 
Indeed, Elphinstone anticipated that the King’s Court’s interference 
would provoke a collapse of the EIC’s rule in the mofussil. He drafted a 
despatch to the Court of Directors to obtain an immediate redress.
70
 He 
warned that a false impression was spread in the Deccan that all who were 
opposed to the government would be supported by the Supreme Court. He 
predicted that ‘great confusion will be produced … [and] it will be necessary 
for us to keep up a more vigilant control over the Chiefs and to alter our plan 
of government to one of great strictness in all respects’. Elphinstone referred 
to an example of the raja of Kolhapur, who was reported to apply to the 
Supreme Court to set aside his peace treaty with the government.
71
 He 
cautioned the Court of Directors that the notion of the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court was so erroneous to allow it to ‘interfere in questions purely 
political’, and the court would certainly interfere in all such questions with 
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reasonable outlook. In another minute, Elphinstone worried that the Indians 
even believed the alteration of the government from the EIC to the Supreme 
Court at the expiration of the charter in 1834.
72
 These comments illustrate the 
location of the sense of crisis caused by the King’s Court in the mofussil: it 
would unleash the disloyal rallying of the independent chiefs and sardars 
around the King’s Court to challenge the government.  
On his part, Bedreechund was rapid in reaping the benefit of the 
judgement. Immediately after the judgement, he petitioned the government 
about a case filed against him in the adalat. Amerchund insisted that the 
register or Deccan Commissioner did not have any legal power to act as a 
judge, as the King, not the EIC, was the sole judicial authority in the Deccan, 
which was admitted by the Supreme Court. The government declined the 




Considering these points, the government could do nothing but to 
appeal to the Privy Council.
74
 Bedreechund had died soon after the judgement  
of the Supreme Court, and now his cause was succeeded by his trustees, 
Heerachund Bedreechund and Jetmul Anoopchund. They employed reformist 
lawyers in Britain in the same way as Cursetjee Manockjee did. Their agent in 
London was solicitor John Hopton Forbes, a relation of radical MP Charles 
Forbes. John Williams, KC, a staunch whig MP, and Thomas Denman, the 
counsel for Cursetjee Manockjee, spoke for Bedreechund and Anoopchund in 
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 The judge was Lord Tenderden, the high tory Lord Chief Justice. 
The government asserted that the King’s Court, as the municipal court, did not 
have jurisdiction over the military conduct of the government and that their 
evidence was unfairly rejected. The Bedreechund side reiterated that the 
property was Narroba’s and that the seizure was civilly illegal as it was done 
in peacetime, not war.
76
 The judgement was given in July 1830. The Privy 
Council overturned the decision in Bombay.  
It seems that party politics influenced the decision of the case. The 
course of debate was determined by the intervention of Attorney General 
James Scarlett, newly converted tory lawyer/politician and protégé of 
Wellington, whose influence over Tenterden was notorious.
77
 He made a long 
speech in favour of the EIC, emphasising that the Supreme Court did not have 
jurisdiction over the conduct of Robertson, as he was a military officer rather 
than a civil administrator who was amenable to a municipal court.
78
 
Accordingly, Lord Tenterden judged in favour of the Bombay government, 
saying that the seizure was made in a time of war over which a municipal 
court had no jurisdiction.
79
 In this way, the tory Privy Council endorsed the 
military ideology of the Bombay government.  
Bedreechund and Anoopchund did not abandon their cause there. They 
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connected the Bedreechund case with a larger political controversy over the 
distribution of the Deccan Prize Money.
80
 A month after the judgement, 
Bedreechund and Anoopchund petitioned the trustees of the Deccan booty, the 
Duke of Wellington and Charles Arbuthnot, and demanded to suspend its 
distribution, as it was partly Narroba’s private property. This eventually led to 
another meeting at the Privy Council.
81
 Tenterden again rejected their 
argument.
82
 Wellington’s influence was not small in this case as in others. 83 
He demanded the full attendance of the councillors at the meeting,
84
 which 
was important because every councillor had an equal vote.
85
 This time, his 
protégé Scarlett was the counsel for the Bombay government. So Elphinstone 
and Robertson got strong support from Wellington and his legal ministers who 
could dominate the Appeals Committee. 
Like Manockjee, Bedreechund and Anoopchund collaborated with the 
radicals in Britain. The case was reported in the Oriental Herald with 
comments by Buckingham. He argued that it exemplified the deficiency and 
corruption of the Company’s judicial system in the mofussil run under 
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‘despotic violence’.86 It was alleged that Joseph Hume ordered Bedreechund 
and Anoopchund to write a petition in order to use it in the Commons 
debate.
87
 Furthermore, the radicals used the case for demanding reform of the 
Privy Council, which had been urged by Henry Brougham,
88
 by emphasising 
Narroba’s personal calamities in parliament.89 The linkage strategy with the 
Deccan Prize Money case might be proposed by the radicals, who had used it 
to criticise the government before.
90
 In this way, the Bedreechund case was 
used to vindicate judicial reforms both at home and in the colony. This did not 
necessarily mean that the Bombay merchants identified themselves with the  
causes of radicals, but it certainly meant that the Bombay merchants had a 
specific interest in radicalism in Britain, as it could increase their means to 




This chapter has pointed out that the Indian merchants’ demand for 
compensation for damages incurred in times of war resulted in the general 
debate on the character of British governance in India. In the midst of the 
crisis in the 1820s, the government’s militarist logic of emergency was 
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challenged by the judges’ civilian logic of law. Officials feared that the King’s 
Court’s rulings, accompanied with its claim of sovereign status, would hinder 
the government’s conduct of war in the future and disturb the tranquillity of 
the newly conquered territories. In the end, the government’s insistence of 
state necessity was sanctioned in the appeal cases, and the judges’ alternative 
vision of colonial governance was rejected. This fact was important for later 
developments of colonial jurisprudence in the nineteenth century because the 
reformed Judicial Committee of the Privy Council since 1833 strictly followed 
the principle of stare decisis across the empire. That is, the decision in these 
cases must be followed by all local courts in the colonies.
91
 Precedent made 
in the cases of Bedreechund were indexed and promulgated in the form of law 
reports across the empire.
92
 The Judicial Committee followed the decision, 
for example, in the case of Marais (1901) from the Cape Colony in the Boar 
War, endorsing the inferior court’s dec ision that the arrest under a martial law 
was not cognizable by a civil court and provoking the criticism of liberals.
93
 
The cases examined in this chapter highlighted the pattern which 
strengthened the government’s despotism. The Bombay merchants actively 
relied on the imperial network of lawyers and radicals. Those lawyers who 
had an anti-establishment inclination such as Attorney Ayrton or Barrister 
Morley were essential as the source of legal knowledge and techniques and as 
agents inside and outside the court. Radical MPs such as Hume, Buckingham 
and Forbes and reformist lawyers such as Denman enabled them to access 
metropolitan journalists, lawyers and politicians and provided them the 
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language of corruption and reform to criticise the government. This Indian 
agency inevitably hardened the attitude of the government. This pattern—the 
Indian agency and the King’s Court’s collaboration led to the reactions of the 
government—accumulated the examples in which the rule of law was denied 
and the logic of emergency was sanctioned even in times of peace. This was 
the mechanism through which the Company’s garrison -state ideology was 
promulgated. 
Put another way, the cases examined in this chapter show that the 
government’s perspective of the Indian government was derived by the 
emergencies in the mofussil, while that of the King’s Court was based on the 
civilian rule of law in the presidency town. While the government wanted to 
cut off the presidency town from the mofussil and applied different logics to 
them, the King’s judges insisted that the civilian rule of law should be 
expanded to the mofussil. These contrasting visions of the government were 
directly and most harshly contested over the King’s Court’s interference in the 
government’s mofussil governance, which  is the theme of the following 
chapters. 
107 




The Bombay government officials were concerned about the effects of British 
legal institutions on the traditional social order. They thought that British law 
was essentially repugnant to the feeling of the Indians and disturbed 
tranquillity in the mofussil. Thus Elphinstone ordered in his circular in 1819 
that the panchayat should be the principal instrument of civil justice,  
 
but it must be exempt from all new forms of interference and regulation 
on our part. Such forms would throw over this institution that mystery 
which enables litigious people to employ courts of justice as engines of 
intimidation against their neighbours, and which renders necessary a 





Economic historians have not paid enough attention to the reasons of this 
antipathy towards the introduction of the British court. This is because they 
are more interested in the socio-economic levelling effects of the Company’s 
Court on Indian rural society than its political consequences. As a result, the 
court is often seen as a transparent devise through which the agrarian 
relationship was mechanically determined.
2
 Instead, we need to pay more 
attention to the ideas and agency of those who used the court and those who 
constituted it. In other words, we need to examine the conditions and contexts 
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under which the levelling effects of the court were promoted or restrained by 
the colonial government. 
David Washbrook’s discussion on the Company’s Court and agrarian 
relationship is suggestive in this respect. He argues that the court of law in 
India in the early nineteenth century was essentially a political rather than a 
legal institution: 
 
The practice of the Anglo-Indian law cannot be divorced from the 
political structure of the colonial state. It never achieved autonomy from 
‘the executive’. … Its concern with ‘traditional’ social norms, while no 
doubt reflecting a genuine desire to avoid social disturbance, also aided 





This passage captures the government’s political perspective on the 
Company’s Court. As Washbrook points out, the economic activities in India 
revolved around the Company’s business of government, and the Company’s 
Court was given a pivotal role in facilitating it. It was this political 
significance of the Company’s Court that was at stake in the King’s Cour t’s 
interventions in the Company’s local administration in the mofussil, which I 
examine in this chapter. 
The conflict between the government and the King’s Court in the 
mofussil is far less noticed than that between the government and the 
Company’s Court. But, although the cases examined here were not as dramatic 
as those against the Company or its governors, nonetheless they posed serious 
problems for the government, especially for its collectors and judges in the 
mofussil. The King’s Court’s jurisdiction  was limited to the presidency town 
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of Bombay. But the troubles were caused by the fact that the Indians living in 
the mofussil came to Bombay city to file suits in the King’s Court. They did 
so because they could reap benefits from their jurisdictional jockeying 
between the King’s Court and the Company’s Court.  
There were various practical obstacles posed by the King’s Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction in the mofussil, which hindered the government’s 
business. First the officials’ regular duties were obstructed by the court’s 
summonses of the government officials as witnesses of civil and criminal 
cases in the King’s Court. Furthermore, the sheriff’s execution of the writ 
sometimes caused commotions in the mofussil, which worried the Company’s 
magistrates. They resisted it or refused to assist the bailiffs, but, in such cases, 
they were prosecuted in the King’s Court for contempt of the court.  
Another, far more serious problem of the King’s Court was related to 
the government’s revenue collection. The case in  point was the use of the 
Kings’ Court by revenue defaulters to overturn the decree of the Company’s 
Court. In these cases, the revenue debtors ‘colluded’ with their friends and 
relatives in Bombay city and abused the writ process of the King’s Court. The 
defendant solicited support for the government. Such acts of jurisdictional 
jockeying by the revenue debtors alarmed the Company’s officials, who were 
always pressured to raise the amount of revenue by Bombay Castle and whose 
imperative was the maximisation of revenue. The regulations and the 
Company’s Court were vital for the government’s revenue administration in 
the mofussil. The collectors were given revenue jurisdiction and could 
directly attach the properties of revenue defaulters. More commonly, the 
collectors sued the defaulters in the Company’s judiciary. This placed the 
collector under the same footing as a private party, and enabled him to collect 




 The overturning of the decree of the Company’s Court 
curtailed the efficiency of debt recovery.  
But the problem was not limited to the practical obstacles to revenue 
business. The political authority of the Company’s revenue administration was 
at stake. As Ballhatchet suggests, the regulations and the Company’s Court 
were vitally important for upholding the legitimacy of the collector’s 
discretionary measures of revenue collection. He quotes Elphinstone’s 
comment: ‘The most extensive exercise of discretion passes unquestioned if 
authorised by a statute and exerted in a specific form; but the smallest act of 
authority becomes suspected if there is anything informal in the 
proceedings’.5 Ultimately, the collection of revenue was the right of the 
sovereign. In pre-colonial western India, its control was the practical 
expression of Maratha sovereignty, and the denial of its payment was the 
expression of sedition and rebellion.
6
 The British followed suit after the 
conquest. Elphinstone declared the establishment of the British rule in the 
Deccan by issuing a proclamation in 1818 which prohibited all persons from 
‘paying revenue to Bajee Row or his adherents’. 7 The British collectors were 
the representative of British sovereignty. The King’s Court’s exercise of the 
jurisdiction in the mofussil was tantamount to the denial of the Company’s 
revenue sovereignty. Because of this, the jurisdictional problem of the King’s 
Court posed a new, general threat to the Company’s governance in the 
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II. Popularity of the Company’s Court 
 
The context of the King’s Court’s increasing interference in the mofussil was 
the Company’s Court’s popularity among the Indians. When the Konkan and 
Gujarat were ceded to the British in 1817, the Indians in the provinces rushed 
to the newly established British courts of law. Local creditors such as native 
bankers, merchants and moneylenders used the more regular process of the 
adalat to sue their debtors living in villages, hills and mountains.
8
 According 
to Chaplin, the numbers of cases instituted in the Deccan for the years 
1819/20, 1820/21, and 1821/22 were 6,522, 6,370 and 9,660 respectively.
9
 
The number increased significantly in the late 1820s. The following table 
shows the number of original suits in civil cases for 1825–8.10 
 
   1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 (first half) 
Deccan 
Instituted  12,405 15,173 24,969 25,041 6,092 
Decided  13,403 14,779 24,465 25,488 7,344 
Depending  2,991 3,383 3,886 3,439 2,187 
Old Provinces 
Instituted  25,586 24,300 32,178 60,945 10,188 
Decided  23,326 26,376 28,811 64,460 11,125 
Depending  5,608 3,532 7,878 4,357 2,380 
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There were on average 955 appeal cases per annum in the Old Provinces and 
615 in the Deccan between 1825 and 1828.
11
 
The majority of the suits were instituted by Indians. The statistics show 
that in the first half of 1827 and 1828 the numbers of suits instituted by 
Europeans were 2,762 and 3,249 while those by Indians were 19,787 and 
52,752.
12
 Elphinstone noted that the major subjects of litigation were 
boundary disputes, division of property on the separation of families, 
inheritance to land (‘which is perhaps the greatest source of litigation 
throughout the whole country’), and debts to bankers. 13 St John Thackeray, 
the collector of Dharwar in the Southern Maratha Country, classified the suits 
in his district (see appendix 1). It shows a wide range of issues of conflict, 
including debts, share of family property, grain or cotton trade, sales of jewels, 




A major reason of the popularity was the fact that the formal, egalitarian 
and mechanical working of the British courts enabled the creditors to recover 
debts more easily. The former mode of debt collection through the village 
panchayat was unfavourable for the moneylenders as the panchayat was often 
constituted by the village authorities inclined to protect the ryots in their 
villages.
15
 The lack of local knowledge on the part of the British was another 
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root cause of the increase of litigations. As Pamela Price points out, the 
Indians could easily manipulate the course and result of the trials since the 
British judges could not understand the details of local affairs.
16
 Indeed, the 
Poona collector H. D. Robertson had to admit that sometimes the Indian 
litigants had a better knowledge about legal procedures than he did.
17
 The 
panchayat suffered from the same problem. Chaplin noted in his report in 
1822 that ‘frivolous and groundless complaints’ were ‘mainly owing to our 
want of acquaintance with personal character, which leads to Punchaets being 
ill constituted. … all who have bad causes prefer the Udalut [than ghur 
sumjhoots or private adjustments]’.18 
Some socio-economic factors also promoted the use of the adalat in 
Bombay in the 1820s. The first was the agricultural depression. As Sumit 
Guha demonstrates, prices fell dramatically at the beginning of the British 
rule in the Deccan and did not recover until the 1850s.
19
 Chaplin analysed 
that the low price of grain was partly caused by the diminution of demand due 
to the ‘annihilation of Paishwa’s court and army’, the disappearance of the 
British military establishment, the commercial interruption before and during 
the war, the emigration of many families following Baji Rao to Bithoor and 
Benares, and the diminution of the amount of currency withdrawn or hidden 
by the peshwa. The fall of prices furnished ‘a plausible subject of complaint to 
the Ryut’.20 Collector Thackeray remarked that the scarcity of grain increased 
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the grain trade and the suits relating to it.
21
 
Second, the ryots in the mofussil were deeply embedded in the chain of 
public and private debts. Elphinstone commented that in the Deccan, the 
whole of the agricultural population was plunged in debt.
22
 Chaplin likewise 
reported that the ryots were ‘much in debt to Sahookars and Merchants, owing 
to the oppressions of the Revenue Contractors’, and their condition was like 
‘the hellish torments of Sisyphus’ who sometimes mortgaged their miras fields 
as security for these debts.
23
 The creditors included almost all the savers of 
money, such as higher government servants, pleaders, merchants, brokers, 
owners of trading boats, or better classes of landholders.
24
 The Bombay 
government reported to the Court of Directors that the i lliterate ryots of the 
Konkan were at the mercy of the Khot creditors.
25
 
Accordingly, debt recovery was one of the major uses of the Company’s 
Court. Thackeray’s statistics showed that about 40 percent of suits in Dharwar 
were related to either ‘deposits, advances, assignments, interest and other 
money transactions’ or ‘bond debts’. The background was that, in many parts 
of the Deccan, the ryots paid the whole of their rents through the savakars 
(moneylenders) by giving up the entire corps to them. The savakars charged 
interest for all the advances, which reduced the ryots to ‘the condition of a 
menial slave’. District and village officials were also indebted to the savakars 
as they mortgaged their enam lands and became unable to pay the quit rents, 
resulting in the sequestration of the lands. The amount  of debts increased 
rapidly as the savakar closed the account periodically, added interest to the 
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principal, and took a new bond.
26
 The savkars’ exploitation by means of the 
adalat was much resented in later years. A petition signed by 7,215 ryots in 
1840 lamented, for example, that they were unwillingly dragged into the court 
of law, extorted money by the vakeels, deprived of their land based on 
unfamiliar regulations, and forced to appeal.
27
 
In addition to personal debt, the problem of village debts was a major 
concern of the district officials. Elphinstone explained that in cases of unusual 
expenses such as employing sebundies for defence or ‘paying an enemy or an 
insurgent for forbearance’, the village could not pay them at once and 
contracted a public debt which was paid by annual assessments or by 
mortgages or grands of land.
28
 Chaplin reported that ‘[a]lmost every village 
throughout the Mahratta country is involved in debts’, which were commonly 
arisen from the exactions of the Maratha government. The vil lage headmen 
contracted the advance of taccavi loan for the purchase of the seed, grain and 
cattle and, before the instalment of their first revenue, also contracted loans 
with the savakars who paid the revenue to the government. The savakars were 
also called for to pay many forced contributions (puttees). The extent of debts 
was difficult to estimate but ‘would probably be found to exceed the means of 
the country to discharge them’. As the government banned the charge of extra 
assessment for repaying them and the private use of coercion (tuggaza), the 
only means to recover these debts was the Company’s Court. 29 The collectors 
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could not decide whether a claim was bona fide or not, because the sum was 
great and the creditors so numerous.
30
 Collector Briggs of Khandesh reported 
that the villages of Nimboree and Kirdee borrowed Rs 16,000 and Rs 1,235 
respectively for meeting the demands of the Pindaris with yearly rates of 100 
to 120 percent.
31
 The panchayat was expected to settle such disputes, but 
appeals against its awards were common.
32
 These factors promoted the 
popularity of the Company’s Court. I now turn to the accompanying rise of the 
use of the King’s Court, and the government officials’ difficulty in dealing 
with it. 
 
III. Summons of government officers 
 
The King’s Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the mofussil was problematic in 
many ways. First, it obstructed the ordinary business of revenue and judicial 
administration. Particularly problematic were the summonses issued to the 
government officials in the mofussil as witnesses and jurors. Attending to 
summonses was costly and time-consuming. The judges summoned to a 
criminal case were demanded to produce documents in their courts only in a 
week or so. The magistrates (that is, collectors) and their assistants were 
ordered to make a testimony about the situation in which they committed 
European criminals. Non-attendance was fined (often Rs 1,000). The officials 
had to obtain permission from the government, as they were prohibited to 
leave their station without one.
33
 Indian officers such as the mufti (Islamic 
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law scholar) were also summoned to the court as witnesses.
34
 The officials 
complained about the summonses and requested government to send 
representation to the court.
35
 The court could also issue commissions to the 
officials in the mofussil to act for the business of the court. For example, the 
judges of sadr foujdari adalat were issued commissions to take evidence in a 




Sometimes the summonses might completely stop the local 
administration. In January 1824, E. H. Baillie, the judge in the Northern 
Konkan, was summoned to the Supreme Court. On this occasion, Saville 
Marriott, the Northern Konkan collector, and Thomas Charles Fraser, the 
collector of sea customs in the Konkan, were also summoned to the court. 
This meant that all the government’s high officials would be absent from the 
Northern Konkan. The government pointed out that their attendance in these 
trials appeared unnecessary. The Supreme Court was asked to make an 
application to the government before summoning public officers.
37
 
Officials in Bombay city were troubled by summonses to the grand and 
petty juries. Since the King’s Court was the court of oyer and terminer and 
gaol delivery, the sheriff of Bombay could summon the inhabitants of Bombay 
city as grand jurors.
38
 The duty of jury was disliked by the British. Richard 
                                                                                                                                          
1826. In the 1820s, it took 2 days from Thana, Northern Konkan, to Bombay, 
10 days from Poona, Deccan, 20–21 days from Surat, Gujarat, and 38 days 
from Dharwar, Southern Konkan. The journey cost Rs 10 a day. Bombay 
Almanac and Calendar (Bombay, 1828), Appendix, 47–52. 
34
 MSA, JD, 1821, 18B/21, 109–16, Assistant judge to Gov., 14 Mar. 1821.  
35
 BL, IOR P/399/27, BJC 22 Oct. 1823, 4443, W. Chaplin to Gov., 7 Sep. 
1823. 
36
 BL, IOR P/399/25, BJC 8 July 1823, 3046, Sadr adalat to Gov., 6 June 
1823. 
37
 MSA, JD, 1824, 18/79, 33–44. 
38
 Morley, Digest, ii. 667, Bombay Supreme Court Charter, XLIV.  
118 
Thomas Goodwin, a member of the council, even suggested allowing 
summary convictions of felonies because, if they were all sent to the jury trial 
in the Supreme Court, ‘the juries must be assembled from day to day to the 
intolerable and ruinous inconvenience of individuals from month’s end to 
month’s end, such an encroachment on the pursuits of indus trious shopmen 
and others would be a public misfortune’. 39 
Officials’ summonses to the jury hindered the routines of the business of 
government. In 1826, for example, William Newnham, the chief secretary, 
reported that he and the secretaries of the revenue and the judicial 
departments (i.e. all the secretaries of the Bombay government) received 
summonses to attend the grand jury. He said that if one or all of them were to 
attend to the court, it could cause an entire interruption of the duties of their 
departments during the days in which the grand jury would sit.
40
 Newnham 
detailed the inconvenience as follows. During three and half days in which he 
attended the grand jury, the whole business of the political and military 
departments had been stopped. When he came back to his office, he found 
‘fifty nine public letters lying unopened on his table besides numerous private 
references on official subjects’. He added that some important despatches 
would not have been sent if the grand jury was not suspended in the  second 
day to enable him to attend the council meeting and to send them.
41
 
Sometimes the principal and deputy in a same department were summoned in 
                                                 
39
 BL, IOR F/4/1336/52921, 355–7, BGC 4 Jan. 1826, no. 16, R. T. Goodwin, 
minute, 23 Dec. 1825. 
40
 MSA, General Department [hereafter GD], 1826, 24/132, 7–8, BGC 29 Mar. 
1826, Chief Sectary’s memorandum, 25 Jan. 1826. The government officials 
at Calcutta and Madras also complained about the service in the grand jury. 
Ibid., 9–16. 
41
 Ibid., 21–3, William Newnham to Gov., 28 Apr. 1826. For importance of 
secretaries, see Peers, Mars and Mammon, 35–6. 
119 
the same sessions, provoking resentment.
42
 
Similarly, the sadr adalat judges, after their seats were moved fr om 
Surat to Bombay, complained their summons to the grand jury. In 1829, for 
example, the chief justice and an acting puisne judge were summoned to the 
grand jury. They said that they should be exempted from it as in Calcutta and 
Madras.
43
 A week later, the judges further complained that the sadr adalat had 
to be adjourned as the register was summoned to the grand jury. They begged 
the government to obtain exemption of the register as well.
44
 In another 
example, the Persian Secretary, who was in charge of the  government’s 
correspondence with the Indian princes and the sardars, was summoned to the 
grand jury at the same time as his writer was summoned to the petit jury. This 
caused delay in their business.
45
 The attendance to the juries was mandatory, 
and if they ignored it, they were to be fined or imprisoned for the contempt of 
the court.
46
 In this way, the government officials were dragged into the 
business of the King’s Court, and they resented that the efficiency of the local 
administration was hindered. 
In addition to these practical obstacles, the officers thought that the 
summonses sometimes injured the government’s respectability and political 
authority. When Francis Warden, a member of the council, was summoned, his 
testimony was heard in the witness box. This was contrary to the convention 
that the members of the council were invited to the bench to speak to the court. 
Humiliated, Warden complained to the governor and even sent his 
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remonstrance to the Court of Directors.
47
 The chief justice claimed that 
Warden did not have any positive right to be heard in the bar. The President of 
the Board of Control, though admitting that he did not have such positive right, 
stated that it had been conventional to show such courtesy to officers of high 
rank both in Britain and in India, and it was materially important in India 
where ceremonial demonstration of authority was important for the stability of 
the rule.
48
 Thomas Munro, the governor of Madras, heard of the event from 
Elphinstone and commented that the judge was in a state of ‘legal madness’.49 
In 1827, Elphinstone wished the Board of Control to exempt the governor and 
the members of the council from the summonses to the grand jury.
50
 But the 
trouble of summonses continued throughout the 1820s, and the government 
officers frequently complained about them. 
 
IV. Writ and disturbance in the mofussil  
 
Besides the interruption of revenue and judicial routines, the government 
officials were concerned that the execution of the King’s Court’s writs by the 
sheriff and his officers would provoke disturbances in rural society. When a 
decree was issued in a civil case, the sheriff appointed bailiffs among his 
officers and sent them to the mofussil to execute the writ. As in England, they 
were vested with the discretionary power to  resort to any means to execute it. 
For example, when they could not attach the property of the defendant, he 
could attach those of the debtors of the defendant. It was mandatory for all 
British subjects to support it. The sheriff’s officers usually went to the 
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Company’s magistrates to request assistance to their execution. But 
sometimes the inhabitants in the mofussil resisted the attachment when, for 
example, they were a third part debtor, or when they simply doubted the 
validity of the writ. For example, in 1823 in Rajapur, the Southern Konkan, 
the execution of writ was violently disrupted by over 200 Brahmans and 
Bhatias with the support of the local kamavisdar.
51
 From the fear of such 
violent incidents, sometimes the government’s officers refused to assi st the 
execution and provoked the judges’ criticism.  
The issue was first disputed in the case of one Balla Gunness Sette in 
1817. He was a vakeel of the Company’s Court at Thana investigating 
embezzlement cases in the collector’s office. He succeeded in re vealing the 
corruption of Indian servants, but one of them named Govind Abbajee 
conspired with Balla Gunness’s creditor and filed a suit in the Recorder’s 
Court.
52
 The sheriff’s officers came to Thana  to execute the writ, but the 
judge and magistrate of the Company, Stephen Babington, resisted it, thinking 
that he was outside the jurisdiction of the King’s Court. 53 The government 
supported Balla Gunness, but Recorder Alexander Anstruther judged against 
him.
54
 Macklin reported that in the court the recorder said that he would not 
listen to such a doubt on the jurisdiction and that, if further resistance was 
made by Babington, he should be taken into custody.
55
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There were several elements which made the officials critical of the 
sheriff’s execution. The conspiracy between the plaintiff and the defendant 
was the one, as indicated in the above case. Another was that the sheriff often 
skipped proper procedures of debt recovery through the court, directly 
collected money from the third party debtors and distributed it to the creditors. 
This was resented by the Company’s Advocate General as ‘a most illegal 
practice’ prevalent in the mofussil.56 The officers also apprehended the lack 
of legal protection when they assisted the execution. Unlike the sheriff, they 
were not protected by the indemnity bond and might incur personal losses if 
the process was wrong. Some of the officers refused assistance for this 
reason.
57
 Another problem was false writs. It was easy to pretend to be the 
bailiffs. In 1823, Southern Konkan Magistrate J. A. Dunlop reported that no 
inhabitants in the district could judge whether the Recorder’s Court’s papers 
were genuine or not because they could not read them when written in English. 
He suggested that it was desirable to devise some measures by which the local 




The problem of the sheriff’s writ manifested itself in 1820, when H. D. 
Robertson, the collector, magistrate and judge of Poona, refused to assist the 
sheriff’s officers and arrested them for disturbing the tranquillity of the 
locality. Robertson was prosecuted by the sheriff in the Recorder’s Court and 
judged guilty for the contempt of court. The case was a sensation for the 
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 The case was filed by a collision between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. The plaintiff was a Bombay merchant named Gungjee Purshotum, 
and the defendants were Poona merchants, Goculdass Natha and Wittul Hurka. 
The court judged in favour of the plaintiff and issued the writ of f ieri facias. 
The sheriff’s officers were sent to Poona to execute it. They broke into a 
house of one Bappoo Angull, an agent of Wittul, and seized his property in his 
house. There was a dispute between Goculdass and Bappoo over a property, 
and Goculdass colluded with Gungjee to take a property back from Bappoo. 
Bappoo and his associates resisted the seizure, saying that they would employ 
men and take it back by force. The bailiff replied that ‘Here all you Bramins 
make gentlemen believe anything. But the case is very different in our 
Bombay’. Bappoo replied, ‘What imprudent folks these Bombay people are’. 
Bappoo solicited support for Robertson. Robertson saw this conduct as an 
illegal trespass and seizure of property and arrested the sheriff’s officers. 60 
This case highlighted the difference between the district officers and 
Bombay Castle. The government did not approve Robertson’s conduct. He 
was told that the sheriff’s writ ran throughout the presidency and that the only 
remedy for Bappoo was to prosecute the sheriff or his officers in the 
Recorder’s Court. Robertson and his superior William Chaplin, the Deccan 
Commissioner, were instructed to release the sheriff’s officers immediately. 61 
Chaplin and Robertson did not accept it. Robertson justified his conduct  by 
saying that ‘the English law does not permit’ to seizure someone’s property 
without a decree, and the sheriff’s officers were illegal as they broke into the 
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house ‘without legal authority’.62 Robertson and Chaplin’s opposition was 
based on a general concern that the King’s Court’s procedure was alien and 
harsh to the Indians. Chaplin strongly urged that some measure should be 
taken to ‘prevent the permanent establishment of the English Code with all its 
appurtenances, in a conquered territory, whose inhabitants, religion, laws, 
moral habits, customs and prejudices are totally repugnant to … our British 
institutions’.63 Robertson insisted that the Indians should not be subjected to 
‘a power, the nature or extent of which had not been explained to them’. It 
was unjust because, while sheriff’s officers could seize anyone’s property, 
those who were seized of it could only obtain redress by going to Bombay and 
filing a ruinously expensive suit against the officers.
64
 
In this case, then, the government endorsed the logic of law as opposed 
to the district officials’ political sense of crisis. The Company’s Solicitor, 
William Ashburner Morgan, pointed out that Robertson was personally liable 
to the Recorder’s Court’s attachment for impeding the sheriff’s execution, a nd 
he was also liable to a civil action for damages. Morgan stated that Bappoo 
should have resorted to the King’s Court for redress by suing the sheriff. The 
inconvenience of the suit in Bombay was ‘imaginary’: Bappoo only needed to 
write to some agent in Bombay to make the suit, or even coming to Bombay 
by himself was not a great hardship. He should not seek redress outside the 
court, and Robertson’s act was an ‘illegal interference’. The recorder William 
David Evans decided that Robertson was guilty for contempt and ordered him 
to pay Rs 387 as damages. Evans concluded that any magistrate would incur 
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the penalty if he would take the similar conduct.
65
 
The contrast between the Bombay government and its district officials 
was also marked in another case in 1826, which shows that the government 
was rather concerned about the discretionary intervention of the district 
officers which could impair the regular working of the judicial system. In 
1826, R. K. Arbuthnot, the first assistant of the Poona Collector and 
Magistrate, refused to assist the sheriff’s officers, when a property of a Gosain, 
a third party debtor, was seized by the collusion of the parties. He thought that 
it was ‘the breach of peace’ and recommended the government to notify the 
sheriff that, if he continued to give such orders ‘by which serious disturbances 
and impositions are likely to happen’, his officers would be treated like other 
offenders.
66
 But the Bombay government and its law officers disliked the 
magistrate’s summary intervention in the writ process of the King’s Court.67 
In the end, Arbuthnot was told that resisting giving assistance to the sheriff’s 
officers was ‘the breach of peace’.68 
In this way, the district officials and the government took two different 
approaches. The officials suggested that disciplinary control and discretionary 
intervention were necessary in order to maintain tranquillity of the mofussil. 
On the other hand, the government and its law officers saw the maintenance of 
regularity as more important and tried to retain the existing relationship with 
the King’s Court as far as possible. But as we shall see , this cautious attitude 
of Bombay Castle gradually changed in the late 1820s. The district officials’ 
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sense of danger started to overweigh Bombay Castle’s legalist perspective. As 
we shall see, accumulation of similar cases of jurisdictional conflict hardened 
the attitudes of Bombay Castle. 
 
V. Revenue defaulters’ jurisdictional jockeying 
 
While the magistrates were concerned about the danger of commotion in the 
mofussil caused by the King’s Court, the judges of the Company’s Court were 
worried about a more abstract but equally urgent threat of the King’s Court on 
their judicial authority. The problem originated in the Indians’ jurisdictional 
jockeying: they used the King’s Court to overturn the decree of the 
Company’s Court. This was a favoured strategy of revenue defaulters to evade 
debt recovery, which ultimately changed the government’s conciliatory 
attitude towards the King’s Court.  
First, the King’s Court was used to overturn the decision of the 
panchayat, the traditional arbitration system in Maharashtra. It was regarded 
as the fit mode of justice in the newly acquired territories, and its use was 
actively promoted by the Bombay government.
69
 In 1819, Frederick Ayrton, a 
Bombay attorney, sent several letters to the inhabitants in inam villages in the 
Southern Konkan, who were the parties to the cases already decided in the 
panchayat.
70
 In one case, he sent a peon to demand the payment of debts. The 
government reprimanded Ayrton, whose acts were ‘in defiance of the native 
civil authority’.71 
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The judges of the Company’s Court well recognised that Indians’ 
jurisdictional jockeying was the cause of the problem. They were worried 
about the erosion of the government’s authority. In June 1823, for example, E. 
H. Baillie, the Northern Konkan judge, reported that a property bought by a 
public auction of the zilla court was attached by the King’s Court and sold to 
an inhabitant of Bombay. Baillie stated that this was harmful to the  
Company’s judicial authority because it would give an impression that a 
decree of the zilla court was rendered useless without the consent of the 
government, and that even the property purchased through the adalat and 
guaranteed under deed by the zilla court was insecure. He emphasised that it 
was of ‘great importance’ that ‘the natives should look up to and place the 
greatest confidence in their legally constituted courts of justice … and to 
consider that their acts can alone be set aside by the Government, to whom an 
appeal is always open’.72 Baillie pointed out that, if similar cases were 
allowed in the future, every property was to be placed out of the search of the 
zilla court, even if it was situated in the Company’s territory, as its owner 
could do so by making himself amenable to the King’s Court. 73 
This kind of jurisdictional jockeying was facilitated by several factors. 
First, it was encouraged by the tardiness of the process of the adalat. An 
official reported that a suitor in the King’s Court had sufficient time to 
commence his action, receive judgement, obtain a writ of execution (fieri 
facias) and recover debts against the defendant before the Company’s Court 
could execute its judgement.
74
 Second, the use of the King’s Court was 
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facilitated by the high cost of making a countersuit against the sheriff’s 
officers. In 1825, John A. Dunlop, the collector of Ahmednagar, reported that 
a petitioner’s property was sold on account of debts due by his brother 
through the partnership which had been dissolved for two years.
 
Dunlop 
thought it unjust, but the petitioner was too poor to prosecute the bailiffs in 
the King’s Court. He begged the government to pay its expense. 75 The third 
factor was the availability of the Bombay lawyers. The Indians were well 
informed of the pro-/anti-government inclinations of the attorneys. The 
famous/notorious attorneys of the 1820s who irritated the government 
included Frederick Ayrton, Thomas W. Browne, and William Fenwick. They 
were in charge of the majority of cases discussed in this chapter. On the other 
hand, some attorneys such as William A. Morgan and his brother Edward C. 
Morgan, the Company’s Solicitors, were often solicited when the Indians 
made countersuits against the sheriff and his officers.  
Against this backdrop, revenue defaulters’ jurisdictional jockeying and 
abuse of the King’s Court became a serious problem. As I noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, the collectors usually instituted a suit in the adalat 
against revenue debtors to recover debt with interest. But this process was 
accompanied by a disadvantage: it allowed the debtors to resort to the King’s 
Court to overturn the decree of the Company’s Court in the same way as in a 
civil case. Many examples of revenue debtors’ evasion by means of the King’s 
Court were recorded in the Company’s revenue proceedings.  
In one case in the Northern Konkan in 1825, a revenue defaulter called 
Shaik Ahmed Kubbe in Thana applied the collector to repair to another town 
in the Northern Konkan to apprehend his security, and on his  way back to 
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Thana, visited one Hassein in Bombay city. He stayed there for four days, was 
arrested upon a writ of the Supreme Court taken out against him by Hassein, 
and was lodged in the Bombay gaol. The collector was convinced of the 
collusion between Shaik and Hassein.
76
 But the government could only blame 
the peon who took Shaik to Bombay.
77
 
It is remarkable that how little the government could do to deal with this 
kind of evasion. In another case in the Northern Konkan, a revenue defaulter, 
one Khanoot Ravoot, was sued by a Bombay inhabitant. The judgement 
against him was obtained in 1822, but the property was not sold until 1824. 
The government suspected the delay, investigated the case, and found that the 
plaintiff was the son-in-law of Khanoot. By that time, the plaintiff died and 
the property was transferred to the administratrix, the daughter of Khanoot. 
Company’s Solicitor W. A. Morgan commented that, even if the lapse of time 
was set aside, it seems hardly possible to succeed in making a legal acti on, as 
there was not sufficient evidence, and as the Company’s Court had not taken 
any steps in its initial stage, which could have enforced its process. The 
government could not take any further measures.
78
 
The authority of the government rather than the amount of lost revenue 
was the problem. In some cases, the government’s judicial authority was 
openly denied by the defaulters. One Kassem Hoosseen Wohoray was 
involved in four cases of revenue arrears in the sadr diwani adalat as the 
security of the prosecuted. He was arrested under the Company’s Court’s 
decree in Bombay, but in the next day he was released from the gaol and taken 
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into custody by officers of the deputy sheriff. Kassem was guarded by armed 
men to resist further seizure by the adalat. The Northern Konkan collector 
criticised the sheriff and the deputy sheriff and insisted to make a suit against 
them.
79
 The Northern Konkan judge expressed his concern that ‘if suffered to 
pass unnoticed and unpunished, it will be the means of lowering the court i n 
the eyes of the natives, and bringing its authority in disrepute’. 80 The 
Advocate General agreed that it was ‘a flagrant contempt of the adawlut court’ 
which was caused by ‘a conspiracy among the friends of the prisoner to abuse 
the process of the Supreme Court by a sham suit’. But he added that their 
indictment was difficult as it was ‘almost impossible that such circumstances 
can be detected so clearly as to be brought home to the parties’. 81 These cases 
clearly show that the government could not take any effective measures 
against the revenue defaulters’ jurisdictional jockeying.  
 
VI. The Govind Abbajee case 
 
As we have seen, while the district officials demanded strong measures 
regarding the revenue jurisdiction, the government preferred moderate 
responses and disliked an open collision with the Supreme Court. But the 
government had to change its attitude when the King’s Court’s interference 
resulted in denying the Company’s revenue and judicial authority in toto. By 
tracing jurisdictional manoeuvre of a revenue defaulter named Govind 
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Abbajee, one of the most notorious persons in the Northern Konkan during the 
1820s, we can see the changing attitude of the government in the matter of 
King’s Court’s revenue interference.  
     Govind Abbajee, a Prabhu, was a former head clerk of the collector’s 
office as translator and interpreter, who was said to have possessed ‘an 
unlimited influence over the Collector’.82 But in 1817, he was expelled from 
his office, convicted and punished for malversation.
83
 Since then, the former 
revenue officer became the bête noir for the government officers in the 
Northern Konkan. Abbajee was skilled in his use of the King’s Court. He was 
a hub of those who used/abused the court to evade the collection of revenue 
arrears. For example, he was acquainted with one of such revenue debtors, one 
Ramchunder Bawajee, who instituted a suit in the Recorder’s Court to 
overturn the zilla court’s sequestration of his property in the Northern Konkan 
in 1819.
84
 By utilising his knowledge, experience, and network, Abbajee 
almost succeeded in outwitting the government.  
Abbajee filed a plaint against the Northern Konkan Collector in the 
Supreme Court in 1826. He claimed that the produce in his grass land had 
been illegally restrained and sold by the collector at auction since the 
collector resumed the land in 1823.
85
 The collector Simson pointed out that, 
first of all, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over revenue affairs. 
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He vindicated his act by detailing Abbajee’s fraudulent measures to take 
possession of the land. He explained that selling the crops at auction was a 
customary way to realise revenue.
86
 The government approved this and 
ordered him to continue his measure.
87
 
But the government soon changed its attitude and started to listen to the 
claim of Abbajee favourably. The focus of the discussion was whether it was 
lawful for the government to forcibly confiscate the crops of the lands before 
establishing its claim in the Company’s Court. 88 Simson thought it was lawful. 
He said that it was admitted by the regulations and that it was the custom of 
the Northern Konkan to prohibit the crops from being removed from the 
village until the security was given.
89
 He emphasised that the collector had 
the first right to decide on the matter of revenue, and the appeal should be 
made to the Company’s Court, not to the Supreme Court. 90 The Advocate 
General agreed with his opinion.
91
 
But the government denied the claim of the collector. The government’s 
primary concern was the irregularity of the collector’s confiscation, rather 
than the corruption of the native officer. The government’s judicial secretary, 
Charles Norris, summarised the problem as follows. The Regulation related to 
this problem was Regulation I of 1823. Section 10 stipulated that anyone 
wholly or partially possessing the land exempted from assessment shall not be 
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deprived of it by the collector without judicial inquiry. The governor and the 
majority of the council were of opinion that the collector should first establish 
the possession of the land in the court before confiscating it, ‘as the rules for 
resuming lands are so favourable to Government’. So Abbajee’s crops should 
be restored, and the government should proceed against him in the Company’s 
Court for holding the land exempt from assessment without any sufficient 
title.
92
 Accordingly, Simson was instructed to replace the land to Abbajee and 
inform him that the value of it would be restored to him.
93
 
The collector repeatedly emphasised the corruption of Abbajee and the 
bad effect of the jurisdictional encroachment of the Supreme Court in the 
revenue matter. Simson strongly reasserted his opinion, emphasising ‘the 
fraudulent nature of the transaction and the established unprincipled character 
of Govind Abbajee’. Besides, he expressed his concern about how to realise 
the revenue of the year. He pointed out that the regulations were silent as to 
the rights vested in the collector to decree arrears. He was doubtful to what 
extent he was authorised to place the hay land under the attachment or to 
oblige the defendant to give security. He insisted on continuing the suit he had 
filed in the adalat because ‘by withdrawing it, the Government will be 
subjected to heavy costs, and my proceedings will necessarily be looked upon 
as illegal and unsanctioned, a point of very considerable importance in 
Salsette, and to be carefully avoided if practicable’. 94 But the government did 
not listen to Simson’s opinion. It only repeated to him that confiscating the 
rent-free land without judicial assessment was contrary to the regulations, the 
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land should be restored to Abbajee and he should be compensated.
95
 The next 
governor John Malcolm endorsed this decision.
96
 
The above transaction underscores the difference between the 
collector’s local, individual and discretionary approach and the government’s 
universal, anonymous and systematic approach towards the revenue debtors. 
The collector’s emphasis on the customary legitimacy of his attachment of 
crops and the bad character of Govind Abbajee indicates that he 
conceptualised the collection of revenue debt as a series of individual 
responses to particular arrears. On the other hand, the governors showed their 
inclination towards a universalism, in which individualised and localised 
response to particular cases were of little importance. A particular corruption 
of a native officer should be redressed within the established system of justice. 
The systematic and regular enforcement of the regulations was vital in this 
respect. Thus the collector’s discretionary attachment which was not  in 
accordance with the regulations was more harmful than good. In other words, 
the Bombay government conceptualised revenue business as an ordinary or 
civil matter, which should be regulated by the established system of law; the 
collectors, always under the pressure of revenue maximisation and the threat 
of revenue debtors’ evasion, felt that they were always dealing with the 
emergency situation. As a corollary, this difference shows that the government 
and the district officers took different approaches to deal with the problem of 
‘native corruption’. They shared the idea of ‘universal venality of Indians’. 97 
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But while the collectors attempted to deal with it with discretionary measures 
in each case, the government abandoned such an attempt and started to a dmit 
and incorporate the problem in an anonymous system of regulations.  
The different priorities of collectors and governors also resulted in their 
different attitudes towards the King’s Court’s role in this affair. The collector 
emphasised the practical obstacles caused by the King’s Court’s intervention. 
Simson pointed out that his subordinate officers were repeatedly summoned to 
the court, and during that period, the business of the court was inevitably 
postposed: 
 
[Suits] are wilfully or maliciously protracted; on the cases coming to a 
hearing, the defendants are spoken of no measured strains; the acts of the 
Government itself are equally liable to unpleasant reflections; and the 
publick officers attending as witnesses, or otherwise, may hear the acts 





For Governor Malcolm, though he was acquainted with all of these problems, 
this exposure by Simson missed the point. Malcolm articulated that, if the 
collector had followed the regulations, Govind Abbajee could not have 
incurred the damage he claimed, and even if he did, he could have been sued 
in the zilla court for his fraudulent acquisition of the title of land.
99
  In other 
words, for the governor’s, this was not the problem of jurisdictional conflict 
between the Company’s and the King’s Courts but that of the collector’s 
irregular exercise of discretion. Thus, the government did not oppose the 
award given in Govind’s favour by the prothonotary of the Supreme Court, 
                                                 
98
 BL, IOR P/400/16, BJC 26 Mar. 1828, no. 54, J. B. Simson to Gov., 17 Mar. 
1828. 
99
 BL, IOR P/400/15, BJC 12 Mar. 1828, no. 65, J. Malcolm, minute 
subscribed by Commander in Chief and R. T. Goodwin, n.d.  
136 
who had been appointed the arbiter on 14 June 1828.
100
 
However, the government’s attitude dramatically changed in 1829, when 
Govind Abbajee attempted to rely on the Supreme Court to stop the 
enforcement of the zilla court’s decree against him.101 This time Governor 
Malcolm conceived that the Supreme Court’s interference did disrupt the 
‘regularity’ of the Company’s revenue system, or in fact the whole edifice of 
the judicial system, and strongly reacted against the interference. His concern 
was detailed in the government’s judicial letter to the Court of Directors. The 
outline of its argument is as follows.  
Govind Abbajee threatened the judge of the Northern Konkan with an 
action in the Supreme Court not to sell the property under attachment, un less a 
bond of indemnification would be taken from the collector for the full value of 
the property. This was problematic because it meant that the Supreme Court 
could take cognizance of the judges of the Company’s Court for their 
judgement. The direct consequence of this doctrine was that even the sadr 
adalat judge could be prosecuted civilly or criminally in the Supreme Court 
for their judgements and decrees. In consequence, the government’s authority 
‘would be annihilated and the judicial and revenue adm inistration of the 
country would become totally inefficacious. The only authority which would 
acquire power would be the Supreme Court’. If left unattended, the Supreme 
Court would be ‘a Court of Revision and Appeal over the public servants in 
the interior’. It was the specific duty of the sadr adalat, which should never be 
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taken cognizance of by ‘any other authority than the regular constituted court 
of regular superior jurisdiction’.102 
The last phrase indicated the location of government’s anxiety: the 
government feared that the Supreme Court’s interference would annihilate the 
regularity of the adalat system, which was, according to an official’s comment, 
‘a desirable check’ on Indians’ attempts to defraud the government or to 
withhold payments of arrear and what underpinned the efficiency of revenue 
collection.
103
 This sense of danger on the system’s regularity was the chief 
cause of Governor Malcolm’s strong reaction against the Govind Abbajee case 
and, ultimately, what became a major driving force to subordinate the power 
of the King’s Court under the local government.  
Abbajee failed to make use of the Supreme Court.
104
 He also failed to 
appeal to the sadr adalat.
105
 But his failure did not originate in the exposure 
of his particular corruptions. It was because of the fact that his use of the 
King’s Court threatened the authority and regular working of the Company’s 
revenue and judicial system. The government’s version of universal rule of 
law in the mofussil should not be demolished by the other version of the 
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The King’s Court’s revenue intervention in the mofussil posed many problems 
to the government. The practical hindrance of the summons of the district 
officers as witnesses and Bombay officers as jurors was resented. The 
sheriff’s officer’s meddling with local inhabitants disturbed the tranquillity in 
the locality, and magistrates who resisted it were prosecuted in the King’s 
Court. In the midst of declining revenue, the collectors were very sensitive to 
any kind of interference in the revenue business. The revenue debtors’ abuse 
of the King’s Court was the annoyance for them, but they did not have 
effective means to prevent it. The anxiety about the King’s Court’s revenue 
interference was a logical conclusion of the district officials’ obsession with 
the revenue collection, which justified the use of discretionary power for debt 
recovery. In other words, these officials dealt with the revenue problems as 
emergencies. Threatened by material disturbances as well as legal 
conspiracies, they were always in a state of war.  
At first, the district officials’ sense of danger was not shared by the 
government and its law officers, who were more inclined to maintain 
regularity of the judicial system. In other words, t he problem of revenue debt 
was not a political but a legal issue. The government shared its attitude with 
the Supreme Court. Both aimed at achieving the regular working of the 
judicial system, which was less reliant on discretionary interventions of 
officials in individual cases and more on the established and anonymous 
system of legal procedures. So they could be as conciliatory as possible in the 
matter of revenue jurisdiction. But, ultimately, the government had to abandon 
its conciliatory attitude. When the use of the King’s Court totally denied the 
revenue and judicial system in the mofussil, the government conceived the 
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problem in the light of politics and emergency. The government’s attitude was 
hardened by the accumulation of the use and abuse of the  King’s Court. 
There was another, far more directly political issue in Bombay in the 
1820s: the King’s Court’s intervention in the sardars. These native aristocrats 
were armed local magnates, whose cooperation and submission were essential 
for the government to keep the tranquillity of the country. There was no room 
for conciliation for the government on this matter. From the onset, the 
government as well as the district officials openly criticised the King’s Court, 
which ultimately led to the total revision of their relationship. We shall see it 























1819/20 1820/21 1821/22 
    
Total                                     
1166 
281 387 498 
judged by collector 2 9 32 
amildars 0 131 63 
panchayat 279 247 403 
    
deposits, advances, assignments, interest and other 
money transactions 
99 124 125 
bond debts 32 23 68 
shares of family property 30 33 37 
grain 8 23 22 
cotton, betel-nut and spices 1 4 8 
watans 41 50 57 
shops, stalls and houses 14 8 33 
jewels and similar ornaments 16 15 31 
cloths 0 3 7 
caste/appeals against sentences of expulsion 11 9 14 
marriages 3 15 7 
claims of relations or subsistence from elder 
brothers and heads of families 
5 17 13 
pledged property except watans 0 5 12 
mortgaged watans and enams 8 2 5 
furniture, utensils and implements of trade and 
husbandry 
17 18 26 
cattle 3 20 18 
adoptions 2 4 6 
rent of land (between enamdars and ryots)  7 13 14 
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The Bombay government in the mid-1820s was caught in a dilemma. The 
semi-military post-war settlement, in which revenue and judicial duties were 
held by officers jointly, hindered the efficiency of both branches of 
government. William Chaplin, the Deccan Commissioner, explained that the 
revenue survey was necessary as the inequalities of assessment had ever 
pressurised the resources of the country and that, in order to make the survey 
effective, the collectors should devote their full time to the business of 
revenue. But ‘at least one half of every week being occupied by business in 
their criminal and civil courts which compels them some times to neglect their 
ordinary Revenue duties’. So, Chaplin recommended the introduction of a 
separate judiciary in the Deccan.
1
 The separation of power was also desirable 
to make the judiciary more effective. The government’s judicial secretary 
David Greenhill explained that the delay of justice was considerable because 
the collectors were busy in their revenue business and the suits were dealt 
with by registers or young servants with little experience.
2
 The need of 
transition from military to civil government was urgently felt.  
But the chaotic situation in the Bombay presidency continued and even 
worsened during the 1820s. Particularly problematic were the ‘wild tribes’ in 
the frontiers. As C. A. Bayly argues, the colonial government was preoccupied 
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with the need of controlling the tribal populations.
3
 It was important not only 
because it was vital for the Company to ensure the regular supply of timber 
for housing and ship-building,
4
 but also because it was related to the very 
problem of political authority and sovereignty of the Company in the plains. 
The tribal people actively negotiated and disputed with the government over 
land tenures, and rebellion was part of the negotiation.
5
 As Ananda 
Bhattacharyya argues regarding the rebellions of fakirs (wandering armed 
ascetics) in late-eighteenth-century Bengal, the government officials were 
urged to curtail the activities of such nomadic populations for the sake of 
protecting zamindars and ryots under its rule and ascertaining stable revenue 
collection.
6
 The situation was the same in the Deccan in the 1820s.  
As F. B. Robinson argues, the fear of raids was part of the political 
structure of Bombay in the 1820s, and, as Ajay Skaria argues, ‘Bhil chiefs 
were often as powerful in times of ‘‘peace’’ as in those of ‘‘disturbance’’’. 7 
The provinces of the Deccan, Konkan and Gujarat were haunted by gang 
robberies by the Kolis, Ramusis and Bhils. Their raids increased as the British 
conquest and establishment of subsidiary system restricted their employment 
as mercenaries.
8
 The most notorious were the Bhils in the Deccan Khandesh.
9
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In Khandesh, there were 50 chiefs with 5,000 followers whose subsistence 
depended on plundering.
10
 In the Northern Konkan, during the six years 
between 1820 and 1825, a total of 483 robberies were reported. The arrest of 
the robbers was extremely difficult.
11
 During the same period, 3,163 robbers 
were implicated but only 406 were arrested.
12
 The raids were facilitated by 
the absence of police establishment in some villages. In the Poona district, for 
example, 11 out of 49 villages in Pabbul pargana and 131 out of 177 villages 
in Sewngur pargana had no police establishments.
13
 
The situation in Gujarat was equally bad. The government villages were 
troubled by raids and collection of tributes by the ‘refractory’ chiefs (called 
girasias and mehwasis) of the Bhils, Kolis and Rajputs who exercised various 
seigneurial rights and privileges including a power of life and death.
14
 Some 
of them retained large armed forces.
15
 Because of the raids, the city of 
Ahmedabad, and its eastern districts of Dholka, Ranpur, Dhandhuka and 
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Ghoga, were ‘in a most disturbed state’.16 Further north, in Mahi Kantha, the 
Koli raids were so frequent that the government separated the region from 
Kathiawar in 1821 to enable a more vigilant control, under which the 
securities were taken from the girasia chiefs to ensure their tranquillity, but 
the raids and feuds among the chiefs continued.
17
 
The Bombay government knew that the problem was not a mere matter 
of law and order which should be dealt with by the police but the one which 
required a major remodelling of the mode of sovereignty in the region. 
Elphinstone’s government tried to adapt the Maratha mode of sovereignty 
with a significant modification. On the one hand, the government inherited the 
confederacy of sardars or military gentry in the hills and the plains from the 
peshwa. These natives of rank were encouraged and promoted to exert their 
sovereignty in their territories, above all to devise the police by themselves 
and prevent the raids of the tribals. This idea was suggested to Elphinstone by 
his mentor Thomas Munro, the governor of Madras. As Burton Stein shows, 
initially Munro had taken hostile policies against the poligars (petty 
chieftains) in the Ceded Districts, which was expressed in the 1812 Fifth 
Report. But he later changed his mind and, in 1818, advised Elphinstone that 
the British government in the Deccan should inherit the position of the peshwa 




On the other hand, the mode of shared sovereignty between the sardars 
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and the tribal chiefs should be discontinued. Before the arrival of the British, 
the sovereignty in the plains land in the Deccan and Gujarat was shared by the 
hill tribes. The tribal chiefs provided the plains powers watchmen in times of 
peace and military men in times of war, and, in turn, they were given rent -free 
lands cultivated by the village headmen, allowed to collect dues (giras) from 
the plains villages and, in cases of non-payment, raided them. In this sense, 
the villages were co-shared by the sardars in the plains and the chiefs in the 
hills, and they both exerted sovereignty over the villages.
19
 This was well 
known by the officials in India. In his ‘summary of the operations in India’ in 
1823, the Marquis of Hastings, the governor general, stated that ‘I saw the 
intimacy of connexion between the Pindarries and the Mahrattas so distinctly, 
as to be certain that an attempt to destroy the former must infallibly engage us 
in a war with the whole body of the latter’ .20 Based on this recognition, the 
officials feared less the sardars’ open resurrection than the decline of the 
sardars’ social control which would unleash the raiders. This was indicated by 
Malcolm’s later comment: 
      
I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, the 
permanence of our power will be hazarded, in proportion as the 
territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule. There 
are now none of the latter who can venture to contend against us in the 
field. They are incapable, from their actual condition, of any dangerous 
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Malcolm explained elsewhere that the sardars were ‘useful, if conciliated, in 
preserving the local peace, and dangerous to it if  outraged or displaced’.22 
As we shall see below, the Bombay government in the 1820s curtailed 
the hill tribes’ exercise of sovereignty by paying the giras to the chiefs from 
its treasury, making them promise not to raid the villages, and severely 
punishing the raiders with its military force. On the other hand, as was done 
by Munro in Madras,
23
 Elphinstone exempted the sardars from the Company’s 
Court and vested them with police authority. By doing so, the government 
made a distinction between the unrespectable raiders and respectable sardars, 
suppressed the former, and promoted the latter as the co-sharer of sovereignty. 
The government’s decision should be paramount in times of war and 
emergency, but the ordinary management of the villages should be conducte d 
by the sardars in the mofussil.  
Crucial for this attempt was the control of the judiciary to realise the 
government’s monopoly of political power. Elphinstone was convinced that 
the government should be the sole arbiter of political relations in the mofu ssil 
and that the courts of law should not meddle with them. He was critical of 
Cornwallis’s judicial system because it unsettled agrarian relations by 
allowing ‘the Aduwluts to fix their new relations to each other. This led to an 
infinity of lawsuits. … An incidental effect of the same mistake was the 
overthrow of the village corporations, the ruin of the police, and the horrors of 
dacoity’.24 
The Elphinstone code of 1827, comprising 33 regulations of civil, 
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criminal, revenue and military branches, was such an attempt.
25
 The 
regulations stipulated various exceptions from the civilian administration of 
law. I argue that, by specifying these exceptions, the government attempted to 
demarcate the realm of politics under the exclusive control of the government 
and the realm of law managed by the regular courts of law. By doing so, the 
government aimed at achieving a greater regularity and efficiency in ordinary 
revenue and judicial business and, at the same time, a more secure ground of 
intervention in times of emergency. What emerged from this attempt was not a 
civil society based on the rule of law but a conquest society internalising the 
logic of emergency. 
 
II. Post-war settlement 
 
Immediately after the end of war in 1818, Elphinstone had explained that the 
main principles of civil government were ‘to consider everything subservient 
to the conduct of the war, and scrupulously to avoid all sorts of innovations’. 26 
One important ramification of this was that the executive should firmly 
control the judiciary. So, even in the regulation areas, he transferred the power 
of zilla magistrate from the judges to the collectors.
27
 Elphinstone’s vision of 
criminal justice and police was, as in the case of civil judicature, based on his 
negative evaluation of the Bengal system under Cornwallis. Among others, he 
lamented the evil of ‘the abolition of the ancient system of Police’, 
particularly ‘the removal of responsibility from the Zemindars; the loss of 
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their natural influence as an instrument of Police’. 28 In order to remodel the 
police in accordance with ‘the ancient usages of the country’, the previous 
police officers sent by the government (foujdars and tanahdars) were 
abolished, and the head of villages (patils) and native collectors of districts 
(kamavisdars) were vested with responsibility of policing in the government 
lands. The magistrates and criminal judges were both in charge of supervising 




Elphinstone was convinced that effective government could only be 
possible in collaboration with the sardars or armed gentry in the mofussil, ‘the 
real rulers in the country’,30 and tried to make them the agent of indirect rule. 
He believed that in India, the judicial system was centred on the logic of 
power. The law in India was ‘constantly influenced by the direct and lawful 
interference of the prince, who was fountain of all law, and by the weight of 
rank and wealth and interest. Indeed, the practice of the country was in a great 
measure the law of the strongest’.31 His intention was that the British 
government should appropriate the political system of the Maratha 
confederacy, in which the peshwa assumed the role of the great king who 
shared sovereignty with the sardars, the head of the li ttle kingdoms in the 
mofussil. This mode of sharing of sovereignty in which the little kingdom s 
partook of the power of the great king while retaining their autonomy was a 
standard practice in pre-colonial South Asia, as works by Dirks, Wink, Skaria 
and Berkemer and Frenz have shown.
32
 The government emulated the Indian 
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way of politics in its newly conquered territories.  
The sardars, literally ‘commanders’ or ‘warlords’, were the local 
military noblemen gathered around Baji Rao’s court at Poona. Some of them  
originated in the old landholding families with the status of deshmukh, but 
others were the arrivistes who rose to the status of gentry by procuring their 
subordinate soldiers to the military labour market in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. They held alienated lands under surinjams, jagirs and 
inams and functioned as the centre of local economy and politics.
33
 Their 
prominence was a marked feature of western India, where the proportion of 
alienated lands far exceeded that of Northern India.
34
 The government 
emphasised that the lands held by the sardars, particularly those of the 
Patwardhans in the Southern Maratha Countries, were prosperous and better 
managed than the government lands.
35
 An official said that the revenue could 
be realised ‘with greater facility and infinitely less expense’ from these chiefs 
in the form of tributes than directly collected by the government officials.
36
 
But their treatment was a sensitive matter. As Ballhatchet argues, the 
jagirdars and sardars lost their aspiration for major scale rebellions after the 
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Third Maratha War, as the treaties with these sardars after the war reduced 
their armies.
37
 The expulsion of the Arab mercenaries significantly reduced 
the fluid military force which could be mobilised by the sardars in times of 
war.
38
 But the contemporary government officials could not be assured of the 
security of the British rule in the early 1820s. The British policing in the 
mofussil was best characterised by its weakness.
39
 Elphinstone commented 
that the failure to deal with them could be fatal: ‘The destruction of so many 
great chiefs could not fail to throw the country … into great confusion’ as the 
peshwa had experienced in his last days.
40
 Chaplin commented that, under the 
Maratha confederacy, the sardars provoked commotions by resisting the 
mamlatdars (the peshwa’s district officers) or connived with them, usurped the 
revenue of the state and oppressed the ryots.
41
 So the government’s 
conciliation policy should be accompanied by means of controlling them.  
The government protected the privileges of the sardars and in turn 
demanded that they maintain the tranquillity of their territories. They were 
allowed to act as sovereigns within their territories and governed according to 
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‘the ancient custom of the Maratha Empire’:  
 
They must have the entire management of their own jagheers, including 
the power of life and death, and must not be interfered with by the 
Government, unless in case of very flagrant abuse of power or long 




Apart from the exemption of land taxes, they were given several privileges as 
their ancient rights. These privileges were confirmed in individual sanads to 
the sardars.
43
 In turn, the sardars were to do their police duties. The sanad to 
Chintaman Rao, for instance, stipulated it as follows: 
 
you will attend to the prosperity of the ryots of your jaghire, to the strict 
administration of justice, and the effectual suppression of robberies, 
murders, arsons, and other crimes. This article is an essential condition 
of the present Agreement; you must therefore indispensably maintain the 
good order of your country. 
 
In turn, the ‘British Government will maintain your rank and dignity as it was 
maintained under His Highness the Peishwa’. 44 
Elphinstone took the same policy of conciliation towards the chiefs of 
tribes in order to make them responsible for the tranquillity of their followers. 
Elphinstone approved the political agent of Khandesh John Briggs’s proposal 
to restore the jagirs resumed by Baji Rao to the chiefs, and allowed t hem to 
tax goods and passage of the hill roads as their privilege. Proclamations were 
issued to allow free pardon of previous crimes. The chiefs were given 
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pensions and lands, and the jaglas (village watchmen) were employed and 
given provisions by the patils with the expense of the villages levied as the 
Bhil tax.
45
 Henry Pottinger of Ahmednagar, for example, was instructed to 
‘employ every means to conciliate the Beels and Ramoosees’ by pensioning 
their chiefs on condition that they were responsible for the ir people and by 
allotting small portions of rent-free lands if they cooperated with the patils in 
maintaining the village police.
46
 The chiefs in the frontiers were also 
assigned the role of policing their territories. In Kathiawar, since the 
settlement of Alexander Walker in 1807, the Bombay government had tried to 
keep security by the ‘fa’el zamin’ or security bonds taken from the chiefs. The 
bonds obliged the chiefs not to annoy merchants and travellers and made them 
liable for compensation for the robberies and/or responsible for the production 
of the thieves. Elphinstone endorsed this policy and, for instance, newly taken 
a bond from the chief of Dasada in 1822.
47
 
The problem was that, in Gujarat, the girasia and mehwasi chiefs’ social 
influence had been constantly weakened by the former governor’s policy. 
Nepean’s government was determined to deny the ‘the pretentions of the 
Grassias, Coolies, and Bheels, to the exercise of rights of sovereignty’ in order 
to increase the amount of quit-rent (salamee) from the alienated land 
(waunta).
48
 Accordingly, the chiefs were required to abandon their due from 
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the government villages and to accept the payment from the government’s 
treasury. Their authority in the villages was weakened as village accountants 
(talati) were appointed. Elphinstone was concerned about these tendencies and 
ordered some measures to uphold their respectability: the talati was abolished, 
small chiefs were given leases, and the amount of tribute was fixed regardless 
of their revenue.
49
 Also, the government did not abolish the old custom of 
private exactions, or tuggaza (or dhurna), to enable the sardars to recover 
debts from their revenue defaulters.
50
 In 1826, Chaplin and Robertson 
suggested that the government allow it, though it was prohibited by the penal 
code, as it was ‘a part of the common law’. The government endorsed that the 
tuggaza was, unless it was seriously injurious, not to be abolished.
51
 
From the start, Elphinstone was concerned about the harmful effect of 
the British courts of law on the respectability and sovereignty of the sardars. 
In 1817 and 1818, the governor Evan Nepean introduced the Regulations in 
the territories of the Konkan and Gujarat immediately after their acquisition in 
the same year.
52
 Elphinstone and even such district officers as Saville 
Marriott, who supported laissez-faire in revenue matters, were critical of 
this.
53
 Elphinstone was convinced that the adjustment of dispute among the 
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sardars ‘should be considered as of a political nature, and conducted under the 
specific orders of the Government, and should not be managed as a district 
affair according to the ordinary regulations’. 54 He remarked in his Report that 
the degree of chiefs’ powers before the conquest should be ascertained so as 
not to interfere in their privileges, but the British judges and magistrates 
tended to act ‘with sternness and indifference to rank and circumstances very 
grating to the feelings of the Natives’.55 Elphinstone emphasised the harmful 
effect of the courts of law on the girasia and mehwasi  chiefs who should be 
treated as ‘sovereign princes, with whom we have no right to interfere beyond 
the collection of a tribute’.56 
So, in the Deccan, the government vested the Commissioner with the 
sole jurisdiction over the cases in which the sardars were  the parties. He was 
also in charge of the internal and external relationship with various ‘natives of 
rank’ inside and outside the presidency as he was to distribute peshkush at the 
dasara and to deal with all the vakeels (agents) of the chiefs and sardar s at 
Poona.
57
 This meant that the sardars were exempted from the process in the 
Company’s Court de jure as well as de facto, and put under the protection of 
the government.
58
 For example, when Appa Desai murdered a young girl in 
1825, Elphinstone decided that the British government could not interfere 
with the matter as the great jagirdars had had the power of life and death 
under the peshwa’s government.59 
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In Gujarat, where the Regulations applied, the chiefs were exempted 
from the Company’s Court by the orders of the government. In 1821, 
Elphinstone ordered that the girasia chiefs of Dholka should not be required to 
attend to the court personally except in cases of great necessity, and that 
instead of seizing and confining their persons, the judges should issue a 
precept to the collector to sequester their lands as might suffice for the 
gradual payment of the debt while leaving a decent maintenance for them.
60
 
Likewise, in 1822, the Political Agent in Kathiawar was ordered to ensure that 
the chiefs in Dholka, Ranpur, Dhandhuka and Ghoga under his authority were 
exempted from operation and penalties of British laws; that the judge or 
magistrate would notice chiefs when the case occurred, and he would exercise 
his discretion to punish or pardon them; and that the Agent was to avoid all 
the interference if the chiefs resided in the British territory.
61
 In this way, the 
government devised indirect rule relying on the sardars in the mofussil.  
 
III. The mid-1820s Crisis 
 
But the government was forced to realise the inadequacy of the policy by a 
series of armed rebellions in 1824. As we shall see  below, they were caused by 
alliances between the raiders and the sardars, and this recognition influenced 
the government’s policy in the later 1820s. These rebellions had two 
significant backgrounds. One was a severe famine of 1823–5. The drought 
affected the whole regions of the Deccan, the Konkan and Gujarat. The wet 
crops failed and the stock of cattle suffered a considerable diminution, which 
halted cultivation and the sowing of seeds. The district officials expected the 
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diminution of revenue, and they were concerned about the emigration of ryots 
from the government lands causing a loss of cultivating population.
62
 The 
other decisive factor was the outbreak of the First Anglo -Burmese War 
(1824–6) which provoked a series of rebellions in Punjab, Delhi, Saharanpur 
and Malwa.
63
 Charles T. Metcalfe observed that ‘the Burma War produced an 
extraordinary sensation all over India, amounting to an expectation of our 
immediate downfall’.64 Malcolm later wrote that ‘the whole northern and 
western frontiers of India, as well as the countries recently occupied ... 
remained for some years in too unsettled a state to admit of large reductions of 
our military establishments’.65 The commotions were also observed in the 
Deccan, which heightened the government’s general sense of crisis.  
The most shocking was a large-scale armed rebellion in the independent 
state of Kittur in the Southern Maratha Country, in which the collector and 
Political Agent St John Thackeray was killed. It was important that the revolt 
originated in the government’s failure to settle the sardar’s family conflict. 
When the Desai of Kittur died in September 1824, Thackeray discovered a 
plot relating to the adoption of son by the chief minister of the country who 
also acted as the agent of the Bombay government. The adoption was not 
admitted and the chief minister was removed. Then, the Desai’s stepmother 
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Channamma and her lieutenant one Sardar Gurusiddappa, ‘a notorious thief’, 
called for the rebellion. The rebels killed Thackeray and captured his British 
assistants. Worse, the insurgents were supported by the patils who should have 
been the bulwark of policing in villages. The rebels also sought support from 
the raja of Kolhapur, an independent chief of a branch of the Bhonsle family. 
The government issued a proclamation of free pardon and continuation of 
inams etc. of those who surrendered, and the sardars and sepoys in the country 
were warned not to join or support the rebels. Eventually the fort was 
surrounded by the armies from Bombay and Madras. The hostages were 




The rebellion in Kittur corresponded with another major insurrection. In 
October 1824, the Pindaris in Gwalior led by one Shaikh Dallah caused a 
rebellion against the British and raided and burned the villages. The subah 
(governor) of Sindhia and other Maratha chiefs cooperated with him. Alarm in 
Bombay was heightened by the news that the rebels were joined by Chimnaji 
Appa, a younger brother of the ex-peshwa Baji Rao, who organised 75 cavalry 
and 100 infantry. A local banker and grain dealers supplied cash and 
provisions to the rebels. The Bhils also joined them and dominated Khande sh. 
Their actions were well organised, and the flow of information and logistics 
between Malwa and the Deccan was totally controlled by them.
67
 
The rebellions of Channamma and Chimnaji Appa were not isolated 
examples. H. H. Wilson enumerated series of rebel lions in the Bombay 
mofussil in late 1824 and early 1825. In Gujarat, the Kolis raided the villages 
near Baroda, escaped from the troops of the British and the Gaekwad and 
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continued their plunder. Its leader could not be captured until 1829. More 
seriously, in Kutch, the Jhareja chiefs of Kathiawar plundered the British 
villages. They were instigated and helped to assemble a force of 2,000 by the 
Amirs of Sindh. The rebels demanded the restoration of their forfeited raja by 
saying that ‘we are Grasias: if you will restore Rao Bharmal Ji to the throne, 




In the Deccan in 1824, a major rebellion was provoked by Umaji Naik, 
one of five leaders of the Ramusis in Poona district , who demanded the 
government restore to him the guardianship of a fort. He totally controlled the 
Purandhar taluka till 1827.
70
 By 1827, he had entered on alliance with the raja 
of Kolhapur.
71
 He issued a proclamation that the rajas, nobles and all others 
who were active in destroying the European gentlemen and their property 
would be conferred jagirs, inams and money by the new government.
72
 In a 
smaller scale, a patel in Omraiz near Sholapur in the Southern Maratha 
Country refused to pay his revenue, fortified himself, and raided the 
neighbouring villages. The Company deployed the military but the campaign 
failed and some officials were killed.
73
 The atmosphere of panic was felt even 
in Bombay city. Lady West noted in her journal, ‘One hears of nothing but 
disturbances all over the country. Poor Mr. Thackeray murdered at Kittoor, 
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and the people rising in many Places; all, it is supposed, in consequence of the 
ill-advised attack on Rangoon’.74 
The series of rebellions in 1824 and the alliance between tribal raiders 
and the plains sardars observed in them—such as between the Kolis and the 
Ramusis and the Kolhapur raja, the Pindaris and Chimnaji Appa, or Kutch 
chiefs and the Amirs of Sindh—showed that the basic political structure of 
shared sovereignty survived in the early nineteenth century. The Purandhar 
Ramusis held some forty villages worth Rs 60,000 acquired when they 
resisted Baji Rao in the Second Maratha War.
75
 The cooperation was most 
markedly observed in the Third Martha War of 1817–8, in which the Bhils 
were enlisted by the peshwa Baji Rao, the Gond by Appa Sahib of Nagpur, and 
the Pindaris by Holkar and Sindhia.
76
 From this perspective, as Dirk Kolff 
suggests, the series of catastrophic events in 1824 represented the potential 
political discontent which was always there and was simply more visible in 
1824 than in other years.
77
 
The state of crisis continued after 1824. The administration of criminal 
justice and police remained a major challenge. It was shown in the large 
number of cases instituted in the Company’s  Court:78 
 
   1825 1826 1827 1828 
Old Provinces 
Total complaints 8,012 7,416 7,363 8,530 
Number of persons 
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Apprehended  10,352 9,228 9,347 10,786 
Punished  7,608 6,470 6,778 7,673 
Acquitted  2,646 2,975 2,700 3,126 
 
Deccan 
Total complaints 2,372 2,579 2,926 3,090 
Number of persons 
Apprehended  3,951 3,919 4,298 4,517 
Punished  2,657 2,348 2,433 2,696 
Acquitted  1,274 1,572 1,828 1,887 
 
The actual number of crimes must have been larger because many cases were 
unreported as people disliked to go to the magistrate.
79
 The raids by the wild 
tribes continued. In Gujarat, a bhagat (holy men) named Govindas Ramdas 
raided villages, declared the end of the British raj, and proclaimed himself 
king in Kaira in 1826.
80
 In the Deccan in 1827, Umaji Naik again organised 
raiders. He issued a proclamation that thereafter the people should pay their 
rent to him; otherwise, they should be punished with fire and sword.
81
 The 
government could not control the situation and pardoned all the raiders under 
Umaji. He was appointed the head police officer of Purandhar and 
neighbouring talukas, granted some land and pension and remembered as ‘the 
second Sivaji’.82 The guerrilla war in Kittur continued, and another 
widespread rebellion happened in 1829. This time, the insurgents were ‘aided 
more or less actively, by the whole population of the province’. Again the 
Desai’s adopted son was established, and the British military had to be sent as 
the Kittur shetsundees (militia) refused to serve.
83
 
The major result of the 1824 crisis was that the government hardened its 
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attitude towards the tribal raids. This was clearly expressed in the 
government’s policy towards the Bhils. The government’s conciliatory policy 
changed in 1825. In that year, a more aggressive policy of ‘amelioration’ was 
commenced with the establishment of the Bhil Agencies and the Bhil Corps in 
Khandesh. The North West, North East and Southern Bhil Agents promoted 
the Bhils’ settlement and cultivation by issuing a pass to each Bhil and 
inquiring and adjusting the giras of the chiefs. Free pardon was given to those 
who surrendered. Waste lands were given rent -free with loans and provisions. 
The Bhil Corps were aimed at the suppression of the raids by the military 
enlisted among the Bhils themselves. The idea was supported by Elphinstone, 
Chaplin and Khandesh Collector A. Robertson. Lieutenant James Outram was 
in charge of enlisting and commanding the corps. The regularly-drilled Bhils 
numbered more than 250 in 1826, replacing former regular military outposts.
84
 
Malcolm’s government endorsed the policy and recommended employing the 
mehwasi chiefs as the police force.
85
 The most sizable campaign by the Bhil 
Corps was the suppression of the Dang Bhils carried out in 1830.
86
 The 
change in the Bhil policy clearly shows that the government wanted to curtail 
the sovereignty of the Bhil chiefs and to reform and transform them into the 
government’s village servants.  
The government also concluded separate treaties with other chiefs and 
ordered them not to commit any depredations in the British and ad jacent 
territories. For example, the tribal chiefs of the Rewa Kantha entered 
engagements with the British government in 1825 and 1826 promising ‘to 
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conduct … according to the orders of the government, after the manners of 
ryots … in obedience to the instructions of the thanas of government’.87 A 
similar security bond promising ‘to behave in a peaceable and proper way, as 
ryots, according to the order of the sarkar’ was taken by the government in 
1830 from the chiefs of Mahi Kantha.
88
 These engagements show that the 
status of the lesser chiefs was reduced from the semi -sovereign chiefs to the 
ryots, the object rather than the agent of policing.  
 
IV. The realm of law and the realm of politics  
 
A more permanent solution to the critical situation in the mofussil was sought 
by means of the Elphinstone code of 1827. The regulations were characterised 
by the stipulations of various exceptions to the general rules. First, the 
governor was given an unlimited power ‘in cases of war and rebellion’. He 
could declare the suspension of the all laws in such instances. Acts of treason 
or rebellion could be tried in the court martial, and the other crimes and 
offences and the general police of the country ‘shall be conducted as the 
Governor in Council may prescribe for the occasion’.89 Besides, a Special 
Court was established to try ‘treason, rebellion, unlawful attempt to alter the 
established laws, and disturbing the peace of foreign states’. 90 The governor 
could authorise the district police officers to detain prisoners longer than 
stipulated in the law, and village headmen could detain prisoners longer than 
usual if there were ‘indispensable reasons’. 91 
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From our perspective, it was particularly important that the government 
claimed its exclusive control over all the sardars based on ‘reasons of state’. 
This was clearly shown in Regulation XXV of 1827 ‘for the confinement of 
state prisoners and for the attachment of he lands of Chieftains and others for 
reasons of state’. The preamble explained the following conditions as the 
‘reasons of state’:  
 
the due maintenance of the alliances formed by the British Government 
with foreign powers, the preservation of tranquillity in the territories of 
native Princes entitled to its protection, and the security of the British 
dominions from foreign hostility and from internal commotion.  
 
By this regulation, the governor was empowered to confine the state prisoners 
or to attach the lands of sardars without any previous judgement of the courts 
of law and place them under the temporary charge of t he collector. The 
treatment of the state prisoners was checked by the circuit judge, but the 
collector could suspend the order of the judge.
92
 
The government devised further specific exceptions by three 
regulations: Regulation XXX on the mode of introducing the separate 
judiciary in the Deccan, Regulation XV on the sardars’ police authority, and 
Regulation XXIX on the exemption of sardars from the Company’s Court. By 
looking at the process of enactment, I suggest that these regulations 
concerning exceptions of the ordinary rule were important in determining the 
general contour of the government’s judicial policy in the mofussil.  
The governor and the members of the council unanimously agreed in 
1825 that separate zilla judges and the sadr adalat were to be int roduced in the 
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Deccan and that the regulations were to be applied in these courts.
93
 However, 
they disagreed on the degree of uniformity in the judicial system. Elphinstone 
wanted to give more power to the men on the spot in the Deccan than in other 
provinces as a necessary preparation. He proposed to assign the zilla judge 
with the duties of circuit judge, which was usually held by a puisne judge of 
the sadr foujdari adalat. But Francis Warden insisted that the regulation 
system had been successfully tested in the Old Provinces and should be 
introduced in the Deccan without exceptions. He said that too many 
preparatory measures had shaken the confidence of the natives. ‘Rules and 
forms’ were vital to achieving efficiency, which was ‘wholly dispensed with 
in the Deccan’.94 From this perspective, he also suggested that the sadr adalat 
should be moved from Surat to Bombay, which would be more efficient and 
economical and lead ‘to the formation of a code of consistent precedents’. 95 
Elphinstone responded that even the Old Provinces were under the 
British government merely for six or seven years; only the native judicial 
system was tested by experience to be able to preserve the ‘peace and 
tolerable security’ of the country. 96 He thought that the British system was 
still too imperfect to allow universal application: ‘we are so far from having 
attained perfection in any of our arrangement in Indian that we are by no 
means entitled to leave off experiment’.97 So he preferred to have different 
judicial systems in the Deccan and the Old Provinces and furnish both with a 
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seat of sadr adalat.
98
 For him, regularity was not synonymous with uniformity 
and centrality. The debate continued in 1826. Warden emphasised ‘the great 
advantage of a uniformity of system’.99 Elphinstone restated the advantage of 
Indian system: ‘In the Deccan we were trying to ascertain how far it was 
possible to adhere to the native system and to exclude our own. We have 
perhaps been too hasty in giving up so much more we should not give’. 100 
In the end, the council endorsed Elphinstone’s view, and exceptions of 
the general rule of criminal justice and police were stipulated in Regulation 
XXX of 1827. The police jurisdiction of the sadr stations (cities of Poona and 
Ahmednagar) was not held by the judges but by the collectors (s. 2, c. 1). The 
criminal judge combined the power of the court of sessions and the Special 
Court trying political cases (s. 3, c. 1). The court of sessions sat continuously 
throughout a year (s. 5). The magistrates could sentence 2 years’ 
imprisonment instead of 2 months (s. 2).  
 
The next important policy of exception was related to the rights and privileges 
of the sardars. In order to deal with the crisis, the government planned to 
devise special measures to exempt the sardars from the harmful effects of the 
judiciary. Chaplin pointed out that they should make considerable 
modifications in regulations regarding the independent chiefs and great and 
lesser jagirdars, because the regulations ‘might be found too unbinding and 
likely to occasion disgust to our subjects of high rank in the Dekhan and 
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consequent disaffection to our Government’. 101 
The government’s intention was that the social status of sardars should 
be protected and promoted so that they could police their own lands as the 
sovereign landholders. In order for this, by Regulation XV of 1827, the 
government vested the sardars with the police jurisdiction in their territories. 
They were also exempted from the Company’s criminal jurisdiction when the 
actions were related to policing. As we saw above, these measures were 
already in force in the Deccan. The government aimed at expanding them to 
the Old Provinces under the regulations.
102
 It particularly targeted the chiefs 
of mehwasis and girasias in Gujarat, who were ‘subject to the Regulations in 
law but exempt in fact’. They were named ‘landholders’ in the title of the 
regulation because, Elphinstone explained, ‘no one word which comprehend 
all Grasseas, Meweysees, Jageerdars, Enamdars, &ca &ca’. 103 This shows 
that the control of the tribal raids was the chief purpose of this regulation.  
The draft regulation was first sent by the regulation committee to the 
government in May 1824. It said that the sardar was expected ‘to maintain the 
public peace throughout his jurisdiction, to apprehend public  offenders, to try 
and to punish offences according to the authority conferred on him by his 
sunnud’. He was also to deal with ‘occasions of necessity, such as the 
apprehension of public offenders, or the defence of the country against 
marauders, or an enemy’. The potential of chiefs to act abusively was 
examined by the zilla magistrates, but they were also given discretion not to 
do so because, if ‘too rigid an adherence to forms is expected … he will find 
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his situation irksome and would cease to think it respectable’. It was 
circulated to the sadr adalat and the zilla magistrates for their opinions.
104
 
The measure was favourably received by the district officers. Thomas 
Williamson, the acting collector of Kaira in Gujarat, welcomed the measure. 
He explained that currently the police agent of the government was badly 
received in the locality, and his process was frequently attended with 
impediments and failures. He expected the merit of the regulation as follows:  
 
Many of these Chieftains are now placed on the  footing of common 
subjects under the immediate controul of Kamavisdar and Police Agent, 
who, however useful they may be to us, are frequently men of low birth, 
and not very delicate in the exercise of their authority, and whose 
official superiority cannot be otherwise than very disagreeable to Chiefs. 
… These evils the Regulation appears well calculated to correct. 105 
 
William James Lumsden, the magistrate of Surat, also expressed his 
favourable opinion; H. D. Robertson, the magistrate of Poona, stated that it 
would repose the sardars and have ‘the effect of conciliating their attachment 
to our rule’.106 
But the district officials expressed a shared concern about the harmful 
effect of the British court of law. They worried about the regulation 
committee’s proposal that the abuse of the chiefs should be checked by the 
judiciary. Archibald Robertson, the collector of Khandesh, recommended that 
the government rather than the Company’s Court should take cognizance of 
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the criminal offenses of the sardars. Chaplin agreed that serious abuses were 
prevented at present only because the British government gave due attention 
to their respectability. The time had not yet come to confine the powers of the 
chiefs and to make them amenable to the British courts.
107
 R. Boyat, the 
acting collector at Broach, even articulated that the sardars should not touch 
regulations: 
 
Even now, there is scarcely one of them that I know who is at all 
acquainted with our Regulation. People who are most about our 
Cutcherries are mere hacking dealers in law, and know little or nothing 
excepting what is bad. Into the hands of such people I am persuaded too, 




The proper methods of conciliation and control were further debated in 
the governor’s council, and again Elphinstone’s proposition of discretion was 
confronted with Warden’s insistence on regularity. Warden insisted that the 
sardars should be tried and punished in the Company’s Court. But Elphinstone 
said that the regulation was too intrusive into their inner management of the 
territory and that they should not be required to keep records of their 
proceedings. He was especially concerned about the summons of the sardars 
to the court. The summons should be issued only in cases of necessity by a 
letter, not by a subpoena. The chiefs should be allowed to sit by the judges and 
should be ‘treated in all respects with the courtesy usual among equals’. 
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Here again, with some compromise, the view of Elphinstone and the 
collectors was reflected in the final draft.
110
 The governor was empowered to 
put landholders under his immediate authority alone or to order the particular 
jurisdiction and procedure to which they were subjected ( s. 14). Though the 
sardars were required to keep records of their proceedings (s. 10), they were 
allowed to be tried in a court of circuit or a special court which could be held 
privately. In these courts, no one should be excluded whom the landholders 
wished to be present; and ‘any forms of courtesy and consideration due to the 
rank of the accused shall also be observed’ (s. 18). In this way, out of 657 




The fact that the government confirmed the exemption of the sardars 
from the ordinary process of law was important. They were formally put 
outside the regular working of the British legal process. By excluding them, 
the government made it clear that the de facto legal pluralism should be made 
de jure. It was decided that the affairs of higher rank sardars were not legal 
but political in nature and thus to be solely dealt with by the government. As 
we will see in the next chapter, the intervention of the King’s Court was 
contrary to this policy. If the native chieftains were tried in the Supreme Court 
as a Company’s servants, it would shake not only the foundation of the local 
police system, but also the structure and principle of the judicial system based 
on the exceptions of sardars. 
The government intended to further strengthen the authority of chiefs 
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and sardars by exempting them from the Company’s civil and criminal 
jurisdiction more generally.
112
 In 1825 Chaplin proposed lists of sardars who 
should be exempted from the ordinary process of the Company’s Court. It 
included a total of 232 persons categorised into three classes. The first class 
of sardars, 22 in number, were wholly exempted from the process of the 
courts; the second class, 45, were exempted from the ordinary process but 
‘may be requested to answer demands either by letter or by their wukeels as 
may be most expedient’; the third class, 165, were subject to jurisdiction of 
the sadr adalat but exempted from attending the trial in person.
113
 
Elphinstone proposed that the civil cases filed against these sardars 
should be dealt with by a special agent appointed by the government. The 
agent should be empowered to compound decrees which were already passed 
and to effectuate the compromise of debts and, ‘even in the clearest case of 
debts’, to allow the sardar to keep his house and a portion of his income 
‘sufficient for his decent maintenance’. The trial should be held not in a 
public Cutcherry but ‘should be conducted rather according to the forms of a 
Durbar than those of a Court of Justice’.114 Warden opposed these measures 
by advocating the principle of ‘uniformity’ and ‘efficiency’. He insisted that 
the ordinary appeals should go to the sadr adalat and not to the government, as 
the latter lacked experience and assistance of the native law officers.
115
 But 
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his view was a minority; Goodwin endorsed Chaplin and Elphinstone’s plan, 
and the first Agent for Sirdars was appointed in January 1827.
116
 
The detail was stipulated in Regulation XXIX of 1827. The sardars were 
classified into three classes, and the list was furnished to the Agent for Sirdars. 
All civil suits against them were solely cognizable by the Agent. The trial of 
the first and second class were solely based on the consideration of privilege, 
custom and usage, and the case was appealable to the governor. The trial of 
the third class was also based on custom and usage with some relaxed 
regulations, and their cases were appealable to the sadr diwani adalat.
117
 In 
this way, the suits against the sardars were categorised to be adjusted outside 
the ordinary court of law. The government was to be the sole authority to deal 
with them through the Agent for Sirdars. In this way, the introduction of the 
regular system of law was suspended by the governor and district officers’ 
political sense of crisis. The sardars were by no means exempted from the 
government’s vigilant eyes. As we already saw, Regulation XXV of 1827 
allowed the government to attach the persons and lands of sardars by ‘reasons 
of state’. What was vital was that the  cases of political importance should be 
dealt with solely by the government, not by the court.  
The government supplemented this exemption scheme with another, 
equally important stipulation in the same regulation. The section 6 stated that 
the Company’s civil courts in the Deccan could not take cognizance of 
following cases: 
 
All claims for damages against persons in authority under the late 
Government, for abuse of power during that period; All claims against 
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Government on account of enams; All claims against Government on 
account of jagheers, wurshasuns [religious pensions], pensions, 
neemnooks [fixed annuities], and other advantages not hereditary; All 
disputes regarding public rent or revenue payable to Government, and al l 
complaints of exaction by mamlutdars, or district or village officers; All 
claims on account of village debts, all village boundary disputes, and 




This meant that the government put the affairs of all service gentry of the 
former government and holders of alienated lands (even if they were not on 
the list of sardars) under its exclusive control, and that it exempted itself from 
liability in the municipal courts in relation to its policies of land and revenue. 
This article survived as late as 1876.
119
 In this way, Elphinstone’s new 
judicial arrangement clearly ordered that the political concerns of the 
government should be exempted from the Company’s judiciary.  
The next governor John Malcolm further strengthened this system of 
judicial exemption. Malcolm pointed out some problems of the Agent for 
Sirdars. First, as the first Agent George William Anderson was also the judge 
of the sadr adalat, he could not spend enough time for the cases of sardars, and 
they fell into great arrears. Second, as he was stationed in Bombay, he could 
not easily look at the revenue and judicial record in Poona.
120
 Third and most 
seriously, the presence of the Agent in Bombay induced the sardars to come to 
Bombay or to send and keep their vakeels there. Malcolm wanted to prevent 
the sardar’s contact with the Bombay lawyers. He explained the evils as 
follows: 
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It would be attended with an expenditure which the limited income of 
those chiefs renders them unable to afford, they would live in a society 
which even in its native branches is altogether uncongenial to their 
present habits and sentiments, and continually mixing with it would 
early have one of two effects. They would either be disgusted and 
discontented, or by forming acquaintance with artful men imbibe 
imperfect and indistinct ideas of our institutions and courts of law that 





In order to deal with the problem, thereafter the zilla judges of Poona were 
appointed the Agents.
122
 Furthermore, in 1828, Malcolm introduced a new 
officer styled the Deputy Agent for Sirdars stationed at Poona, who could use 
his entire time to deal with the suits against the sardars ‘for the purpose of 
effectual and permanent separation of the transactions  of the privileges classes 
from those of others’. John Warden was appointed the first Deputy Agent. 123 
Malcolm further conferred civil jurisdiction to the jagirdars by Regulation 
XIII of 1830 and expanded the jurisdiction of the Agent for Sirdars to disputes  
on land. He experienced some conflict over the issue of regularity and 




The government’s policy of exemption was favourably received by the 
sardars. They petitioned the government to be included in the lists, and the 
number of sardars on the lists increased rapidly. The initial list of the first 
class sardars contained 20 names. Only a year later, 14 new applicants were 
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accepted. To the second class list of 57 was added 56, and to the third class 
list with 160 names was added 117. So the grand total doubled from 237 to 
494 in a year.
125
 It seems that the actual working of the agent was also 
agreeable to the government. John Warden reported in 1832 that the Agent 
accommodated ‘without the expense and vexation of regular law suits’ 218 out 
of 308 claims; 967 claims were preferred to the Deputy Agent, who amicably 
adjusted 810. There were few arrears: between 1827 and 1832, the Agent and 
the Deputy Agent could not dispose of only 73 out of 1,376 cases.
126
 The 
Bombay government confidently reported the result to the Court of Directors  
(See Table).
127
 Overall, the Agent seemed to work well. The cases of debt 
recovery, family dispute, and revenue matter were all decided by the Agent 
with consideration of specific situations of sardars.
128
  
The trouble was the King’s Court. From the start, Elphinstone was 
concerned about the King’s Court’s interference in the affairs of sardars. 
Elphinstone asked the Advocate General George Norton whether the Supreme 
Court could take cognizance of the cases under the Agent of Sirdars. His 
specific concern was that the Agent was regarded as lacking any legal 
authority. He even asked the Advocate General about the possibility of 
conferring the authority of the court of record to the governor for this 
                                                 
125
 Names of 70 not ascertained above were added to the above number. BL, 
IOR F/4/1035/28544, 31, J. Malcolm, minute, 30 Jan. 1828.  
126
 BL, IOR P/400/61, BJC 23 Jan. 1833, nos. 97–101, John Warden to Gov., 
31 Dec. 1832. 
127
 BL, IOP L/PJ/3/919, 269, BJL, Gov. to CoD, 6 Feb. 1833.  
128
 BL, IOR P/400/18, BJC 18 June 1828, nos. 8–11, John Warden, Deputy 
Agent, to Gov., 28 May 1828, Khooshaldass Damoodhurdass v. Mahomed 
Hurreef Moonshee; BL, IOR P/400/18, BJC 18 June 1828, nos. 21–4, John 
Warden, Deputy Agent, to Gov., 28 May 1828, Row Gunness Pansey v. Rumma 
Baee, widow of Gunput Rao Pansey; BL, IOR P/400/27, BJC 10 June 1829, 
nos. 37–41, J. A. Dunlop to Gov., 1 June 1829, and BL, IOR P/400/30, BJC 4 
Nov. 1829, nos. 1–8, J. A. Dunlop to Gov., 25 Sep. 1829, Rungoo Wisswanath 




 Norton replied that it was illegal, only admissible under the 
peshwa’s despotic government.130 Elphinstone established the Agent without 
any further measures on this point, and, as we shall see in the next chapter , his 




This chapter argues that, driven by the crisis in the mid -1820s, the 
government decided to expand its conciliation policy towards the chiefs and 
sardars. It was deemed essential for the effective mofussil governance, 
especially for policing the wild tribes. What the government was doing was 
demarcating the boundary between respectable and unrespectable chiefs.
131
 
The government protected and promoted the former to use them in the form of 
indirect rule in the mofussil.  The government articulated that the affairs of 
sardars were in the realm of state necessity, outside the realm of law. The 
post-war settlement in the Deccan was confirmed and expanded to the whole 
presidency, in which the sardars were regarded as sovereigns in their 
territories and vested with extraterritoriality. The tribal chiefs should be 
deprived of the sovereignty in the plains and, if they failed to keep tranquillity, 
became the object of policing either by the government or by the respectable 
sardars. They were, with the rest of the subjects, subjected to the municipal 
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law and put to the realm of regularity.  
Ballhatchet points out that Elphinstone had to codify hitherto informal 
privileges of chiefs in the regulations ‘to protect them from the zeal o f 
egalitarian Judges’, suggesting that the new administrators would substitute 
the rule of men with the rule of regulations.
132
 The codification of the 
sardar’s exemption indicates that, contrary to Ballhatchet’s suggestion, the 
realm of men would not be vanished. The exemption of political discretion 
from the realm of civil/legal regularity was the essence of colonial governance. 
The newly conquered territories would remain ‘new’ during the British raj, 
because even after the introduction of regulations, the  working of law was 
only buttressed by exemptions of certain state necessities. The division 
between the realm of law and the realm of politics became the defining 
characteristic of the political structure of colonialism.
133
 As we will see in the 
next chapter, the King’s Court denied this, and exercised its jurisdiction over 
the political affairs of sardars, which was conceived to be threatening the 
entire system of Company’s colonial domination. In other words, as opposed 
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_______________________________________________________________ 
Table 1: Suits disposed of by the Agent 
________________________________________ 
Original Suits: Adjusted without resorting to law proceedings 
   1827 28 29 30 31 32 Total 
Claims preferred  0 11 89 15 77 26 218 
Claims Accommodated 0 2 84 17 80 35 218 
Remaining in hand - - - - - - 0 
 
Original Suits: Regular Suits 
Claims filed  23 1 5 1 1 1 32 
Suits disposed of  12 1 3 4 8 1 29 
Remaining in hand - - - - - - 3 
 
Appeals from the Deputy Agent 
   1827 28 29 30 31 32 Total 
Appeals filed  2 10 8 8 15 15 58 
Disposed of   0 0 8 2 21 12 43 
Remaining  - - - - - - 15 
 
Grand Total 
Disposed of   12 3 95 23 109 48 290 




















Table 2: Suits disposed of by the Deputy Agent  
_______________________________________________  
Adjustment without resorting to law proceedings  
  1828 29 30 31 32 Total 
Claims  64 230 216 188 163 861 
Accommodated 14 206 222 232 136 810 
Remaining  - - - - - 51* 
* All preferred in the last 3 months (Oct-Dec 
1832) 
Regular Suits 125 36 24 60 35 280 
Disposed of  68 60 30 72 46 276 
Remaining  - - - - - 4 
 
Grand Total 
Disposed of  82 266 252 304 182 1,086 
Remaining  - - - - - 55 
______________________________________________________________  
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In 1825, Elphinstone instructed Chaplin to persuade Chintaman Rao, the most 
powerful sardar in the Deccan, about the danger of his coming to Bombay 
city: 
 
1st. That His Majesty’s Castle and Island of Bombay (or more legally 
speaking the County of Bombay) is under the exclusive control of H. 
M.’s Justices and H. M.’s Court of Recorder, and is governed according 
to the laws of England. 2nd. That in consequence the Governor has no 
power whatever to protect Chintamun Row or his followers from the 
ordinary operation of those laws, or from the rules of police which to 




In this passage, the government’s determination to protect the sardars from the 
King’s Court took the form of an awkward admission that the government was 
powerless in the presidency town, the very heart of its territorial empire. This 
was yet another sign of the fragility of the Company’s sovereignty in the 
1820s in its confrontation with the King’s Court. The sovereignty of the 
government and the sardars were at once jeopardised by the King’s Court’s 
assertion of jurisdictional expansion, which would totally nullify the 
government’s vision of indirect rule via the sardars.  
The problem was not confined to the British territories, because the 
state of sovereignty was complex in Bombay in the 1820s. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the chiefs and sardars in British India were given political, 
economic and social privileges which were equal to the ‘independent princes’ 
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such as the raja of Satara or the Gaekwad of Baroda. In turn, the independent 
princes were not so ‘independent’ because, like under the Maratha 
confederacy, the British government received tributes in the form of 
subsidiary alliance and advised on their internal affairs via the Political 
Residents. This heterogeneous constellation of sovereignty was, as Chaplin 
stated, the defining characteristic of the Deccan.
2
 
For example, it was impossible without collaborating with and 
controlling the chiefs and princes in Indian India for the government to export 
Malwa opium, one of the most important sources of revenue in the 1820s. This 
was because the production of opium was entirely conducted in Indian India. 
The route of opium passage from Malwa to the west coast was also outside 
British India. The government was involved in difficult negotiations with the 
chiefs and princes. From 1823/24, the Company started to order the native 
chiefs in Malwa to sell opium to the Company at a fixed rate. Especially 
difficult was the negotiation with Indian princes to ban the pas sage of the 
smuggled opium. Sindhia, one of the most powerful independent chiefs and 
the single largest producer of Malwa opium, resisted the Company’s 
restrictive policy and often supported the smuggling from Daman.
3
 
So, instead of making the anachronistic distinction between ‘British’ 
and ‘Indian’ India, the issue of ‘external’ sovereignty should be conside red in 
relation to that of ‘internal’ sovereignty and vice versa. In order to do so, we 
need to bridge the scholarly division between British India and Indian India. 
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Although there are good studies on indirect rule in the princely states,
4
 few 
works address its interconnectedness with the government’s policies in British 
India. I offer a case study in this chapter by focusing on the King’s Court’s 
relationship with the sardars and independent princes. The intermixed and 
layered state of sovereignty influenced the government’s judicial policy in the 
mofussil. The law easily transcended the boundary of ‘colonial state’, and, 
like the opium issue, the government had to make its judicial policies in 
reference to both internal (sardars’) and external (independent  princes’) 
Indian India. 
As we shall see below, the government wanted to deal with the chiefs 
and sardars in the foreign territories in the same way as those under its direct 
rule. This was because the raids by the wild tribes easily transcended the 
boundary of British and Indian India. On the one hand, the sardars in British 
India should be treated as independent princes who were exempted from the 
domestic system of the Company’s Court. Their relationship with the 
government was more like international relations, in which both stood on the 
same footing without a superior tribunal. On the other hand, the sardars in the 
territories of the independent princes should be made to carry out the same 
policy of tribal policing as those in the British territories. Thus, for the 
government, while there was essentially no difference between the 
independent chiefs and the sardars in its territories, there was an insuperable 
gap between the sardars and other subjects such as the ryots or merchants in 
their status of sovereignty. As we saw in the last chapter, the government tried 
to consolidate this relation by putting the sardars under their exclusive control 
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and outside the realm of law. 
The problem was the King’s Court. The government’s attempt to 
privilege the sardars was confronted by the King’s Court’s assumption that 
there was only a single body of ‘Indian subjects’ in British India to whom the 
law was equally applicable and that British rule had nothing to do with the 
independent chiefs and their subjects. The judges did not admit the 
differentiation between sardars and other Indians based on political 
expediency. The sardars were prosecuted, and their persons and property were 
attached in the King’s Court. They complained that it was injurious to their 
respectability and contrary to the government’s promise to protect their 
privileges. The government, especially its district officials in the mofussil, 
strongly reacted against these cases.  
But the sardars were not just passive victims of the King’s Court, as the 
government and the sardars themselves tried to impress; they were active 
users of the King’s Court, especially in their family conflicts. These cases 
were important because, as Pamela Price argues, the problems of power and 
authority were most clearly exposed in litigations over local magnates’ 
inheritance and land tenure.
5
 In addition, discontented with the government’s 
intervention in the affairs of the sardars in their territories, the independent 
princes started to rely on the authority of the King’s Court t o resist the 
government’s policies. They claimed that the King’s Court had the  power to 
redress the wrongs of the government and that they would ‘appeal’ to the 
King’s Court if their demands were not admitted. The government conceived 
that this act of jurisdictional jockeying could subvert the Company’s rule in 
India. The King’s Court’s cognisance of cases meant that the government 
could not control the affairs of the sardars, which was crucial for the 
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tranquillity in the mofussil. The King’s Court disturbed the government’s 
vision of sovereignty and indirect rule both in British and Indian India.  
 
II. Sardars and the King’s Court  
 
The inhabitants of the mofussil came to Bombay and filed complaints against 
the sardars in the King’s Court. The government’s po licy of protecting the 
sardars, which led to the enactments of the regulations which we saw in the 
last chapter, could be nullified by the King’s Court. There were indeed many 
such cases. Debt recovery was a major motive. As Chaplin reported, the 
sardars were ‘in general much embarrassed by their creditors, notwithstanding 
that every possible consideration is extended to them in respect of their 
debts’.6 In 1822, for instance, a writ of the King’s Court was issued to Gunput 
Row Patwardhan of Shedball, one of the most powerful sardars in the Deccan. 
He was sued by a patil for debt. Gunput Row’s vakeel explained that the patil 
came from Bombay with one or two persons claiming to be sent by the 
government. The patil said that he had obtained an adjustment in the King’s 
Court, but did not show any authoritative documents. Chaplin cautioned that 
this kind of event would lower the dignity of chiefs, ‘whom we are bound by 
our engagements to treat as independent and may have the effect of 
frightening them into a compliance with claims that are not legitimate’. He 
added that he had just received a complaint of a similar nature from Punt 
Sucheen (Pant Sachiv), a major jagirdars in the territory of the raja of Satara, 
who was under the protection of the British government.
7
 The patil’s attorney 
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W. A. Morgan explained that though he wrote a common letter of demand to 
Gunput Row, he did not know that he was a sardar. The government told 
Morgan not to grant any letter if the defendant was outside the jurisdiction of 
the King’s Court.8 Chaplin was not satisfied with Morgan’s answer. He 
complained that Morgan did not appear to disclaim his right of interference 
except in the cases of sardars. He requested the government to tell him that 
their interference outside jurisdiction was ‘a matter of supererogation’.9 
     The suits against the sardars sometimes obstructed the government’s 
revenue policy relating to them. The government had promoted a policy to 
replace the sardars’ huks (customary dues collected in the watan lands) with  
the payment by the government for their revenue collection in the government 
lands. This was aimed at relieving the burden of the ryots and to persuade the 
sardars to improve the cultivation of waste lands.
10
 But in a suit against a 
sardar in the Northern Konkan in 1826, a Bombay creditor sued a sardar for 
debt and demanded the collector to pay part of the debt as the granter of the 
huks.
11
 The government denied the jurisdiction of the King’s Court as it was a 
matter of revenue. It further argued that the huks were not the payment for 
services and therefore, legally speaking, not ‘debts’ and attachable. 12 It might 
be necessary for the government to make this claim, for if this case was 
admitted, the government would be involved in many similar cases as the thi rd 
party debtor. 
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The layered state of sovereignty complicated the government’s 
engagement in the judicial management of the mofussil. This was especially 
true in Kathiawar, Gujarat, where the girasia and mehwasi chiefs shared 
sovereignty with the British and the Gaekwar of Baroda. It was best indicated 
by debt recovery suits against the Thakur of Bhavnagar. The city of 
Bhavnagar was a major port city in the region, trading with the Arabs and 
exporting the Malwa opium.
13
 The Thakur incurred a large number of debts 
by his commercial transactions. His legal status was complex. His tribute to 
the Gaikwad was transferred to the British in 1807, and since then, he was 
under the protection of the British government. In this sense, he was an 
independent tributary prince exempted from British courts of law. But as a 
proprietor of the city of Bhavnagar and neighbouring villages in the Goga 
pargana, he was a subject of the British government amenable to its court. The 
government disliked the civil suits against him in the Company’s Court, as he 
was a major girasia chief in the region important for suppressing the Kati and 
other raiders in his territories, but also sometimes instigated insurrections 
himself.
14
 In 1827, for example, a Bania filed a suit against the Thakur in  the 
Company’s Court for the recovery of Rs 11,40,000. The Thakur claimed that 
he should be exempted from the British jurisdiction. The members of the 
council, Romer and Warden, insisted that he should be subjected to the adalat 
as his debt was incurred by his commercial transactions, but Governor 
Malcolm was determined to protect his status and suggested referring the case 
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This already complicated situation was further exacerbated by the 
King’s Court. In 1827, Advocate General George Norton reported one of such 
cases as follows. A person who called himself an agent of Thakur employed 
Solicitor James Patch to make a suit in the Supreme Court. Patch asked 
Norton to be the retainer. But when Norton perused the case, he discovered ‘a 
system of fraud and conspiracy to abuse the process (by writ of execution on a 
fictitious judgement) of the Supreme Court in sweeping away some property 
of the Thakoor in Bombay’. He told Patch that if this business should be 
continued, he would report it to the government, and the case was withdrawn. 
Furthermore, Norton explained that this case was discovered when he was 
asked to take a retainer of another case, in which a Bombay merchant 
attempted to sue the Thakur for a wrongful seizure of property. He declined 
the offer, as he thought the Thakur was not amenable to the Supreme Court.
16
 
So the Thakur was about to be involved in two cases in the Supreme Court. 
The government confirmed that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction 
and told Norton that he was right in not accepting the retainer as he would be 




These suits against the sardars should be considered in the context of 
more general use of the King’s Court to challenge authority  of social superiors 
in settled regions. As in Bengal, the government was concerned about the 
King’s Court’s harassment of the Indian revenue intermediaries such as patels 
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(village headmen) or deshmukhs (headmen of parganas).
18
 For example, in 
the Southern Konkan in 1819, a patil was threatened by villagers via a 
Bombay attorney to stop exercising his ‘unlawful force and injury against’ 
them. The district judge cautioned that ‘any such interference with the 
revenue details of a recently acquired territory in particular must prove 
mischievous to the public interest and embarrassing to the local 
functionaries’.19 This levelling effect was more problematic in the cases of 
sardars who controlled unsettled regions.  
The problem was not confined to debt recovery suit s by bankers and 
merchants against the sardars; the government officials were also concerned 
about the use of the King’s Court by the sardars themselves in their family 
conflict. Indeed the sardars used both the Company’s and the King’s Court for 
this purpose. The settlement of these suits posed a serious problem for the 
government, as it involved examinations of complicated facts such as kinship 
or joint-property relationship or titles of lands. Chaplin confessed that there 
was no prospect of early adjustment of the family conflict of the Patwardhans. 
He even admitted that the decisions in the Company’s Courts were useless in 
these disputes, for the European judges were unable to make a correct 
judgement and the parties were unlikely to agree with  it. He could do nothing 
but leave them to solve the dispute by themselves.
20
 In such a situation, the 
sardars naturally used the King’s Court as an option of their jurisdictional 
jockeying. 
An early example was the case of Raja Rutton Singh in the Deccan in 
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1820. He was a sardar of Malegaon, near Baramati.
21
 His father adopted a son 
before Rutton Singh was born. Both the father and the adopted son were dead, 
and the son of the adopted son named Ramchunder Judow Row claimed a 
share of the family property. The claim was examined by the panchayat, but 
Ramchunder employed Frederick Ayrton and sent a letter of demand to Rutton 
Singh and threatened that he would be sued in the Recorder’s Court if he did 
not pay the money. Chaplin worried that it was injurious for the raja’s high 
status: ‘any meddling on the part of its inferior agents, amongst the natives of 
a conquered country, whose institutions are utterly at variance with many 
parts of the British Code would be attended with the most mischievous 
consequences’.22 He emphasised that the first peshwa was originally in the 
service of raja’s grandfather, and the family was in consequence very highly 
honoured by the peshwa. Ayrton apologised that he would be more careful in 
the future on the matter of jurisdiction, and this case was settled.
23
 
The sardars used the King’s Court with the help of European and Indian 
legal agents. The working of these agents was criticised by the government 
officials in a prolonged family conflict in the Mankeshwurs in the Deccan. 
The Mankeshwurs had been politically important under the peshwa’s 
government. On the accession of Baji Rao II, Sadashew Punt Mankeshwur 
became one of his chief officers and eventually became the prime minister. He 
retained the position till his death in 1817. As he left no son, his wido w 
adopted a distant relation, Luximon Row.
24
 This succession generated a fierce 
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controversy with Sadashew’s nephew, Mulhar Row, who claimed a share of 
inheritance as a common property of joint family. The question was first 
submitted to the panchayat in 1819 and then referred to arbitration by H. D. 
Robertson, the collector of Poona.
25
 
But instead of waiting for the Company’s arbitration, Mulhar Row 
resorted to the King’s Court. In March 1820, Mulhar Row employed Frederick 
Ayrton and sent a letter to the widow of Sadashew Punt that he would institute 
a suit in the Recorder’s Court if the case was not speedily decided by 
arbitration. Collector Robertson was particularly concerned about the working 
of Ayrton’s Indian agent at Poona, one Luis Fernandes. Robertson  explained 
that Mulhar Row ‘had the folly’ to promise to pay Fernandes a seven percent 
commission of the amount recovered from the opponent. Robertson ordered 
Fernandes to make out a bill, which exhibited Rs 1,500 in total including 
prices of consultations, documentations, drafting of cases and ‘personal 
expenses’. Robertson commented that this bill would save Mulhar Row from 
‘his foolish bond for percentage’ and prevent Fernandes, ‘this jackal of the 
Bombay lawyer’, from making any greater demand than was specified in it.26 
As to the arbitration, Robertson delegated it to his assistant William J. 
Lumsden, who decided in favour of Mulhar Row. Luximon Row appealed to 
the governor, but it was dismissed in 1822.
27
 
However, the said Luis Fernandes himself used the King’s Court to 
recover his profit which would have been gained from the business but 
prevented by Robertson. He filed a suit in the Recorder’s Court against 
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Mulhar Row for the non-payment of commission for ‘work and labour’ 
amounting to Rs 37,000. Fernandes employed another Bombay attorney 
William Fenwick and demanded the widows not to hand the share to Mulhar 
Row. Mulhar Row declared that he never met Fernandes after he left Poona in 
1820 and no ‘work and labour’ was done by him. Chaplin disgustingly 
reported that this was another attempt of ‘the inferior law practitioners in 
Bombay to establish a footing in cases which appear to me to be absolutely 
and entirely out of the jurisdiction of the Recorder’s Court’. He and Robertson 
thought that ‘there is something very nefarious in this claim’ and its object 
was ‘to frustrate the words of Government’.28 Robertson recommended the 
government to prosecute Fernandes for false claims and threat, pointing out 
that the case was instigated ‘with the design of having Mu lhar Row detained 
and harangued in Bombay’.29 Acting Advocate General George Norton 
explained that, as the case was not instituted and the judgement was not given 
in the Recorder’s Court, the notice had no effect, which was probably 
obtained by Fernandes ‘as a contrivance to frighten Mulhar Row into some 
settlement or compromise of his suit’.30 It seems that no suit was filed in the 
court. 
The family conflict itself continued. Although Malhar Row was allowed 
his share, he disputed the amount, and eventually his jagir was temporarily 
resumed by the government.
31
 The final decision of the Privy Council was 
given as late as 1831.
32
 During the interval, both parties repeatedly petitioned 
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the government through Chaplin. He once even requested the government to 
take some measure to deal with their frivolous references.
33
 Two years before 
the judgement in the Privy Council, when Luximon Row accompanied 
Governor Malcolm in his tour in the Deccan, Malcolm expressed his desire to 
release him from bad and designing advisors,  who first involved his family in 
a law suit, and now encouraged him to appeal to the King in Council. Malcolm 
stated that the cost of appeal was so great that the family would be ruined 
even if they won the cause. He conceived ‘the strong necessity of some 
modification in this part of Indian legislature, which from its delays and 
expenses must in most instances prove efficient to no purpose but the ruin of 
natives, who from a spirit of litigation, or ignorance, of the consequences, 
became involved in such suits’.34 
The Mankeshwur case shows that the sardars could use the King’s Court 
for their own profit, and attorneys and their agents were available for that 
purpose. Luis Fernandes, a Portuguese, was such a figure. He embodied the 
proximity of the world of law and that of violence in early nineteenth-century 
India. He was from a notorious family in the Deccan. Before the Third 
Maratha War, his brother Joseph de Souza was employed in the commissariat 
department of the Poona subsidiary force. He was arrested by the government 
for conspiracy of communicating with a Pindari chief of Burhanpur to release 
a state prisoner (a relation of the Holkar) under the custody of the Peshwa. 
The examination by the government showed that the brothers John de Souza, 
Joseph de Souza and Luis Fernandes acted as the intermediaries of sardars 
employing and mobilising the raiders such as the Arabs and the Bhils.
35
 His 
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social influence was shown in a case in 1823 in which he was arrested for 
beating a peon but released by ‘about 75 Por tuguese who severely beat the 
constable and other police officers’.36 These connections with the world of 
sardars, wild tribes and lawyers might have raised the officials’ sense of 
danger on the King’s Court’s meddling with the affairs of the sardars. 37 
 
Some cases more directly provoked security concerns. The arrest of a sardar 
Ramchunder Chowdry in 1820 caused a sensation in the Deccan. He was 
arrested under a writ of attachment issued in a case for damage of Rs 40,040 in 
the Recorder’s Court presided over by George Cooper. The case had been 
decided in the panchayat, but the plaintiff Balum Bhat Watwey, Peshwa’s 
former military commander
38
 and probably Chowdry’s under-farmer, was 
dissatisfied with the result and petitioned to the government. When it was 
rejected, the plaintiff resorted to the King’s Court. He hired the bête noir  




Reporting the case, Chaplin commented that the case required a special 
attention in order to avert ‘the acknowledged evils of introducing amongst 
natives of the interior foreign laws, which are totally at variance with their 
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habits and prejudices’. He demanded that the government ‘take an active part 
in maintaining the integrity of the jurisdiction of its own courts from the 
encroachments of the Recorder’s Court’. He pinpointed that the arrest of 
Chowdry was illegal (1) because he had never been to Bombay and therefore 
was not under the jurisdiction of the Recorder’s Court, (2) because he was a 
minor and not personally liable to responsibility of debt, (3) because the point 
in litigation had been decided in the panchayat, from which no appeal was 
made, and (4) because the sheriff could arrest him only if he was found in his 
district. Chaplin recommended that the Company’s Solicitor should institute a 
suit in the name of Chowdry against the sheriff in order to recover the damage 
of false arrest and imprisonment.
40
 
     The news of the arrest stirred the country. Henry Pottinger, the collector 
of Ahmednagar, reported that ‘a very considerable sensation has been excited 
amongst all classes of our new subjects and of whom … many are similarly 
situated with the Chowdry’. Pottinger warned that, if it was admitted, ‘the 
whole country must inevitably be thrown into a sta te of confusion and alarm 
which will put a stop to everything else’.41 This was because Chowdry was a 
revenue farmer of the peshwa. Before the British conquest, the sardars were 
appointed the revenue farmer of their districts by the peshwa’s government. 
They paid a fixed amount of revenue to the peshwa and were given the 
judicial and magisterial authorities. They confiscated the lands and properties 
of revenue defaulters and sold them to recover debt.
42
 Elphinstone explained 
the mechanism under which the discontents relating to the farming system 
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The party in the wrong could always, by a bribe, prevent his cause going 
to a Panchayat, or overturn the decision of one. An appeal lay from the 
under-farmer to the upper, whose income depended on the exactions of 
the authorities below him; and from him to the Minister, who never 
received a complaint without a present; or to the Peshwa, who never 
received one at all. In consequence the Government afforded little 




Now these claims were flooded into the Company’s Court. Pottinger explained 
that he repeatedly declined to take cognizance of these claims of damages as 
they were done under the authority of the peshwa. If the claim against 
Chowdry was admitted in the King’s Court, many of these old and dormant 
claims amounting to ‘crores of rupees’ would be instantly brought forth. 44 
The government requested the Recorder’s Court to supersede the order. 
The new recorder William Evans issued an order that Chowdry was not 
amenable to the court. Morgan proposed to prosecute Watwey for forgery in 
Poona adalat and to issue a proclamation about the jurisdiction.
45
 But the 
proclamation was not issued because Chaplin feared that it would give 
publicity to the affair and instigate similar recourse to the King’s Court.46 The 
government’s sense of crisis was strongly expressed in its letter to Calcutta, 
which was not submitted but kept on the record.
47
 It would require the 
Supreme Government to apply to the home authority to define the jurisdiction 
of the King’s Court, in order ‘to guard against the great degradation which the 
                                                 
43
 Elphinstone, Report, 90–1. 
44
 BL, IOR P/398/78, BJC 29 Nov. 1820, 5131, Henry Pottinger to W. Chaplin, 
15 Nov. 1820. 
45
 Ibid., 5132, W. A. Morgan to Gov., 21 Nov. 1820.  
46
 BL, IOR P/398/78, BJC 6 Dec. 1820, 5216, W. Chaplin to Gov., 27 Nov. 
1820. 
47
 The reason was not recorded. 
195 
natives conceive to result from the arrest of persons of rank’. The recorder 
was to be requested to consider ‘some sort of process less irritating and 
repugnant to the feelings of the natives to guard against the danger of 
violating their prejudices’. The government’s policy towards the sardars 
would be ‘rendered nugatory by the process of a court regulated by the forms 
prescribed by the laws of England’.48 The draft letter also referred to a case in 
which Chimnaji Appa was sued in the Recorder’s Court for debt by ‘a 
shopkeeper in Bombay’. Recorder Alexander Anstruther admitted that 
Chimnaji was amenable to the King’s Court and could be arrested. The 
government warned that the most powerful sardars such as Chintaman Rao or 
Appa Desai could have been prosecuted and arrested ‘in the midst of their 
own jageers, if the oppressed party repaired to Bombay and preferred his 
complaints to any of the practitioners in the King’s Court’.49 
At this stage, in 1820, the government chose not to provoke further 
conflict with the King’s Court. The draft letter was not sent to Calcutta. The 
government referred Chaplin to the opinions of H. G. Macklin and R. Spankie, 
the late Advocates General at Bombay and Calcutta, who had stated that  the 
writ of the King’s Court ran through the whole presidency and that redress 
was only obtainable in the court. Chaplin did not accept the view and said that 
‘the late Advocate General must have taken an  erroneous view of the court’s 
power’.50 This indicates that the government tried to retain regularity of 
judicial system by referring to the former decision of the supreme government 
in Calcutta. So, as in the cases of revenue which we saw in chapter 3, there 
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was still a gap between the sense of crisis of district officers such as Chaplin 
and Pottinger and the inclination for regularity of those in the Bombay castle. 
But thereafter similar cases accumulated and the government’s attitude was 
hardened. 
 
The King’s Court’ interference was most apprehended in relation with the 
policing in the mofussil. The government’s security anxiety was enhanced by 
its recognition that the King’s Court might hinder the working of village 
police. In a letter to the Court of Directors in 1823, the government expressed 
its anxiety about whether the hereditary village officials vested with police 
authority were amenable to the jurisdiction of the King’s Court. Advocate 
General Woodhouse admitted that although they were not amenable to the 
court merely because they were the landholders in charge of revenue 
collection; they would however be amenable if they exercise a magisterial 
power which was not connected with revenue. The government apprehended 
‘the inconvenience and distress public and private which must be occasioned 
if such parties should be summoned to the presidency’. 51 As we saw in 
Chapter 4, the patils were at the centre of Elphinstone’s police system in the 
mofussil. Their allegiance to the government was vital in times of  emergency, 
for they would follow the example of the patils in Kittur who ignored orders 
of the collector and cooperated with the insurgents.  
However, the real danger came not from the villages but from the hills, 
or more precisely, from the connection between the two. The crisis of 1824 
significantly heightened the government’s security anxiety, and it became very 
sensitive to the problems of hill tribes. But the King’s Court did not care about 
the distinction between the hills and the plains; its sovereign jurisdiction 
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should cover all the territories and the peoples. Accordingly, Laxdir Dulput 
Rao III, the Muslim raja of Peinth in the Deccan Khandesh, was detained by 
the sheriff’s peons under the process of the Supreme Court in 1825. The suit 
was instituted by a creditor for the raja’s debt of Rs 9,000. The raja claimed 
that he did not borrow from him and never visited Bombay city.
52
 The 
government was concerned about the tranquillity of the raja’s estates, which 
were situated in thick forests and chiefly inhabited by the Kolis.
53
 According 
to John Briggs, the Political Agent for Khandesh, he possessed ‘considerable 
influence over the Bhils and Coolies’.54 When he proceeded in the region in 
the Third Maratha War in 1818, the raja voluntarily cooperated with him by 
giving information and dispelling the hostile bands in the hill.
55
 Naturally, 
Elphinstone could not admit the King’s Court’s interference in the affairs of 
this Koli chief from the perspective of security in the internal frontier.  
The raja’s political conducts were not favourably perceived by the 
government officials. The huge amount of debts incurred by the raja and the 
collection of giras contrary to the government’s order were the two major 
problems. As to the debts, which were the immediate background of this case, 
the raja borrowed Rs 33,000 from a Surat savakar in 1824 to consolidate his 
debts to numerous creditors. It amounted to Rs 52,000 in 1827. He also owed 
Rs 12,000 to others, and the total debt was nearly Rs 65,000. Its annual 
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demand far exceeded the revenue of the country. As a result, the country was 
said to be totally sunk under the control of the savakar and his vakeel.
56
 
Because of this, the district officials were critical of the raja. William S. Boyd, 
the second assistant collector at Nasik, reported the incident and expressed his 
worry about the evil of the apprehension of persons of rank outside the 
jurisdiction of the King’s Court.57 
Boyd was also concerned about the raja’s collection of giras, which had 
been prohibited since 1823.
58
 He explained that the raja repeatedly promised 
to give up villages which he had no right to dispose of, but continued to 
collect revenue from villages contrary to the contract. This was detrimental to 
the confidence of ryots and harmful to the revenue collec tion. The 
improvement of the situation could not be expected as he was an ‘unprincipled, 
debauched, ignorant man’. So the government should pay the debt with 
interest and temporarily resume the country. The tranquillity of the country 
and its neighbouring districts would be secured by the government’s direct 
rule. The limited mortgage would be the most certain and least embarrassing 
measure for the government, which enabled it to be ‘unentangled’ with the 
affairs other than to guarantee the savakar’s agreement, without which no one 
would transact with the raja.
59
 Collector Dunlop and Deccan Commissioner 
Chaplin endorsed this view. 
But Elphinstone and the government’s law officers were determined to 
protect the raja from the encroachment of the King’s Court. The Company’s 
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Solicitor E.C. Morgan explained that the arrest was irregular because the raja 
was an ‘independent sovereign prince’ who was not amenable to the Supreme 
Court. He applied to the Supreme Court to set aside the case, but the 
application was declined. He advised that the jurisdiction had to be contested 
in the court and the plaintiff should be prosecuted for perjury.
60
 Advocate 
General Norton described the raja’s arrest as ‘one of the greatest outrages and 
abuses of the process of the Court’. He predicted that further abuse of the 
Supreme Court would happen, as he thought that the perjury was done with 
‘effrontery’ and ‘a sense of impunity’ to do so. He recommended public 
prosecution of the culprits to prevent further evils.
61
 Elphinstone said that it 
was urgently necessary to deal with the problem of jurisdiction because if the 
plaintiff should succeed in his plot in the King’s Court, it would induce other 
creditors of other princes to resort to the same method.
62
 
Elphinstone’s deep concern was based on his belief that the raja’s 
presence was essential to keep the tranquillity of his hilly territory. After 
perusing the original sunnuds of the raja and related documents, he expressed 
his urgent sense of danger: 
 
He [Raja of Peinth] seems indeed to be pretty nearly on the same footing 
that the Dessaee of Kittoor was—His country was restored to him in a 
great measure on account of the molestation we were likely to 
experience should we attempt to retain it, and the quiet of the Bheels and 
Coolies in the neighbourhood seems to depend in a great measure on him 
anything that might provoke him to rebel is therefore of serious 
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consequence and I think every means should be taken by application to 
the Court and by prosecuting the sheriff to obtain the immediate rel ief of 





Elphinstone urged that the raja’s right of exemption from the jurisdiction 
should be proved in the King’s Court, because if ‘a sovereign prince tributary  
but not feudatory to the Paishwa’ could not be protected, ‘there will be no 
safety for our numerous subordinate chiefs’; but,  on the other hand, if there 
were not good hopes, the proceedings should be dropped, as ‘a failure might 
ultimately be serious even in a political point of view’.64 
The prospect for the government was not promising, though. The 
Company’s Solicitor (E. C. Morgan) collected information to sue the sheriff, 
bailiffs, the plaintiff and his son. But it was discovered that the sheriff and hi s 
officers only followed the ordinary process of law, and the plaintiff was not 
aware of his son’s conduct.65 Receiving the information, Norton explained 
that the only remaining option was to prove the son’s perjury by the testimony 
of the raja himself in the Supreme Court.
66
 But the government could not call 
for the ‘sovereign prince’ to attend to the court. Eventually, the government 
decided to drop all further proceedings.
67
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In this case, the district officials in the mofussil and the governor in 
council in Bombay sought different solutions. The former thought that the 
temporary resumption of the Peinth estates was necessary, while the latter 
stuck to the principle of indirect rule. This difference originated in their 
different priorities, which I have already pointed out in Chapter 3. The district 
officials’ response was more local and individual, depending on the nature of 
each case. On the other hand, the government was more concerned about the 
regularity and principle of governance which would influence the other 
sardars’ liability to the King’s Court in future. But, despite the difference of 
preferred solutions, the government officials in the mofussil and in Bombay 
unanimously agreed that the problem should be settled by the government, not 
by the King’s Court. 
More importantly, this case revealed the inability of the government to 
resist the process of the King’s Court in the arena of law. As we saw above, 
the government had kept its conciliatory attitude towards the King’s Court in 
the case of Ramchunder Chowdry in 1820. By the late 1820s, after the crucial 
revolts in 1824 as well as the accumulation of similar cases, the government’s 
attitude was hardened. In this 1827 case, the government was fully determined 
to fight to deny the King’s Court’s jurisdiction. But it could not do so. The 
government could devise measures to prevent the Company’s Court’s political 
interference, such as Regulations XV and XXIX of 1827 or the Agent for 
Sirdars in the Deccan. Indeed, the raja’s name was entered in the lists of  the 
first class sardars in 1828.
68
 But the order of the King’s Court was outside the 
jurisdiction of the government. The government officials’ aspiration for 
institutional/legislative solutions was heightened by this and other similar 
cases. 
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III. Independent princes and the King’s Court  
 
As we have seen, the government’s concern about the respectability of the 
sardars in charge of policing in the mofussil, especially in the hill regions, 
was the main factor which provoked the government’s strong reaction a gainst 
the King’s Court. But the King’s Court’s political problem was not confined to 
the sardars in British India. The government worried about the King’s Court’s 
relationship with the foreign or independent princes in Indian India, as these 
chiefs started to show their intention to ‘appeal’ to the King’s Court to defy 
their political engagements with the government. In other words, the chiefs 
started to treat the King’s Court as an independent political authority separate 
from the government. This new dimension of the use of the King’s Court 
pushed the government’s sense of crisis to the limit. 69  
The cases in point were the independent chiefs of Kolhapur, Satara and 
Baroda. The structure of problem was similar in all three cases. What was 
disputed by the chiefs was the British government’s interference in their 
internal affairs, particularly in their relationship with their subordinate sardars. 
The government’s intervention was based on its conviction that, in order to 
deal with the critical situation in the mofussil, the foreign princes should 
apply the same policy of conciliation towards their sardars as the government 
did in British India. In all three cases, the government was concerned about 
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the princes’ oppression against or inability to control their subordinate sardars 
and tried to uphold the sardars’ sovereignty in their territories. In this sense, 
the government dealt with the sardars in foreign territories in the same way as 
those in British India. This was because the troubles caused by the wild t ribes 
could easily ‘infest’ the British territories. As Radhika Singha suggests, the 
strengthening of the British policing towards the forest tribes drove out the 
thugs to the native states.
70
 In order to deal with the raids of these tribes, the 
same policy should be taken by the independent chiefs. The Bombay 
government demanded the independent chiefs to be more vigilant to suppress 
these raiders, and when they failed, the government interfered in their affairs.  
The princes’ resort to the King’s Court had a  grave political implication, 
as it meant that the princes tried to establish an alternative means of political 
negotiation which bypassed the Residents sent by the government. As Michael 
Fisher shows, maintaining independent means of communication was 
essentially important for the Indian rulers to uphold their political authority, 
and while the British government imposed the Resident as the sole agent of 
communication, they tried to evade it by directly sending letters to the 
Resident’s superiors, such as governors, governor generals or the king in 
England.
71
 So the princes’ effort to appeal to the King’s Court was a 
customary political recognition that the King’s Court was superior to the 
government. 
 
If 1824 was the first major year of crisis, 1827 was the  second. At the centre 
of this crisis was the problem of relationship between the Ramusi raiders led 
by Umaji Naik and the independent chiefs of Satara and Kolhapur. Both Satara 
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and Kolhapur were the direct descendants of Sivaji Bhonsle, the founder of 
the Maratha confederacy, and both were protected states of the British 
government supervised by its Political Residents. In the case of Kolhapur, the 
raja directly entered the alliance with the raiders to resist the government. In 
the case of Satara, containing the largest number of Ramusis in the Deccan,
72
 
the government apprehended the raja’s inefficiency in policing the raiders in 
his territory and demanded more vigilance. Both chiefs were discontented 
with the British interference and tried to use the King’s Court as a tool of 
negotiation and resistance. 
The raja of Kolhapur’s resistance to the British most clearly exhibited 
the old structure of politics based on the connection between the plains 
sardars and the hill tribes. The new raja Baba Sahib, who star ted his reign in 
1821, was particularly notorious for his bad character. After the succession, he 
considerably increased the army, resumed his conflict with the neighbouring 
Patwardhans, and plundered the territories of his feudatory jagirdars, the 
chiefs of Kagal and Ichalkaranji.
73
 The raja’s government was based on his 
coalition with freebooters. His state sometimes became a refuge to the raiders, 
and his favourite servant, one Subhana Nikam, was the head of highway 
robbers. The raja even raided his own treasury to get possession of the state 
jewel.
74
 As we saw in the last chapter, the Kittur rebels approached the raja in 
1824. For Elphinstone, ‘the Raja of Colapore is a great plague’. 75 
Deeply concerned about these situations, the government sent its army 
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to Kolhapur in 1825 and concluded a treaty with the raja in January 1826.
76
 
The treaty, while admitting ‘the independence of the said Rajah as a sovereign 
prince’, bound him to be advised by the British government on all security 
matters, to reduce his force, and not to raise a force to endanger the 
tranquillity ‘within or without his territories’. The points were the protection 
of sardars and the suppression of raiders. The raja was obliged not to molest 
his subordinate jagirdars and to pay compensations for  those who were injured 
by him. The government also guaranteed the land and rights of the sarda rs. 
The raja should not grant asylum to the enemies or rebels of the British and 
was obliged to suppress and arrest raiders who plundered the British 
territories. If he failed to do so, the British government was to send the army 
or police to arrest the raiders in his territory.
77
 
The raja was dissatisfied with this measure. He soon resumed his 
resistance, and this time, he relied on the authority of King’s Court. The detail 
was explained in Elphinstone’s minute on his final tour in the Deccan. The 
raja first applied a passport for pilgrimage to Jejuri, famous for its temples 
and its Ramusi bands.
78
 Elphinstone discouraged but eventually admitted it. 
After Jejuri, the raja visited Poona to see Elphinstone and revealed his real 
intention. He wanted to annul the late treaty and demanded that the 
government allow him freely to extract taxes in his territory. Elphinstone 
explained the futility of these demands, but the ra ja was adamant. Then, 
Elphinstone was confidentially exposed by his vakeels that the raja was 
intending to resort to the Supreme Court. Elphinstone explained to them that 
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their exposure was meaningless, because going to the Supreme Court could 
have no effect. The vakeels expressed their fear that their exposure would 
come to the raja’s ears, but Elphinstone suspected that they were sent by the 
raja to ascertain his attitude on this issue.
79
 
Soon after this attempt, in September 1827, it was revealed that the  raja 
of Kolhapur allied with the Ramusi chief Umaji Naik and planned a rebellion 
of a much larger scale. In the plan, while the raja defended his country from 
British encroachment, the Ramusis were to strike Poona or harass the 
government army until favourable terms were extracted. The Ramusis started 
to levy contributions from villages, often with connivance with the patils.
80
 
Elphinstone cautioned the Kolhapur’s mobilisation of ‘a predatory army’, and 
he ordered to attack the raja in advance in order to prevent it.
81
 Eventually, 
the British troops were sent to Kolhapur, and the second treaty was concluded 
in October 1827. By the treaty, the government had to seize a direct control of 
Akewat, ‘a notorious haunt of robbers’. But even after that, the raja repe atedly 
disturbed the public tranquillity, the British troops were sent again, and the 




Contrary to the Kolhapur raja, the Satara raja had acquired a favourable 
reputation among the government circle including Elphinstone.
83
 But the 
government was not satisfied with the raja’s policing of the tribal raiders in 
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his territories. The suppression of the raiders in Satara was vital for the 
government. This was not only because the country contained the largest 
number of the Ramusis in the region, but also because the raiders sold the 
goods plundered in the British territories to Satara’s local merchants. 84 
Elphinstone had articulated that Satara should be governed on the same 
principles as those prescribed for the conquered territories in the Deccan.
85
 
By the treaty with the raja in 1819, the Bombay government guaranteed the 
possessions of jagirdars in Satara.
86
 But, for example, the policing in the 
territory of Pant Sachiv was ‘scandalous’: he seized robbers only to extract 
booty and release them in his fort, so the territory became a favourable retreat 
of the robbers after they plundered the Company’s districts. 87 His status as 
the descendant of Sivaji was easily used to legitimatise the raids. In the crisis 
year of 1824, a Bhil leader Godaji Danglia in Baglana, a relative of the 
notorious Trimbuk, called for rebellion against the government, pretending to 
act under the name of the raja of Satara.
88
 
The raja, on his part, was discontented with the interference of the 
British government in his relationship with the sardars. Resident Briggs 
commented that the raja evinced his ‘jealousy’ towards the British 
interference and disliked their protection of his jagirdars. But the government 
interfered in the succession issue of Nimbalkar Naik of Phultun, whose 
territory was a hub of gang raiders,
89
 and criticised the raja’s dealing with his 
heavily indebted sardar Ram Row Duffle, which was jeopardising ‘the 
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tranquillity and prosperity of the Duffle districts, and, particularly the  
administration of justice and police matter’. 90 
The discontent over these conflicts led the raja to write a series of 
letters to other independent chiefs and sardars, which was contrary to the 
‘fundamental condition’ of his treaty with the British that the  raja should 
‘forbear all intercourse with foreign powers, and with all sirdars, jaghiredars, 
chiefs and ministers’ who were not under his authority. 91 In 1826 the Political 
Resident reported that the raja ‘rather too publicly’ resented the presence of 
the Political Resident and envied the independent status of the raja of 
Kolhapur.
92
 Soon after this, William Simson, the Acting Political Resident, 
reported that the raja had several secret contacts with Kolhapur and planned to 
reinforce the fort Serala [Shirala] at their border.
93
 It was rumoured that he 
would receive the fealty of the Patwardhans and other sardars. ‘He is … 
extremely tenacious of his prerogative and will every day more and more 
resent out control’, concluded Briggs.94 Indeed, there was a large-scale plot 
going on. The raja concluded a treaty with the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa in 
1826, under which he would pay money to the Portuguese to regain the former 
Maratha territories.
95
 In January 1827, it was reported that the raja plotted 
with Kolhapur, Appa Desai of Nipani, Ichalkaranji, Patwardhan, and the 
Swamee of Sunkeshwur. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the French, the Portuguese, 
Sindhia, Appa Sahib of Nagpur, the Gaekwad of Baroda and the Pindaris 
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would be invited to it.
96
 
It was in this context of intrigue that the raja approached the King’s 
Court. It was reported that the raja was ‘very anxious to come to Bombay’ and 
to meet the chief justice, though he did not show such eagerness to meet the 
British Commander in Chief or any other members of the governor ’s council. 
Malcolm, who succeeded the precarious situation as the governor in 1828, had 
to have a prolonged correspondence with the raja on this matter. He argued 
that the purpose of the raja was jurisdictional jockeying:  
 
This may arise from two motives, dread of the ill understood and 
magnified power of the Supreme Court, or more probably from an 
impression that there are two parties in our administration, and that it 
may be useful on a notion of the good terms he is with the one, to 
propitiate the other. This last ground of action is the most probable, as it 
is suited to the limited knowledge on such points of this Prince, and that 
prevention and cautious policy bordering on intrigue which belongs to 




This time the meeting seemed not to be realised, but Malcolm’s belief in the 
mischievous influence of the King’s Court over the discontented chiefs was 
strengthened. Malcolm further discovered in 1830 that the raja of Satara in 
turn was annoyed by his jagirdar Akulcote, who instigated a rebellion against 
the raja by pretending the name of government and the King’s Court. The use 
of the name of the King’s Court in politics and diplomacy became fairly 
common by this time.
98
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The cases of Kolhapur and Satara indicated that the King’s Court’s 
jurisdiction in the mofussil had started to assume a more direct political 
importance. Both chiefs tried to use the court as a means of negotiation with 
the British government. The King’s Court was recognised more as an 
independent political sovereign than a branch of the British government. This 
sense of crisis reached its apex in early 1828, when another, far greater threat 
was posed by the use of the King’s Court by Sayaji Rao II, the Gaekwad of 
Baroda. Baroda was the powerful successor state of the Mughal empire in 
Gujarat and in a subsidiary alliance with the British since the Second Maratha 
War. The chief concern of the government was again related to the 
suppression of raids by the wild tribes. The Gaekwad’s role was crucial in  this 
respect, because as the overlord he had the right to receive tributes from many 
girasia and mehwasi chiefs. As we saw in the previous chapter, the raids by 
these chiefs were the main concern of the government which led to the 
legislation of Regulation XV of 1827 vesting the sardars with police authority. 
The tranquillity of Baroda was also vital from a commercial perspective, as it 




The government had already taken some measures which were directly 
aimed at eliminating the raids in this region. First the government concluded a 
treaty with the Gaekwad in 1820 which ordered that he should not send his 
troops to the sardars in Kathiawar and Mahi Kanta for the purpose of 
collecting tribute from them.
100
 At the same time, the government also 
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deprived Baroda of the power of superintending its tributary chiefs and put 
them under its direct control.
101
 But the raids by the girasia chiefs continued. 
By the late 1820s the government realised that the Gaekwad’s irregular 
payment of the giras was the root cause of these raids.
102
 In 1825, the 
collector of Khandesh proposed the transfer of the right of distributing giras 
from the Gaekwad to the Bombay government, ‘since the burden and troub le 
of putting down any risings of such people must always in a great measure fall 
upon us’.103 The Gaekwad resisted because it was the mark of his supremacy 
over the chiefs.
104
 This situation was the background against which the 
government conceived the King’s Court’s evil effect on the security of the 
territory. 
The immediate context of the Gaekwad’s resort to the King’s Court was 
Sayaji’s large amount of debt to the local bankers amounting to over Rs 133 
lakh in 1825, which were to be paid by yearly instalments of Rs 15 lakh. It 
was a serious concern of the government, because the government was 
involved in the bhandari or guarantee system under which it guaranteed the 
payment of Sayaji’s debt to the local bankers. Malcolm said that it was ‘a 
prominent feature of the government of the country’ succeeded by the 
British.
105
 From 1801 to 1827 the Bombay government concluded 119 
bhandari contracts, of which 65 were redeemed and 54 were still in force.
106
 
In 1827, the Bombay government imposed upon Sayaji Rao the septennial 
bhandari settlement, a plan of farming out his district in septennial leases to 
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the holders of the guaranteed loans. It was devised by John Pollard 
Willoughby, the Assistant Resident at Baroda, with the cooperation of 
Baroda’s chief minister Wittul Row Dewanjee. As Fisher points out, the 
British government often appointed the chief minister to control the internal 
and external affairs of the Indian princes and provoked their resistance.
107
 
This was also true in this case of Baroda. Sayaji agreed with the  scheme with 
great reluctance and repeatedly complained about it.
108
 He sought loans from 
new bankers not under the guarantee of the British government and succeeded 
in borrowing Rs 7 lakh in January 1828.
109
 
The enforcement of the Gaekwad’s payment of debts guaranteed by the 
British was essential for the maintenance of British power and the tranquillity 
in this region. Before the arrival of the British, the guarantee was provided by 
the Arab sardars (or jamadars) commanding mercenaries. The bhandari  was, 
as Malcolm recognised, a source of their strength and influence as was their 
military power.
110
 When the government superseded the Arabs, it also 
‘deprived of the Guicowar Sirdars of a powerful means by which they derived 
a right of controlling their Government’.111 So the guarantee of solvency of 
Sayaji’s debts was essential for the government to maintain the tranquillity of 
the region by depriving Arabs and others of any political influence over the 
Gaekwad. Malcolm said that it was the arrangement ‘which gave to the 
government the great advantage of settling without war the countries of 
Guzerat’.112 In short, it was synonymous with the paramountcy of the British 
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Malcolm disliked any cases in which the political authority of the 
Gaekwad was undermined by other actors’ interventions. When the septennial 
contract was concluded, the Indian bankers recommended the government to 
resume the land and start its direct rule. Malcolm strongly reminded them that 
the government would never collude with them in such a  machination against 
Sayaji Rao.
114
 Apprehending such an unstable condition of the country, 
Malcolm instructed the Resident to prevent ‘any intercourse with individuals 
that is likely in any way to hurt his feelings or excite his jealousy: you should, 
indeed, take every opportunity you can of disclaiming all right of interference 
with his internal affairs’.115 The King’s Court in the 1820s was the perfect 
candidate for this kind of interference.  
Sayaji Rao threatened the government that if his demands were not 
realised, he would ‘appeal’ to the King’s Court. He sent his notorious chief 
minister Veneram to Bombay to demand two things of the Bombay 
government. One was the reduction of the interest rate of public debts from 
7.5 to 4.5 percent, and the other was the removal of internal interference by 
deposing the Political Resident and the chief minister Wittul Row.
116
 The 
Resident reported that Sayaji expressed his intention that ‘he will appeal to 
Bombay and to England’, or ‘if the governor will not attend to his wi shes, he 
will appeal from government to the Supreme Court’. 117 
Malcolm expressed his strong antipathy towards ‘a knot of natives at 
Bombay’ who, for their profit, attempted to create a belief that the King’s 
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Court’s jurisdiction extended beyond its limits, ‘by working in the fears, the 
hopes, and the ignorance of those they delude with false expectations to their 
ruin’.118 His sense of danger was strong: 
      
I have no hesitation in stating it to be my deliberate opinion that as long 
as an impression exists that there is an authority vested in his Majesty’s 
Court to check and control the exercise of political power by the civil 
government, it will operate beyond all other cases to disturb the country 




The event was conceived to be an emergency: Malcolm ordered the 
reinforcement of troops in Baroda.
120
 
     The attempt of Sayaji Rao and Veneram was supported by their agents 
in Bombay. Veneram was said to have received bills drawn by Sayaji 
personally and jewels of value Rs 5 lakh to take with him to Bombay. He 
landed at Bassein and communicated with one Munmooindas in Bombay.
121
 
Besides, what is particularly interesting for our study is that he visited 
Cursetjee Manockjee and Amerchund Bedreechund, the two Bombay 
merchants discussed in Chapter 2, for advice.
122
 Though Veneram’s request 
was declined by both of them, his attempt suggests that the information of the 
suits of the Bombay merchants was widely known among the chiefs and 
sardars. As we saw in the last chapter, Malco lm worried about the sardars’ 
coming to Bombay or sending their vakeel there to contact the Agent for 
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Sirdars. The case of Baroda indicates that Malcolm’s attempt to restrain it by 
establishing the Deputy Agent for Sirdars was annulled by the presence of t he 
King’s Court. 
Veneram’s Bombay mission heightened the tensions in Baroda. The 
Political Resident James Williams reported that the peasants in Baroda were 
instigated to prepare complaints against the kamavisdars of the parganas 
leased under the septennial loan and, when Veneram returned, to deliver their 
petitions to the governor.
123
 The bankers who were affiliated with the 
bhandari of the British government were also alarmed. The false information 
of Veneram’s success was disseminated, and the intimidated bankers issued a 
public declaration that they would acquiesce to Sayaji Rao.
124
 Malcolm 




Eventually, Veneram’s mission to the King’s Court failed. But even after 
that, Sayaji denied the fulfilment of his payment of debt. Malcolm was now 
convinced that the ‘System of non-interference then is wholly incompatible 
with the redemption of a pecuniary obligation where the disposition of the 
sovereign is sordid …’.126 He sequestrated the Gaekwad’s territories yielding 
Rs 10,00,000 and leased them to the guaranteed bankers. Wittal Row was 
nominated in charge of his former lands. Malcolm later vindicated the 
intervention as the act of political emergency:  
 
This nomination of Wittal Row to the charge of the districts in Guzerat 
and Kattywar was no doubt most offensive to the feelings and pride of 
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Syajee; but the case was one of emergency; it was produced by his 
faithlessness; there was no alternative; and the success of the 




The sequestration was completed without any disturbance, except that Sayaji 
complained against the measure, issued a counter proclamation (‘a 
manufacture of Bombay, and meant for the London market’, said Malcolm), 
placarded it at Baroda and over his territories, and sent it to Calcutta and 
Benares.
128
 The liquidation of debts was completed and the land was returned 






As we saw in Chapter 4, the government intended to subject the affairs of the 
sardars and the independent chiefs only to the political authority and 
exempted them from the Company’s judiciary. The cases of the sardars in 
British India show that the King’s Court’s writ nullified this  policy. The 
government could not control the process of the King’s Court in the mofussil. 
By taking cognizance of the cases of sardars, the King’s Court exercised the 
sovereign power to determine the fate of the sardars against whom an action 
of law was brought about. This inability to monopolise the political power to 
decide the affairs of the sardars was at the core of the government’s anxiety of 
sovereignty in the mofussil.  
     The cases examined here show that the government’s logic of 
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emergency and the King’s Court’s logic of law were based on different notions 
of time, space, and boundary in the mofussil. The government had to deal with 
the fact that the raiders easily transcended the boundaries between British and 
Indian India even in times of peace . Because of this, the officials’ notions of 
time and space were characterised by gradation and continuity. The security 
issues at the time of conquest persisted in times of peace, and there were no 
boundaries between internal and external frontiers. In consequence, India was 
always in a state of emergency. The realm of politics should be retained after 
the post-war settlement. On the other hand, the King’s Court assumed a sharp 
discontinuity before and after the conquest. Once a territory was conquered, it  
became part of British India, and the British law could be applied in the 
territory. In this sense, the King’s Court exhibited a rigid notion of 
territoriality. For the judges, there were no internal frontiers in British India, 
while the boundaries between British Indian and Indian India were essential in 
demarcating the inside and outside of its jurisdiction. In other words, territory, 
sovereignty, and jurisdiction were identical for the judges; all of them 
signified the state of civil society presided over by regular courts of law. This 
was simply unrealistic and unacceptable for the government.  
     The accumulation of cases of the King’s Court’s intervention in the 
revenue affairs, which we saw in Chapter 3, and those of sardars and 
independent chiefs discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 showed an alarming 
tendency of the King’s Court’s exertion of sovereignty in the mofussil. This 
anxiety of sovereignty culminated in late 1828, immediately after the failure 
of the Baroda mission to Bombay, in two legal cases relating to the King’s 
Court’s prerogative writ of habeas corpus. The next chapter discusses the 
cases in detail.
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As Rajnarayan Chandavarkar points out regarding the Bombay c ity police in 
the late nineteenth-century, ‘[p]aranoia was the hallmark of the colonial 
imagination’.1 Nothing showed this more clearly than the government of John 
Malcolm in its conflict with the King’s Court in the late 1820s. The 
developments depicted in previous chapters converged and exploded in two 
cases of habeas corpus in 1828. In the first case, the King’s Court issued the 
writ to a second class sardar in Poona. In the second case, it was issued to 
release a revenue defaulter in the gaol. The government overtly intervened in 
the processes of the King’s Court, and the judges strongly reacted to it. Every 
aspect discussed in previous chapters—judicial check of the government 
officers, revenue collection and revenue debts, use and abuse of the civil 
litigation, and the policing of tribes and the rebellions of princes in the 
mofussil—was disputed by the government and the court.  
Little scholarly attention has been paid to the cases,
2
 but they were the 
single most important political issue of the Bombay government in the late 
1820s. The Political Department of the Bombay government sent 59 letters 
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relating to these cases to the Court of Directors in 1828 and 1829, while only 
5 letters were related to other topics. The enclosures amounted to 3,000 pages, 
contained in three dedicated volumes in the India Office Records.
3
 Governor 
Malcolm remarked that ‘if there had not been shedding of blood in this war, 
there had been shedding of ink in abundance’. 4 During the event, the Bombay 
government constantly sought support from the home authorities and 
maintained dense public and private communication with the other 
governments of Bengal and Madras.
5
 The King’s Court also sent petitions and 
letters to authorities in India and in London. The fact that the two cases wer e 
disputed in the imperial arena gave them a lasting importance in shaping the 
future form of imperial governance in India.  
The King’s Court and the Bombay government both fully developed 
their logics of law and state necessity in the cases, each of which was 
strengthened by the other. The government’s chief concern was that the King’s 
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction undermined the authority of the government, 
because the Indians were unable to understand the division of power in the 
British constitution and simply assumed that the British were fighting with 
each other.
6
 The government ordered the court to stop its proceedings as they 
were the cases of ‘state policy’. The judges of the Supreme Court rebutted that 
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it was not the government but the King’s Court that should decide whether 
they were such cases or not. The King’s Court’s reaction inevitably induced 
the government to take a more extreme position. Its language of governance 
and law became more crisis-driven and emergency-oriented than before. 
The Moro Ragonath case jeopardised the Bombay government’s central 
policy of preserving the native aristocracy, which was, as we saw in previous 
chapters, given the primary importance as the agent to deal with the tribal 
raids in the newly conquered territories. Governor Malcolm was equally 
concerned about the fate of sardars as his predecessor Elphinstone was. 
Malcolm’s model of government was what he called the subah government. In 
regard to Malwa and Rajputana in central India, he explained it as follows:  
 
     My object … is … to establish a subah government which in the 
principles and forms of its administration, should be so constructed as 
to admit of the co-existence of a native aristocracy with our rule: and to 
do this, I was satisfied it was indispensable to keep both our regular 
courts of adalat and his Majesty’s courts of justice at a distance. 7 
 
In this way, Malcolm clearly stated that the judiciary—both the Company’s 
and the King’s—had nothing to do with its governance in the newly acquired 
territories. The sardars and refractory chiefs were to be totally exempted from 
the application of regulations in the court of law and to be put under the 
exclusive control of the commissioner who combined executive, judicial and 
police powers. 
The high priority put by Malcolm on the issue of the native aristocracy 
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was indicated in his controversy with the Bengal government on the 
importance of maintaining nuzzerana, or an inheritance tax paid by the 
subordinate to their superior. It was disputed in relation with the resumption 
of the rent-free lands. On this point his attitude was in a marked contrast with 
the Bengal officials. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Bengal 
government preferred the resumption of these lands in order to increase the 
revenue.
8
 It appointed special commissioners for that purpose in Lower 
Bengal by Regulation III of 1828.
9
 But Malcolm proposed that these lands of 
the heir-less chiefs and sardars should not be resumed by the government but 
should be kept in their hands, while the revenue from these lands should be 
realised in the form of nuzzerana. The reason was that it would limit the 
‘spirit of discontent and turbulence’ and cultivate ‘attachment and allegiance’ 
of the chiefs as the least objectionable to them as a form of taxation.
10
 As this 
issue of nuzzerana exemplifies, the maintenance of the native aristocracy was 
the foundation of the government’s indirect rule in the mofussil. The 
exemption of sardars had to be maintained in order to suppress raiders and 
maintain paramountcy in the mofussil. The King’s Court endangered 
Malcolm’s vision of empire.  
 
II. The logic of law and the logic of emergency 
 
The habeas corpus case of Moro Ragonath originated in a conflict over the 
management of property of a Hindu undivided family, the Dhunderes . Moro 
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Ragonath Dhumdere was a minor in a branch of the family, and Pandoorung 
Ramchunder Dhumdere was Moro’s grand uncle. The Dhunderes had been in 
charge of the daftar (records) under the peshwa’s government. Pandoorung 
was a personal friend of the peshwa. His grand-nephew married with the 
peshwa himself.
11
 Both Moro and Pandurang were on the lists of sardars. 
Moro was in the third class in the criminal list and the second class in the civil 
list. Pandoorung was the second class sardar in criminal and civi l lists.
12
 
Pandoorung and Moro were involved in a conflict over family property. 
When his father died, Moro was first under the charge of his mother and 
grandmother, but as both died, he was protected by Mahadajee Pundit, the 
family’s karkoon (clerk) managing his estate. Thereafter, he was under the 
influence of his father-in-law Dinker Gopall Deo and the karkoon. While 
Pandoorung insisted that the property was not divided, the karkoons claimed 
that the share solely belonged to the minor.
13
 This kind of karkoons’ attempt 
to appropriate their master’s fortune was well known among the Bombay 
officials. Chaplin referred to the karkoons of the Tasgaum branch of the 
Patwardhans who attempted to ‘suppress or destroy the will of their late 
master and to usurp the management of the estate according to a forged 
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The government could not ignore the political and social influence of 
Pandoorung. Under the British government he held an important office of 
amanatdar who was in charge of managing extensive records left in the 
peshwa’s secretariat (huzur daftar).15 He held several inam villages in the 
Deccan, and well understood his power to negotiate with the government. He 
frequently petitioned the government to protect his customary rights and 
privileges. Immediately after the Agent for Sirdars was appointed in 1827, 
Pandoorung requested the government to insert his name in the lists of 
sardars.
16
 Four months later, he complained that villagers in his inam and 
jagir lands in Khandesh, Ahmednagar and Poona were arrested under the 
process of the court of munsifs and demanded the exemption of his 
subordinates as well as of himself. He explained that the regulation vested the 
first and second class sardars with the original jurisdiction of the inhabitants 
in their inam and jagir lands. The collectors were perplexed by this claim 
because, apparently, there were no such stipulations in the regulations. But the 
government admitted that it was the custom in the Deccan which should be 
followed by the judicial authorities in the mofussil.
17
 This episode clearly 
indicates that the government could not prevent the abuse of the regulations 
by the great sardars such as Pandoorung Ramchunder.  
The immediate context of the family conflict was Pandoorung’s demand 
for Moro to share his debt. In early 1820, a suit was instituted in the 
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panchayat by Pandoorung against Moro. Pandoorung demanded the joint 
payment of debt incurred by his pilgrimage to Benares up to the year 1816, 
which amounted to Rs 4,91,525.
18
 As C. A. Bayly points out, to go to the 
pilgrimage to the holy cities of Benares, Allahabad, Jaganath, and Gaya and to 
contribute to building temples, ghats, and colleges by donation were important 
for the Maratha princes and nobility to claim their princely status.
19
 The case 
was decided in the adalat in favour of Pandoorung. The first decree was given 
in 1821 by the majority of panchayat. Moro immediately appealed to the zilla 
court of Poona and petitioned the Deccan Commissioner. Chaplin ordered in 
1824 that Moro should pay his share of debt Rs 2,45,000 with fine Rs 9,800.
20
 
His estates were attached and his karkoons were detained on his behalf. The 
appeal to the governor was admitted, but in 1826 the governor confirmed the 
decision of the Commissioner.
21
 Meanwhile, Pandoorung told the government 
that Moro’s karkoons appropriated Moro’s property. The government inquired 
it, but the karkoons refused to give the account of the estates. The government 
appointed Pandoorung as Moro’s guardian in 1827. 22 When the karkoons of 
Moro Ragonath decided to resort to the King’s Court instead of appealing to 
the Privy Council, this family conflict developed into one of the largest 
political crises in early nineteenth century India.  
In July 1828, Governor Malcolm received a letter from John A. Dunlop, 
the Agent for Sirdars, notifying him that Moro had been taken away from the 
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house of Pandoorung by the bailiffs of the Supreme Court. In order to resume 
Moro from Pandoorung’s confinement, the karkoons collaborated with one 
Pandoorung Herajee, an inhabitant of Bombay city, to file a suit against Moro 
in the Supreme Court to attach him and bring him to Bombay by the writ of 
capias for the debt of Rs 11,400.
23
 Malcolm and Dunlop immediately 
conceived that the case was a conspiracy to abuse the process of the King’s 
Court. Malcolm said ‘it might be a trick’ and such a writ must not have been 
issued. They also realised that this might develop into yet another case of 
conflict with the King’s Court. Dunlop expressed his opinion that ‘this case 
among many others is one of which we might have been pretty sure of the 
illegality, but we were led to believe that the judges would not allow any other 
authority to interfere, ever, with the illegal acts of their officers, reserving to 
themselves the right of judging …’.24 But Malcolm was optimistic at this 
stage because the chief justice, Edward West, agreed with his view. In their 
meeting, West admitted that it was ‘a complete fraud’ by the discontented part 
of the family to kidnap the minor, the writ was a false one, and the bail iffs had 
no right to take him away. He recommended Malcolm to prosecute the bailiffs 
in the Supreme Court.
25
 However, this correspondence was followed by the 
death of the chief justice, and the remaining puisne judges, Charles Chambers 
and John Peter Grant, took a far more antagonistic attitude against the 
government. Malcolm’s fear was becoming reality.  
The chief concern of Malcolm was that the Indians might misconceive 
that the Supreme Court was superior to the government. Malcolm expressed 
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his sense of danger as follows: 
 
Nothing can be more calculated than such occurrences to weaken the 
civil government, and to encourage the discontented and seditious … 
members in our Indian Dominions. The establishment of our power in 
the Deckan is too recent and its inhabitants too ignorant to enable them 
to understand those limits, and distinction of authority. The consequence 





He explained that the Indians regarded the King’s Court ‘as something great 
and wonderful, and think … that there is not an action of government, civil, 
political, or military, that is not subject to its revision or control’. 27 What was 
lacking in India was the ‘publicity’ about the authority of the government , 
‘that the governed should understand the causes and grounds of every action 
of those that govern them, and know to what they were liable, and what was 
the nature and extent of that authority local and remote to which they were to 
grant respect and obedience’.28 
The case immediately developed into a critical situation. On 25th 
August, a writ of habeas corpus was moved in the court, and on 29th it was 
issued. James Dewar, the Advocate General, reported that the judges were 
intending to instruct the bailiffs to request the assistance of the military to 
execute the writ, and if it should be refused, they would close all the courts of 
law in Bombay.
29
 Pandoorung represented Malcolm ‘in a very crowded 
durbar’ that when the rumour of battalion’s mobilisation was ci rculated, a 
large number of people gathered around his house to see what was happening 
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and ‘his enemies were exulting in his anticipated disgrace’. 30 The use of the 
military by Supreme Court was not a totally unrealistic prediction. Malcolm 
once suspected that Thomas Bradford, the Commander in Chief of the 
Bombay army, was thinking of supporting the judges. Malcolm determined 
that if such a case should happen, Bradford should be deported.
31
 Though this 
did not happen, Malcolm worried about the development of the event. On 29th 
September the alias habeas corpus was issued. Malcolm told Pandoorung via 
Dunlop that he should not receive it.
32
 
This case of Moro Ragonath was accompanied by another case of 
habeas corpus, in which the government criticised the King’s Court’s issuing 
of the writ within its jurisdiction on the ground of political expediency. It was 
issued on 15 July 1828 to the gaoler of Thana in the Northern Koncan to bring 
the body of one Bappoo Gunness, a revenue defaulter. Bappoo Gunness was 
judged guilty in the Company’s Court for embezzlement, sentenced two years’ 
confinement and fined Rs 350.
33
 This was a typical use of the King’s Court by 
a revenue defaulter similar to those cases which we saw in Chapter 3. 
Advocate General Dewar advised Malcolm not to take an extreme measure of 
interfering in the King’s Court’s process, as the gaoler was under the 
Company’s employment and therefore the case was clearly within the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
34
 However, because it happened at exactly 
the same time as the case of Moro Ragonath, a common case of the revenue 
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defaulter became crucially important for the government’s contest against the 
King’s Court. Malcolm replied Dewar that the case should be considered on 
political rather than legal grounds.
35
 Thereafter the government dealt with the 
two cases as one. In the trial, Bappoo Gunness was defended by the 
indefatigable James Morley, who vindicated the King’s Court’s privilege of 
reviewing the proceedings of the Company’s Court as the King’s Bench could 
do in regard to the inferior courts in Britain.
36
 
The government made two arguments in the court. One was that the 
King’s Court had no power to issue a prerogative writ to those who were 
outside its ordinary jurisdiction.
37
 The other point was that the case of Moro 
Ragonath was a case of emergency, in which the state necessity should 
supersede the legality. Dewar repeated Malcolm’s sense of danger in the court:  
 
the situation of the English in India was so dependent on the opinion 
entertained of their power and union among themselves that things 
which at home were of no import were here of the highest consequence, 
if calculated to disquiet or unsettle the minds of the Natives, or destroy 




The judgement of the Supreme Court was based on a totally different 
logic. Firstly, Chambers claimed that the King’s Court had the  power to issue 
a prerogative writ, which was ‘unlimited both as to place and person within 
the territories subject to the Bombay Government’, for the court was vested 
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with the power of the King’s Bench in Britain to protect the personal and civil 
liberty of the Indian subjects.
39
 Grant elaborated this point by employing a 
distinction within the power of the court. One was potestas jurisdictionis, the 
judicial power of hearing and determining civil and criminal cases, and the 
other was potestas imperii, the ministerial or mandatorial power of the 
sovereign to command something to be done. He argued that the latter was not 
the matter of jurisdiction: ‘the limits of the Jurisdiction of any Court to try 
causes afford no measure of its power to issue the prerogative writs of the 
Crown, either in respect of the territory in which they are to run, of the 
persons to whom they shall be directed, or of the matters they may concern 
and grow out of’.40 To make this point, the judges extensively relied on the 
legal authorities of the common law tradition such as Edward Coke and 
Matthew Hale, the opinions of English judges such as Lord Mansfield  and 
Lord Eldon, and the precedents such as the case of R v. Monisse in Madras in 
1810, in which a sovereign prince was subjected to the court’s prosecution. 41 
As was clearly shown in the above claim of potestas imperii, the judges 
emphasised that they were vested with a sovereign power to command the 
orders of the King; it was a question of ‘the power of the King in right of his 
Crown exercised by his Supreme Judges in this part of his Dominions’. 42 A 
logical consequence of this argument was that even the government should 
obey the order of the King’s Court:  
 
the Governor of this Presidency, and the council, and the Commander in 
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Chief, and all persons in authority are bound to pay obedience to the 
commands of the Court in execution of its several powers … so that in 
any of these persons to refuse obedience was a direct breach of their 




In essence, then, the judges articulated that it was the King’s Court rather than 
the Company that truly represented the King’s sovereignty of India.  
Secondly, the judges argued that the case of Moro Ragonath was not a 
case of emergency. Chambers admitted that ‘in times of sedition or public 
commotion’, the general privileges of the subjects should be suspended for the 
public good, but it was not applicable to this case. He said that the Court 
would admit the government’s power of arbitrary imprisonment of state 
prisoners on the ground of state necessity, but ‘the present case involves no 
such difficulty, and the principle which we are now considering is of the most 
general nature’.44 Chambers later criticised that it was the government that 
had ‘a mischievous tendency … to create unnecessary alarm’, for the case of 
Moro Ragonath was ‘of no public importance nor of any political consequence 
…. There are no circumstances of state policy affecting it’. 45 The denial of 
the existence of emergency was essentially necessary for the judges to claim 
the superiority of the municipal courts in a civilian society.  
In the same vein, Grant defined the case as an issue of personal, not 
political, liberty of the Indian subjects. By doing so, he could claim the 
judges’ power to check the government’s violation of civil liberties and 
avoided the criticism that they were politically jeopardising the Indian empire: 
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It is very true that this is a matter which nearly concerns personal 
liberty; and I may observe in passing that, although in the British 
Dominions in India, as in other colonial possessions, the same degree of 
political liberty cannot exist as in the governing country, yet the 
personal liberty of every individual in all the parts of His extensive 
Dominions, scattered over every clime, and at every variety of distance 
from the seat of His Government, is equally under the special protection 




This assertion of civil liberties and the denial of political emergency 
were made possible by the judges’ clear distinction between Indian India and 
British India. The government saw India as a confederation composed of 
different countries. The government’s Advocate General Dewar told the court 
that the jurisdiction of the King’s Court could not be extended to ‘another 
Kingdom, the Deccan, the Malwa, or other Countries, as separate from each 
other, and from Bombay, as Russia from Austria’.47 However, the judges 
thought that the Deccan was ‘the only part of the territory subject to the 
Bombay Government’, ‘a part of the vast fabric of the English Empire, and its 
inhabitants … are, as subjects to the  Crown of England, entitled to the 
privileges of Freeman’.48 Chambers alluded to the case of Amerchund 
Bedreechund, in which the court exhibited a similar distinction, and said that 
since the conquest of the Deccan in 1817, its inhabitants had been ‘the sub ject 
of a mixed and limited monarchy’, and those who were born after 1817 were 
Britain’s ‘natural born subjects’.49 
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The series of associations of ideas exhibited in the judges’ argument 
were dangerous for the government. Malcolm proposed that the government  
should protect Pandoorung and resist all further attempts by the King’s Court, 
and if the judges should proceed to enforce its decrees:  
 
they must be met at all hazards by the power of Government, the 
exercise of which will be fully justified, not merely on the grounds of 
expediency and policy, but on that of self-preservation, a principle which 





For him, the King’s Court’s prerogative writs in the mofussil would incur ‘the 
complete subversion of the constitution of all our judicial institutions’. 51 He 
could not admit the situation in which a peon who brought about the writ to 
Pandoorung could say ‘I can if I choose go and take your Governor 
prisoner’.52 
Based on the above considerations, the government finally directly 
intervened in the judicial process of the court by sending a letter to the 
Supreme Court on 3 October 1828. The letter desired the judges to ‘abstain 
from any acts (however legal you may deem them) ... which must have the 
effect of producing open collision’ between the government and the Supreme 
Court, for the supposed division of authority within the British would 
jeopardise the government’s rule in India. It further specified that as a result 
of the cases of Moro Ragonath and Bappoo Gunness, they were compelled to 
‘direct’ that no further proceedings should be admitted in the case of Moro 
Ragonath, and no returns would be made to writs of habeas corpus directed to 
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the Company’s officers or Indian inhabitants in the mofussil. The government 
admitted that it was irregular to interfere in the court’s process, but justified 
its acts from ‘exclusive reference to considerations of Civil Government, and 
of state policy’.53 
The judges were infuriated, as Malcolm expected.
54
 Chambers 
criticised the irregularity of the government’s sending a public letter in such a 
dictatorial manner. The Court should be addressed by anyone in no other way 
than as a humble suitor soliciting its protection through their counsel or a 
petition. The EIC did not have any privileged position in the court in this 
respect. Its act was ‘highly unconstitutional and criminal’. Grant said that the 
government did not understand that the writ of habeas corpus was not a matter 
of discretion in the judges but a ‘writ of right’. The court replied to the 
government that the letter was received and that the judges could take no 
notice thereof.
55
 On 10th October, the court issued a pluries writ of habeas 
corpus with fine of Rs 10,000.
56
 Puisne Judge Chambers died three days later, 
and Grant continued his battle with the government alone.  
In order to appeal his justice, Grant petitioned the King in Council in 
November 1828. This act provoked a further conflict between the 
government’s political logic of emergency and the court’s civilian logic of law. 
For Grant, the case of Moro Ragonath was ‘a question of private right 
regarding the personal liberty’. The government’s letter of 3 Oct 1828 was 
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‘the most unconstitutional and criminal attempt’ to threaten the Court with 
civil and military power of the government. It was the government that was 
causing a public disturbance by diminishing ‘respect for the court and 
confidence in the law, which are the only sure foundations of such peace and 
obedience’. The government was endangering the British rule not only in the 
Deccan, which was still unsettled, but also that in the Konkan and Gujarat 
‘now for many years peacefully submitted to the British rule’. It was 
dangerous to leave the Company’s provincial courts without control and  to 
place the inhabitants without the protection of habeas corpus.
57
 
Malcolm criticised Grant’s lack of knowledge about the crisis in the 
mofussil. Gujarat was still troubled by the ‘predatory tribes of Bheels, 
Cooleys, and Rajpoots’ and by the invasions of  Muslim and Maratha princes. 
The writ of habeas corpus was ‘little short of a general gaol delivery 
throughout all the provinces subject to the presidency’. The Supreme Court 
would set free every criminal, and as a consequence, villages and tracts of 
cultivation would be wasted, outlawry inhabitants would increase, the revenue 
would fall off, and ‘regularity and public peace and security would be at an 
end’.58 
As shown in the above comment, Malcolm emphasised the King’s 
Court’s detrimental effect on the government’s policy of preventing raids by 
means of the sardars’ indirect rule. The power of the chiefs was ruined by the 
rigid forms and processes of the British law, which were appropriated by their 
discontented dependants in collaboration with lawyers and vakeels. In order to 
‘preserve and create a native aristocracy’, the government conciliated the 
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sardars and introduced a simple code of regulations, but these efforts would be 
nullified if the King’s Court’s jurisdiction was extended to the mofussil. 
Baroda and Satara made suspicious moves (as we saw in Chapter 5), and 
Angria and other chiefs solicited the government to protect them when their 
discontented servants or seditious dependents should file a suit for their 
oppression. Its jurisdiction would ‘seriously weaken the authority and 
accelerate the downfall of our power in this quarter of India’. 59 The minute 
was sent to the Court of Directors.
60
 
In this way, the government firmly set the case in the context of the 
King’s Court’s interference in the government’s sardar policy in the mofussil. 
As we saw in previous chapters, this was not new. Since the British conquest 
in the provinces, the problem had recurred. But at the same time, the timing of 
the Moro Ragonath case seemed to be important to make it such a  big issue. 
The government had just completed furnishing the system of protecting 
sardars by the revised regulations of 1827. The memory of the 1824 crisis in 
Kittur was still fresh, and the raiders were encouraged by the conspiracies of 
the rajas of Satara and Kolhapur. It happened in less than six months since the 
failure of the Gaekwad’s mission to the Bombay Supreme Court. These factors 
converged to harden the attitude of the government against the King’s Court.  
 
III. Court procedures 
 
The judges’ resistance to the government depended on their power to control 
the court procedures. As we saw in Chapter 2, the power of ruling the 
evidence was the most important of them. Throughout the proceeding, the 
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government assumed that it was Moro’s karkoons who had instigated the boy 
to make the legal actions. Indeed, at an early stage, Malcolm received a letter 
from Moro Ragonath himself stating that he was happy under the guardianship 
of Pandoorung and that it was the karkoons who appropriated his property and 
filed the suit in the Supreme Court.
61
 Malcolm believed that the letter was 
genuine and ordered the Advocate General to make use of the letter in the 
King’s Court.62 But Dewar replied that even if the letter was presented to the 
court, the judge would say that it was extracted and ignore it. Dewar 
confessed that there would be no remedy on this matter. Malcolm concurred.
63
 
Thereafter, the government repeatedly failed to make their argument in the 
court because of this procedural power of the judges.  
In February 1829, Grant finally ordered the attachment of Pandoorung 
Ramchunder for not returning the pluries (or the third) writ of habeas corpus. 
He directed the governor and members of the council to execute the writ in the 
king’s name. If the government did not obey the order, it would be ‘guilty of a 
great contempt’.64 The government left it unnoticed and referred the court to 
their letter on 3 October 1828.
65
 Grant claimed that the bailiff of the court 
was ‘violently opposed’ by the Company’s civil and military officers with a 
display of military power.
66
 In the court, Grant dramatized this incident of 
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‘the Provincial Government employing the Troops to oppose its Process’. 67 
The government inquired about the incident and believed that it was false, but 




The government also failed to prosecute the kidnappers of Moro 
Ragonath (Pandoorung Herajee, Madoo Sewba and others) in the Supreme 
Court. The court ruled that the criminal information could not be filed as the 
defendants were not amenable to its jurisdiction. Grant pointed out that it was 
a contradiction that the government denied the King’s Court’s jurisdiction in 
the case of Moro Ragonath while admitted it to prosecute the kidnapper s 
living in the mofussil.
69
 Malcolm had to abandon the suit, explaining that it 
was better to let the criminals escape than to make the government look 
incoherent on the pivotal point of the case of Moro Ragonath.
70
 The 
government’s failure to prosecute was immediately reported by the Bengal 
Hurkaru, a leading English newspaper in Calcutta.
71
 
To resist the government further, Grant closed the Supreme Court in 
April 1829 ‘until the Court receives an assurance that its authority will be 
respected and its Process obeyed, and rendered effectual by the 
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Government’.72 This was noticed in the special issue of the Bombay Courier 
with Grant’s further attack on the government.73 Grant claimed that it was the 
government that necessitated the closure, because it distorted the case of Moro 
Ragonath as state necessity while it was nothing but an ‘ordinary case of 
confining a culprit’.74 Here again we see the judge’s attempt to deny the 
government’s claim of state necessity by interpreting the situation as a civilian 
state under the jurisdiction of the municipal court.  
The government responded by issuing a proclamation in the Bombay 
Courier that the governor would make ‘every effort in his power to protect 
their persons and property during this Extraordinary conjuncture’. 75 Dewar 
listed the inconveniences caused by this measure: criminals would not be 
arrested and prisoners would remain untried; debtors would escape from their 
creditors; no warrants could issue from the admiralty side of the court; the 
intestate estates would be wasted as the ecclesiastical side was shut; and no 
one could be brought up by habeas corpus for the purpose of being bailed. He 
lamented that ‘we are now … in a state without law’. 76 
The government’s difficulty was exacerbated by its inability to control 
the flow of information on the court proceedings. Malcolm was concerned 
about the circulation of the strong language of the judges criticising the 
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 The government prohibited the newspapers from publishing 
any proceedings at the Supreme Court.
78
 But a Gujarati newspaper 
Summachar continued reporting the speech of the judges in 1828 and 1829.
79
 
Besides, there was a dense Indian network of information. Malcolm lamented 
that the native correspondence was faster than that of the government and 
there were many unnoticed exchanges between the nobility in the Deccan and 
the peshwa at Benares on the case of Moro Ragonath.
80
 Furthermore, the 
government could not prevent the in-flow of metropolitan radical ideas which 
were reprinted in newspapers and magazines.
81
 Frustrated, Malcolm 
commented that if the government would not exercise its power to limit the 
freedom of the press, it ‘should be permitted to employ the same weapons for 
their defence’.82 
In this way, Grant fully used his advantage of controlling the court 
procedure. The government did not have the means to deal with it. This 
procedural control was always problematic for the government when it dealt 
with the Supreme Court. The government sought support from outside the 
court proceedings. The rest of the chapter turns to the development of the case 
of Moro Ragonath outside the court room, which I argue decided the final 
result of the conflict between the government and the King’s Court in 
Bombay. 
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IV. Imperial networks 
 
The open collision between the governmen t and the King’s Court dramatically 
expanded the arena of conflict, as both the government and the King’s Court 
sought support from higher authorities in Calcutta and London. This crucially 
changed the nature of conflict from one like the previous cases in Bombay to 
one of the most important imperial conflicts between the executive and the 
judiciary in nineteenth-century India. 
The government sought political and legal support from Calcutta, 
Madras and London. The Bombay government reported every event rela ting to 
the case of Moro Ragonath to the Court of Directors in their political letters, 
enclosing the proceedings in the governor’s council and notes of the court 
proceedings taken by the Advocate General. In addition to this regular 
communication channel, after sending the letter on 3 October 1828, the 
government appointed Major Barnwall, Malcolm’s former aide -de-camp, as 
the special agent to England to transmit the whole proceedings of Moro 
Ragonath and Bappoo Gunness to the Court of Directors.
83
 Barnwall had 
ample knowledge on the harmful effect of the legal proceedings on the chiefs 
and sardars as the political agent of Kathiawar, who had worked under 
Alexander Walker when Gujarat was first annexed to the British territory.
84
 
At the same time, the government sent letters to Madras and Calcutta and 
asked for the help of the Advocates General. To seek legal aid from other 
presidencies was a standard measure at this period, as there were only two 
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lawyers, the Advocate General and the Company’s Solicitor, on wh ose legal 
knowledge the government could rely, and as the communication with the 
Company’s legal officers in London (the standing counsel and the solicitor) 
took time. Throughout the event, the governments of Bengal and Madras 
supported Malcolm. The Advocates General of Bengal and Madras both 
agreed with the opinion of the Bombay government.
85
 
Besides the public correspondence, Malcolm maintained a large number 
of private transactions with the politicians in India and London. He frequently 
exchanged opinions with the Madras governor S. R. Lushington and the 
governor general William Bentinck at Calcutta, in addition to district officials 
throughout the Bombay presidency. Bentinck encouraged Malcolm not to 
compromise: ‘You have taken your line and whether right  or wrong, you 
cannot retreat an inch, without compromising the authority of government and 
without occasioning great political mischief’. 86 In London, the tory 




The King’s Court’s resources outside the presidency were limited. 
Given his emphasis as the true representative of the king, it was natural for 
Grant to resort to the authority of the King in Council (the Privy Council), 
which was the final tribunal of the colonial affairs. In November 1828, Grant 
sent a petition to the Privy Council to complain about the government’s 
interference. He appointed Attorney William Fenwick as the agent of the 
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 The selection of an attorney instead of a barrister was 
natural given the conflict between barristers on the one hand and the attorneys 
supported by the King’s Court on the other, which we saw in Introduction.  
The other resource outside Bombay which the judges tried to use was 
the Board of Control, the Supreme Court’s supervising body of in London. 89 
By this Grant tried to revive the conflict between the government and 
Company at home over sovereignty and land revenue in the late eighteenth 
century.
90
 The Bombay government complained that Grant spoke ‘of that 
Board as a distinct, not a component part of the Indian Government in 
England’ and tried to impress that ‘an assertion of more entire and active 
sovereignty on the part of the Crown’ was only possible by ‘a more complete 
negation of any sovereignty’ of the Company.91 The problem was that, as we 
shall see later, the president of the Board of Control, Lord Ellenborough, was 
a staunch supporter of the Bombay government.  
Due to the scarcity of record, the extent of the private network of the 
judges was difficult to know, but it is known that Grant sent via his son 
William Patrick Grant some letters to the chairman of the EIC or the president 
of the Board of Control when he resigned, and his Indian supporters also sent 
a letter to Lord Holland.
92
 When the court was closed, Grant solicited support 
for the supreme government in Calcutta.
93
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It was this difference of the density of public and private networks 
which decided the course of event. First, the Bengal government was firmly in 
support of the Bombay government. The Bengal government answered to 
Grant, referring to the ‘distress which the suspension of the powers of the 
Court must occasion to the multitudes’, that the suspension should not be 
continued because it ‘must be highly prejudicial to the general intere sts of the 
Empire’. The governor general expressed to the Bombay government his 
‘entire concurrence with the view … of the great evils arising out of the 
unlimited jurisdiction as assumedly exercised by the Supreme Court at 
Bombay’.94 
Second, the authorities at home were also firmly in support of the 
Bombay government. In September 1828, immediately after the death of 
Edward West, Malcolm wrote letters to ‘those in authority in England and to 
all who I supposed were likely to have influence in the nomination ’ to make 
sure that the next chief justice ‘must have temper and judgement, as well as 
law and above all he must view himself as an aid instead of a check upon the 
civil government of the country’.95 Two years later, it finally bore its fruit. 
Lord Ellenborough, the newly appointed President of the Board of Control, 
expressed his entire agreement with Malcolm’s idea on the dangers of the 
Supreme Court and appointed James Dewar, the Advocate General, as the next 
chief justice. He also appointed William Seymour as a puisne judge, who 
‘would rather support Government than use the authority of the Supreme 
Court as a means of raising opposition’. Ellenborough predicted that ‘no more 
mischief can happen, as he [Grant] will be like a wild elephant led away 
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between two tame ones’.96 He later added that ‘India was won by soldiers and 
statesmen & we must not allow lawyers to lose it’. 97 
This appointment changed the course of events. In the case of Moro 
Ragonath v. Dunlop, in which Moro’s karkoons prosecuted Dunlop for 
trespass in the Supreme Court,
98
 Grant repeated his criticism of the 
government, but Dewar judged in favour of the defendant.
99
 Malcolm thanked 
Wellington for his support for the appointment of Dewar which was as 
effective as ‘a master stroke’.100 Malcolm also thanked Ellenborough for the 
measure which worked ‘like at charm’.101 
The government was further empowered by the decision of the Privy 
Council in its favour, which was given in May 1829.
102
 The counsels for 
Grant were Thomas Denman, who was also the counsel for  Cursetjee 
Manockjee and Amerchund Bedreechund, whose cases we saw in Chapter 2, 
and Edward Hall Anderson, a judge of the Common Pleas. Denman and 
Alderson repeated Grant’s argument that the King’s Court had the power of 
issuing prerogative writs in the mofussil, which was distinct from its ordinary 
civil jurisdiction.
103
 The Company was represented by John Bosanquet, the 
Company’s standing counsel, and Robert Spankie, the former Bengal 
Advocate General. They argued that the court had no such power and that n o 
habeas corpus was issued in India since the enactment of 21 Geo 3 in 1781 
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which corrected many examples of its abuses in 1773 and 1781. They also 
argued, regarding the Bappoo Gunness case, that the Act stipulated that the 
officers of the Company’s Court were not amenable to the King’s Court for 
their official conducts.
104
 Lord Tenterden interfered in favour of the Bombay 
government, and the Privy Council gave a decision that the Supreme Court 
could not issue a writ of habeas corpus outside its jurisdiction and that it had 
no power to release prisoners who were convicted by the Company’s Court. 105 
After the decision of the Privy Council was given against him, there 
were few means left for Grant to contest with the government. Grant tried to 
do so in a criminal case of Madoo Sewba, one of the kidnappers of Moro 
Ragonath, who had been convicted for perjury on the indictment of the grand 
jury.
106
 Sewba demanded the attendance of Moro Ragonath was a necessary 
witness, and Grant issued a new writ of habeas corpus direc ted to Pandoorung 
Ramchunder to bring Moro Ragonath.
107
 Malcolm stated that ‘on grounds of 
Political Expediency and State Policy its enforcement ought to be openly and 
fiercely resisted’.108 Grant criticised it as the prosecution was based on the 
grand jury’s indictment. He sent the affidavits and other papers to the Privy 
Council.
109
 But by abandoning the case, the government finally terminated 
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the commotion of the Moro Ragonath case in September 1829. Malcolm 
expressed his delight: ‘I am discovered to be a grea t lawyer. God help 
them’!110 
 
V. Indian involvement 
 
The battle of the government and the King’ Court was anxiously watched by 
many Indians whose future conduct might be significantly affected by the 
result. The sardars in the Deccan had a particular interest in the case, since 
they would be involved in the same trouble as Pandoorung Ramchunder. They 
pressed on the government to settle the problem with a petition signed by 112 
‘principal inhabitants at Poona’, which was directly handed to Malcolm by 
Basker Ram Gokla and Ballajee Punt Nathoo. The former was a third class 
sardar, a relation of the peshwa’s commander-in-chief Bappoo Gokla.111 The 
latter was the second class sardar holding inam villages in Poona, 
Ahmednagar and Kolhapur, and Elphinstone’s chief native servant during the 
Maratha war.
112
 Handing the petition, they told Malcom that the agitation has 
been heightened in all over the Deccan since the writ of habeas corpus was 
issued; they were concerned about ‘the evils … from the extension of the 
English law’ upon their respectability. The following is the petition:  
 
     The settlement of the country (the Dukhun) was made by the Company’s 
Government. At that time certain terms and Agreements were entered 
into with all persons of good character, high and low, and Regulations 
established, for the preservation of Rank and Respectability all which 
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have been enjoyed. Summonses have lately been issued from the King’s 
Court against Pandoorung Ramchunder Dunderee, which people 
considered a Breach of these Regulations, it was however well known 
that the Company’s Government shielded us from the evils of this case. 
But having now that the Court has been suspended in consequence of 
this affair, doubts have arisen. All people are very apprehensive as to 
how it will be permanently settled and how their honour and character 
will be preserved, and protection afforded them. Reflecting on these 
things we unite in submitting this Petition to Government, and pray that 
taking the subject into consideration arrangements may be made by 
which whatever has been enjoyed on the Faith of the Company’s 
Government may be continued in future, and that nothing shall occur to 
detract from our respectability. 
 
Malcolm replied that there was no real cause for alarm, and their interest and 
honour would continue to be objects of special care of the government. The 
petition was forwarded to the Court of Directors and the Bengal 
government.
113
 Whether this petition was solicited by Malcolm was not 
known, but it was clear that the sardars and the government had a shared 
interest in resisting the King’s Court.  
     On the other hand, Indian merchants of Bombay city supported the 
King’s Court. The public in Bombay city saw the political elevation of Dewar 
to the chief justiceship with strong suspicion and  cast a jealous eye on all his 
acts in the court.
114
 Their feeling was expressed in two addresses of thanks 
made at the resignation of Grant as the puisne judge in September 1830. The 
first address was signed by 4,400 people and read at a meeting at the cour t 
house. It was introduced by one Jehangheir Nasserwanjee, a Parsi 
shopkeeper.
115
 It praised the effort of Grant as well as West and Chambers to 
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protect the Indians in the mofussil from false imprisonment, and articulated 
that ‘an appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court from the judgements of 
the Provincial Courts [was] the sincere and ardent desire of all the natives 
who reside under this Presidency’.116 The second address was read in Grant’s 
chamber. The meeting was chaired by Jagganath Sunkersett, a Hindu 
merchant,
117
 and the address was read by Bomanjee Hormusjee. It stated that 
the King’s Court’s British law was the benefit for the mofussil as well as for 
Bombay city. It was signed by 3,000 inhabitants including the city’s biggest 
merchants such as Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, Dhackjee Dadajee, and Framjee 
Cowasjee. Jetmul Anoopchund and Heerachund Bedreechund, the plaintiffs of 
the Amerchund Bedreechund case, also signed it.
118
 The government thought 
these addresses as Grant’s another attempt to ‘heat the kettle’. 119 Indeed, in 
replying these addresses, Grant advocated the expansion of the King’s Court’s 
jurisdiction in the mofussil.
120
 
     These petitions indicate that, while the users of the King’s Court 
covered the whole spectrum of society including the sardars in  family 
conflicts, the Hindu and Parsi merchants in Bombay represented the political 
aspiration of the King’s Court’s expanding jurisdiction. Parsi legal prowess is 
well known. The Parsi community was unique, as Mitra Sharafi shows, in that 
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they were the only minority group actively engaging in the British legal 
culture in colonial society.
121
 It was reflected in the fact that, when the 
Indians were selected as grand jurors for the first time in Bombay in 1834, the 
Parsis constituted nine out of thirteen native members.
122
 The Hindu 
merchant’s appropriation of British law was also known, chiefly in the context 
of their commercial transactions.
123
 The petitions show that they were active 
in using the court in a more directly political way in the early nineteenth 
century. 
These petitions further suggest that, in addition to the jury and the press, 
the expansion of the King’s Court’s jurisdiction was the major issue through 
which Bombay’s radicalism was nurtured in the 1820s and the 30s. Those 
mentioned above who signed the addressed—Sunkersett, Hormusjee, 
Jeejeebhoy, Dadajee, and Cowasjee—were the directors of the Bombay Native 
Education Society (later the Elphinstone Institution), which later became the 
incubator of Indian liberal intellectuals in the middle and late  nineteenth 
century.
124
 As Mridula Ramanna points out, the Supreme Court provided 
employment for the Elphinstonians as interpreters and translators in the early 
nineteenth century.
125
 There was a clear connection between the King’s Court, 
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native education and radicalism in early nineteenth century Bombay.  
The government officials were well aware of this. William Newnham, a 
member of the governor’s council, put them in the context of a growing tide of 
radicalism in the presidency towns. He said that the second address was 
‘radical’; the first one was ‘ultra-radical’ drafted by a Parsis ‘not above the 
level of retail shopkeepers’. The professional lawyers must be involved in 
drafting the addresses and the signature must be collected in the same way as 
that of electioneering in England by distributing blank papers on streets and 
collecting signs of everyman passing there.
126
 Malcolm exhibited a theory of 
moral contagion from Bombay city to the mofussil. The British law and court 
in the city made people profligate and instigate them to communicate with the 
discontented in the provinces.
127
 
The sardars in the Deccan also criticised the addresses in a durbar held 
before Malcolm.
128
 Basker Ram Gokla handed Malcolm a memorandum 
which expressed their apprehensions: The addresses might be believed in 
England as the genuine voice of all of the Indians, while they only represented 
the opinion of ‘a few discontented men, perhaps, some impostors and 
intriguers, low associates of money usurers, or crafty emissaries of lawyers’. 
The sardars’ honours and privileges would be easily taken away by ‘a low man 
and bit of paper nobody can read’ from the Supreme Court. The introduction 
of English law was contrary to the government’s 1818 Satara proclamation 
and the 1827 Regulations. Therefore, ‘ the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
Bombay may not be extended to this Province’. The memorandum was signed 
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by 4 first class sardars, 8 second class including Pandoorung Ramchunder and 
Moro Ragonath, and other 200 sardars and merchants.
129
 The governor had to 
issue a further notice criticising the addresses.
130
 
The petitions by the sardars and the addresses of the merchants suggest 
that the case of Moro Ragonath was a moment of politicisation for the sardars 
and the Indian merchants. The sardars strengthened their affiliation with the 
government, and the merchants identified themselves with the King’s Court. 
The backdrop of this sharp political divide between the two parties was the 
government’s policy of indirect rule. In turn, the Moro Ragonath case 
necessitated the government to put further priority on the agrarian politics in 
the mofussil rather than the trade and commerce in the presidency town. The 
strong connection with the merchants observed in the eighteenth century was 
fading away, and the government’s policy was more and more focused on 
security and revenue collection in the mofussil. In other words, the Moro 
Ragonath case facilitated the process of reorganisation of the political order of 
western India from a maritime commercial network of Indian merchants to the 




On 21 September 1830, in the midst of the commotion, Grant left Bombay for 
Calcutta.
131
 The biggest conflict between the government and the King’s 
Court in India was finally ended. The Moro Ragonath case gives us many 
insights into the nature of Bombay politics in the early nineteenth century. 
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First, jurisdictional jockeying by the Indians was quite common in Bombay in 
the 1820s. Both Pandoorung Ramchunder and the karkoons of Moro  Ragonath 
well understood how to use the jurisdictional conflict between the government 
and the King’s Court. They allied with the one to criticise the other and 
employed multiple means to make use of the conflict. The most immediately 
available ally for those resorting to the King’s Court was the Bombay 
attorneys and their subordinates in the mofussil. They could mobilise their 
relatives and friends for making testimonies and writing affidavits. They also 
used the press to publish the addresses to the chief justice. In this sense, Moro 
Ragonath’s karkoon followed these legal practices which were quite common 
in the Deccan. Those allied with the government, on the  other hand, could 
demand it act against the court, chiefly by means of petitions, and in cases of 
sardars, at the durbar. This Indian agency was the origin of the conflict which, 
as we shall see, changed the overall structure of the imperial governance.  
At the same time, the case clearly showed the process by which a local 
issue in a local province in India was transformed into an imperial agenda in 
Bombay, Calcutta, and London. The Moro Ragonath case was unique in this 
respect. The government sought support from the home authorities not only by 
means of usual departmental letters but also sent a special agent to convey all 
the information and opinion of the government. The London politicians such 
as Wellington and Ellenborough were well informed about the issue thanks to 
their private correspondence with Malcolm. The intensity of communications 
among the governments in India was also remarkable in this case. The 
Bombay government could obtain advice and supports from the governors, 
members of the council and the Advocate Generals in Calcutta and Madras by 
means of public and private correspondence. The chief justice, in addition to 
his regular communication with the President of the Board of Control, also 
253 
petitioned the Bengal government and sent a special mission to London to 
represent to the Privy Council. Their connection with the London radicals wa s 
especially important in this respect. The hub of such networks was the 
influential Europeans who were in Bombay and now back in Britain such as 
Charles Forbes and Robert Rickards. At the same time, it was clear that  the 
government was in an advantageous position in utilising the established routes 
of communication than the King’s Court which must rely on personal and 
ad-hoc networks. This difference of resources available from outside the 
presidency brought about the favourable outcome to the government.  
It was also clearly shown, as in the cases discussed in Chapter 2, that 
the appeal structure of colonial judiciary had a tendency to work in favour of 
the government. That is, the independent judiciary in India could not 
ultimately fulfil its independence in the structure of empire, where the final 
decision was always retained in the politicians at home rather than the judges 
in India or in Britain. It means that, even if the law courts sometimes judged 
against the government, as in Bombay in the 1820s, the  rule of law was 
structurally limited in the colonies. As we shall see in the next chapter, this 
structural limitation to the rule of law was further strengthened in the 
succeeding debates on the charter renewal in Calcutta and London. Because of 
the scale of conflict, the governments in Bombay, Calcutta and London had to  
realise the need to resolve this jurisdictional conflict and make a unified and 
hierarchical order of judicature in India. In that process, the Bombay 
government’s discourse of crisis and danger was given an institutional form. 
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The East India Company’s royal charter was to be renewed every twenty years. 
This was the occasion when the whole system of the Indian government was 
reviewed and revised. The coming renewal of 1834 was the opportunity for 
the Bombay government to settle the problem of the King’s Court. 1 The logic 
of state necessity should be firmly established and the chiefs and sardars 
should be protected from the encroachment of the King’s Court. This chapter 
assesses the extent to which the Bombay officials’ vision of empire was 
realised in the charter renewal.  
The reform of the Company’s judicial administration, rather than the 
abolition of the China monopoly, was the central issue of this renewal. The 
abolition of monopoly was a consensus in Westminster, and the Company 
itself had admitted that it was unavoidable.
2
 Thomas Macaulay gave scant 
attention to it in parliament, saying that ‘No voice, I believe, has yet been 
raised in Parliament to support the monopoly. On that subject all public men 
of all parties seem to be agreed’.3 Instead, the ministers and radicals 
discussed most of the time whether the expansion of the King ’s Court’s 
jurisdiction was a blessing or an evil of the British colonialism. While the 
radicals advocated the constitutional check of the King’s Court, the 
                                                 
1
 Mithi Mukherjee’s India in the shadows of empire does not pay attention to 
this charter renewal, which is highly relevant for her argument.  
2
 Wilson, History, iii. 479–87; C. H. Philips, The East India Company 
1784–1834 (Manchester, 1961), 285–90; Ian Newbould, Whiggery and reform 
1830–41: The politics of government (Basingstoke, 1990), 111–2. 
3
 Parl. Debs. (series 3) vol. 19, col. 502 (10 July 1833), T. B. Macaulay, 
speech. Cf. Bowen, Business of empire, 296. 
255 
government urged the need of uniformity in judicial government. The most 
important consequence of this debate was the establishment of the first 
all-India legislative council. The debate on its establishment was crucially 
important in determining the future form of Indian governance especially in 
regard to the rule of law and its exceptions.  
Eric Stokes in his English utilitarians and India (1959) argues that the 
1834 charter was the product of amalgamation between utilitarianism of 
Mackenzie, Ross, Mill and Macaulay and paternalism of Elphinstone, 
Malcolm, Bentinck and Metcalfe.
4
 This remains an important point. While the 
role of paternalism tends to be undervalued than that of utilitarianism,
5
 we 
need to pay more attention to these paternalist governors, especially when we 
consider recent historians’ call for paying more attention to the crisis in India 
than the metropolitan intellectual debate. For example, Jon Wilson argues that 
the legislative council was part of the government’s struggle for a uniform, 
efficient and mechanical mode of governance which was required as a 
response to ‘chaos and uncertainties of everyday colonial rule’. 6 As we have 
seen in previous chapters, a major cause of such chaos and uncertainty was the 
King’s Court’s jurisdictional expansion, which was vehemently opposed by 
the paternalist governors. 
I argue that the debate on the legislative council was important as it 
institutionalised the Bombay government’s paternalist logic of emergency and 
state necessity in the political structure of Britain’s Indian empire. The idea of 
establishing the legislative council first appeared as a means to solve the 
conflict of authority between the government and the Supreme Court which 
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was exposed in the Bombay case of Moro Ragonath. The charter limited the 
power of the King’s Court and prescribed its subjugation to the governor 
general’s legislature, and, by doing so, it realised the Bombay officials’ 
aspiration for a more unitary and hierarchical form of authority in India. The 
following analysis shall make it clear that it was not the utilitarians and 
evangelicals in London such as Mill, Grant and Macaulay but the officials in 
Bombay and Calcutta such as Malcolm, Metcalfe and Bentinck who demanded 
and realised this crucial stipulation on the supremacy of the executive over the 
judiciary. 
This chapter pays attention to the process through which the debates in 
Bombay and Calcutta determined the final form of the legislative council. As 
we shall see, they had different ideas on the problem of judicial system s and 
political authority in India, especially in regard to the status and 
socio-political role of the native aristocracy. Nonetheless, they were united in 
criticising the political interference by the King’s Court. This was because 
they shared the sense of danger of the tribal raids and believed that the 
constitutional check by the judiciary should not hinder the government’s 
power to employ necessary measures in times of emergency. They agreed that 
the political authority in India should be united in the hands of the 
government and that the King’s Court should be subordinated to it. As a result, 
the power of judicial check against the government in India was officially 
abolished. This was a major constitutional change from the idea of Indian 
governance in the 1770s and 80s, when the Supreme Court was introduced for 
the very purpose of judicial check against the corruption and oppression by 
the Company officials. Now the British parliament made the Company the 
author of the law. The rule of law was replaced by the rule by law made by the 
government. This chapter traces the debate in India and at home through 
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which such a major constitutional change was devised without much 
difficulty. 
 
II. Conflict between the executive and the judiciary in Bengal  
 
The new charter was the result of a convergence of different senses of danger 
in Bombay, Calcutta and London. First, we look at that in Calcutta. As we saw 
in Introduction, the Bengal government experienced a series of conflicts with 
the Supreme Court in the 1770s, which resulted in the Act of 1781. It is less 
known that the conflict did not cease there and intensified in the 1820s.
7
 In 
1820s Calcutta, the conflicts between the government and the  King’s Court 
were related to two issues. One was the King’s Court’s intervention in the 
local revenue administration, which was also disputed in Bombay. The other, 
which was not seen in Bombay, was that the King’s Court had exacerbated the 
European settlers’ violence in the mofussil. Engaging in these problems, the 
Bengal government developed its own sense of danger of the King’s Court and 
realised the need of establishing the unitary and exclusive authority of the 
government in the mofussil.  
The background to the government’s sense of danger on the King’s 
Court’s revenue intervention was an unprecedented financial crisis in the 
1820s. The urgent economical reform was necessitated by the huge debt 
incurred in the first Anglo-Burma war in 1824–6 as well as a more general 
price depression. In 1828/9, the accumulated debt of the Company amounted 
to £40 million.
8
 Pressed by the home authorities, the Bengal government 
                                                 
7
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appointed the Civil Finance Committee in 1827 in order to reduce the amount 
of expenditure to the level of 1823/4, or before the war.
9
 A member of the 
governor-general’s council Charles Metcalfe said that ‘a very little 
mismanagement might accomplish our expulsion’. 10 
One of the key policies of the government to increase revenue was the 
promotion of European planters’ land holding in the mofussil, and this was the 
focus of its conflict with the King’s Court. Indigo was one of the most 
important commodities of the Bengal presidency in this period.  The 1820s saw 
a great expansion of indigo cultivation underpinned by the EIC’s large 
purchase. There were 1,600 planters in Calcutta in 1828, which was more than 
one fourth of the total white population in India, and they had more than 700 
factories in 1830.
11
 The planters were the agent of the agricultural 
improvement in collaboration with the new class of  bhadraloks 
(merchant-zamindars) such as Dwarkanath Tagore and Rammohan Roy, who 
were aspiring to improve agriculture and industry.
12
 In order to bring about 
the improvement, the contact with the European should be promoted, not 
hindered. The planters’ social influence was widely felt throughout the 
presidency. They pressured the government to allow their land holding in the 
mofussil which was prohibited by the charter. The government was 
sympathetic to the planters and admitted concessions.
13
 Bentinck was 
‘convinced that the development of the natural resources of the country 
depends mainly on the introduction of European capital and skill’. 14 Metcalfe 
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likewise stated that the abolition of restrictions of their land holding would 




At the same time, the government’s support for the indigo planters was 
a desperate response to the indigo depression at the beginning of the 1830s. 
When the charter renewal was debated in Bengal and in London, the indigo 
plantations in Bengal were about to collapse; the bankruptcy of the house of 
Palmer in January 1830 ushered a general downfall of the industry between 
1830 and 1833, which destroyed all the agency houses in Bengal. The Bengal 
government tried its best to save the situation by strengthening the legal status 
of the planters with Regulation V of 1830, which allowed them to seize ryots’ 
property in order to enforce contracts.
16
 
The major obstacle was the dual jurisdiction of the Company’s Court 
and the King’s Court in the mofussil. European settlers’ violence against 
Indians was exacerbated by their exemption from the Company’s Court which, 
as Elizabeth Kolsky shows, became the major motive for the government’s 
codification project.
17
 An official report gave a detailed account of the 
problem.
18
 First, in order to use the Company’s Court to deal with cultivating 
ryots’ various ‘resistances’,19 it was conventional for the planters to hold land 
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in their Indian servants’ name. In consequence, the planters were virtually 
exempted from liability in the Company’s Court, and they ‘connive[d] at the 
misconduct of the servants in whose names his land is holden, towards the 
ryots and other natives’.20 Against this background, the planters used the 
King’s Court to evade the hands of the government’s district officers. The 
magistrate of Dacca explained it as follows: 
 
They may direct brigands to be entertained; they may plan and order 
attacks to be made; but if not personally present as principals, it is 
difficult to convict them of being accessories. Instances have occurred, 
in which the mere warning a European planter against being accessary to 
a breach of the peace, on the information of a police officer that armed 
men on his part were collected, has called forth a threat of prosecution in 
the Supreme Court; so that magistrates are really afraid to act against 




In this way, the King’s Court’s criminal jurisdiction over Europeans in the 
mofussil exacerbated the planters’ violence and oppression against Indian 
cultivators, which in turn raised the possibility of disturbance by the indigo 
cultivators. Worse, the contemporary pointed out that the impoverished 
peasants often converted themselves to the dacoits.
22
 In order to solve these 
problems and to utilise the planters as the agent of agricultural improvement, 
the Bengal government had to deal with the jurisdictional problem of the 
King’s Court. The Bombay government did not experience this problem, as 
there were virtually no Europeans who dared to repair to the mofussil other 
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than some agents of mercantile houses or lawyers.
23
 White violence was not, 
however, the main point of jurisdictional conflict between the King’s Court 
and the government in Bengal, for the judges of the King’s Court also 
unanimously supported the government’s plan to subject Europeans in the 
mofussil to the Company’s Court.24 
The real problem was that, in the late 1820s, the King’s Court started to 
intervene more overtly in the government’s revenue administration in the 
mofussil. The most disputed case was the case of Chowdry v. Chowdry in 1829, 
in which the Supreme Court decreed partition and re -assessment of a revenue 
defaulter’s land and, in order to compel enforcement, attached the land and 
appointed an officer of the court as a receiver of the revenue.
25
 This was 
followed by similar cases of partition of lands in the mofussil.
26
 The 
government was concerned about the collision of authorities between the 
collectors and the Supreme Court, and the problems caused by the Supreme 
Court’s awarding of lands without reference to the government records or 
support of the local officers.
27
 But the judges vindicated their jurisdiction 
based on the doctrine of ‘constructive inhabitancy’, which assumed that those 
living or having offices in Calcutta were amenable to the King’s Court even if 
the cases originated in the mofussil. Jon Wilson points out that the 
background of these cases was the changing pattern of the agrarian 
relationship, particularly the emergence of a bhadralok class living in Calcutta, 
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holding lands in the mofussil, and using the King’s Court for managing their 
landed property.
28
 From this perspective, the cases exhibited an alarming 
tendency for the government, as it meant that the bhadraloks could evade the 
government’s control of mofussil lands by using the King’s Court as another 
channel of land transactions. In this sense, the Bengal government’s sense of 
crisis was similar to that of Bombay which we saw in Chapter 3. They both 
apprehended that the King’s Court would curtail the government’s exclusive 
control of revenue affairs. Reporting the cases to the Court of Directors, the 
government explained that 
 
… our main object has been to retain in our own hands the entire control 
of the revenue arrangements in estates affected by decrees of the 
Supreme Court, … we have especially guarded against the drawing of 
any inference which might imply an acquiescence on the part of 
government in the jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court over 




This problem of the King’s Court’s revenue intervention should be put 
in a larger picture of the conflict between the executive and the  judiciary in 
the Bengal mofussil. It was related to a prolonged conflict between the 
government and the zamindars over the revenue assessment and the 
resumption of rent-free lands. The government suspected that the zamindars 
appropriated the rents from the lands which were cultivated and added to their 
estate after the Permanent Settlement in 1793. In order to investigate the title 
of these lands, the government had issued several regulations, which were 
disputed by the zamindars. The most problematic issue for the zamindars was 
that the government gradually strengthened the power of the collectors to 
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investigate and resume their lands. In the original settlement in 1793, the 
collectors had to make a suit in the Company’s Court to dispute the doubtful 
titles. But Regulation IX of 1825 empowered the collectors to directly 
examine the titles of the lands, and Regulation III of 1828 appointed the 
special commissioners, in lieu of the ordinary court of law, to receive appeals 
from the decision of the collectors. This meant that the Bengal government 
put the affairs of the zamindar’s rent-free land under its exclusive control. The 
zamindars criticised the arbitrariness of these measures by a series of petitions 
published in the press.
30
 
The Bengal government could not admit that the judiciary became the 
rallying point of those who criticised the government. In reviewing the 
revenue and judicial administration of all the presidencies, Holt Mackenzie, 
the Bengal government’s secretary to the Territorial Department in charge of 
all revenue matters, reached the following conclusion:  
 
It seems to me that the theory of a complete separation between the 
judicial and executive authority, if elsewhere sound, is here misplaced. 
The judicial is the chief branch of the executive  administration. Though 
in free countries it may belong to the people, in a despotism, it must 
belong to the ruler or his delegates; and to put judges arbitrarily over the 
people, whom the people cannot control, and to leave them uncontrolled, 




Considering this aspiration for the sovereign power in regard to revenue 
affairs, it was natural that the government strongly reacted to the King’s 
Court’s interference in the problem of land and revenue in the mo fussil which 
enabled the bhadralok’s jurisdictional jockeying.  
                                                 
30
 Ahmed, Social ideas and social change in Bengal , 118–22; PP 1831–2 
(735-III), 222, Mackenzie, evidence, 18 Apr. 1832.  
31
 PP 1831–32 (734), 136, H. Mackenzie, minute, 1 Oct. 1830.  
264 
Furthermore, though small in number, more overt political interferences 
of the King’s Court was resumed in this period. During the debate of the 
charter renewal, the Supreme Court at Calcutta maintained that it could take 
cognizance of a civil suit against the Company in Bank of Bengal v. United 
Company in 1831. The Company insisted that the conduct of the sovereign 
was not amenable to the civil court, but the Court held that the Company was 
not a sovereign, as ‘the sovereign is the King of the United Kingdom’. 32 
We can add to these problems Bentinck’s personal involvement in a 
conflict with the King’s Court in 1805–7 as the governor of Madras. His 
government bypassed the Supreme Court and the JPs when it established a 
town police force. The chief justice Henry Gwillim repeatedly denounced the 
‘military despotism’ of the government and its ‘ill -advised young lord’. 
Rosselli analyses this affair as an expression of ‘the resentment of private 
traders, shopkeepers, and other independent Europeans against the hardening 
of company rule’.33 The structure of conflict was almost identical to that in 
Bombay in 1808–12, which we saw in Chapter 1. 
 
But above all, what urged Calcutta to support the cause of the Bombay 
government was its own sense of crisis over the tribal raids in the presidency, 
which was exacerbated by its conflict with the judiciary or, in this case, the 
Company’s Court. The fear of the raids was equally strong in Bengal as in 
Bombay in the early nineteenth century. Lord Minto who was the governor 
general between 1807–13 once stated that the ‘dacoits’ established ‘the horrid 
ascendancy’ and ‘its sirdars, or captains of the band, were esteemed and even 
called the hakim or ruling power, while the real government did not possess 
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either authority or influence…’.34 Particularly problematic were the gang 
robberies in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, then called the Upper 
Provinces, which were adjacent to the Kingdom of Awadh and troubled by the 
raiders from there. The Bengal government enacted a series of regulations 
aiming at the suppression of gang robberies. By these regulations, the 
government gradually excluded the thugs and dacoits from the realm of 
ordinary criminal judicature and created a series of special stipulations only 
applicable to these robbers. Regulation III of 1805 and VIII of 1808 fixed 
additional exemplary punishments of the gangs. Regulation IX of 1808 
stipulated that the government could proclaim rewards for their arrest. 
Regulation VIII of 1810 newly appointed the superintendent of the police for 
the Upper Provinces chiefly in view of suppressing robberies. Regulation III 
of 1821 empowered the native police officers to arrest ‘suspicious’ gangs. 35 
Bentinck’s government set out a series of measures to deal with the 
problem. In 1829, the Bengal government started to carry out a series of 
anti-thuggee campaigns which relied on the working of the government’s own 
magistracy rather than the sardars. As Kim Wagner and Tim Lloyd argue, 
these campaigns were permeated with the logic of exception, which was 
embodied in Bentinck’s comment that the thugs ‘may be considered like 
Pirates, to be placed without the pale of social law, and be subjected to 
condign punishment by whatever authority they may be seized and 
convicted’.36 In addition to these campaigns, the government sought 
systematic solutions by placing these regions in a more immediate sphere of 
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government influence. Bentinck and Metcalfe thought that the capital of the 
Bengal presidency should be moved to the Upper Provinces in order to enable 
‘prompt and quick interposition of command … in cases of emergency’. 37 
Holt Mackenzie recommended creating a new, separate presidency of Agra, 
which enabled an easy access to ‘all points requiring p rompt attention—the  
Sutlej frontier—Malwa and Rajputana—Bharatpur—Sindhia—Bhundelkhand 
—Rohilkhand.38 This idea was eventually realised in the 1834 chapter 
renewal in the form of the newly created Agra presidency. By these measures, 
the government tried to enable a more efficient suppression of the gang 
robbers. 
But, the government’s operation against thuggee was frequently 
hindered by the judicial checks by the Company’s Court. As Radhika Singha 
points out, the government officers in charge of robbers often complained that 
the Company’s Court’s criminal procedures rather hindered effective policing. 
The paucity of evidence often prevented the conviction of the suspects. 
Magistrates could keep suspected thugs in confinement by taking a large 
amount of security, but they could be released by the Company’s Court. The 
government officials suggested that persons who were suspected to be ‘thugs 
by profession’ should be immediately arrested, but the Company’s Court 
rejected them as they would jeopardise uniformity of law and allow 
oppression by the police officers. The magistrates continued banishing entire 
communities on suspicion of being dacoity tribes, but the judges of the 
Company’s Court also continually stated that these acts were inadmissible. 39 
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The judges said that these measures ‘certainly increase the evils which are 
experienced from the too extensive powers already vested in the officers of 
police without diminishing in any material degree the danger to which 
travellers are exposed from thugs’ and that the  regulations should not be ‘an 
instrument of legalised oppression and extortion’ by the police. 40 In a 
different way, therefore, the Bengal government was also experiencing the 
problem of its relationship with the judiciary, which was crucially important 
for controlling raids and maintaining tranquillity in its vast inner territories 
especially in times of emergency. The Bengal government’s sense of danger 
might be strong, as the above example indicated that the judges of the 
Company’s Court as well as the King’s Court employed the logic of law. 
Calcutta could fully sympathise with Bombay’s difficulty in dealing with the 
raiders and the judiciary.  
 
III. Native aristocracy and security in central India  
 
Although they were united in criticising the political encroachment of the 
judiciary—both the Company’s and the King’s—, there were also many 
differences between the Bombay and Bengal governments. In order to think 
about the making of the legislative council, it is necessary to look at their 
differing attitude towards the role of native aristocracy in the mofussil. As we 
saw above, the King’s Court’s interference in the affairs of sardars was not 
disputed in Bengal in the 1820s. This was because the government did not rely 
on the zamindars in suppressing the raids in the same way the Bombay 
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government did. Since the lapsing of the Nizamat and its replacement with 
European magistrates and Indian darogahs by Cornwallis in 1792, the Bengal 
government had disbanded the force of zamindars and absolved them from any 
police duties.
41
 The succeeding governments followed the suit, thinking that 
relying on zamindars was ‘unsafe and inexpedient’. 42 Deprived of physical 
force, zamindars also tried not to incur any responsibility of suppressing 
robberies.
43
 Bentinck and other officials were rather critical of zamindars 




This attitude of the Bengal government reflected a rapid decline of the 
social influence of zamindars in Bengal in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Already under the Company’s rule for more than 50 
years, the social influence of Bengal’s hereditary zamindars was much more 
weakened than in Bombay by this time. The decline of old aristocracy was 
already remarkable in the 1770s, and their demilitarisation was complete by 
the 1790s except at frontier regions.
45
 As P. J. Marshal shows, they ‘passed 
from being great territorial magnates who effectively enforced their own law 
to being men who exercised certain rights defined b y a law that was both laid 
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down and enforced from above’.46 As S. N. Mukherjee points out, they were 
being replaced by the bhadraloks, who were vocal in demanding rule of law 
and security of property but fundamentally establishmentarian in their 
political outlook.
47
 In the mofussil, the decline of lesser gentry continued 
throughout the nineteenth century.
48
 
Accordingly, even Thomas Herbert Maddock, the Agent of Sagar and 
Narbada, the regions haunted by the thuggee, did not see any benefit of 
conciliating the chiefs. He referred to Bundelkhand in the Conquered 
Provinces as his example where the government’s conciliatory policy 
generated no benefit. Maddock complained that the chiefs of that rich region 
which could procure more than a crore of rupees but contribu ted no man or 
penny to the government. He concluded that the government could ‘in case of 
need … derive little or no advantage from the undisciplined rabble’. 49 
This did not mean that the Bengal government did not pay attention to 
the native aristocracy. The difference was that Calcutta was chiefly interested 
in zamindar’s economic role in society, while Bombay was more emphatic 
about their political influence. Maddock, in the same report, clearly stated that 
the lapsed enam lands should be used ‘to form a native aristocracy more 
attached than the present race of jagheerdars to our Government, more 
dependent on its prosperity, better calculated to support it, and which will be 
more likely to conciliate our subjects, and benefit them by its disbursement’. 50 
This indicates that Maddock wished to encourage the Bengal bhadraloks’ 
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mode of mofussil land management which was, as Jon Wilson argues, 
conducive to ‘the rule-based form of governance’ introduced by the Company 
rather than the old mode of politics based on patronage and network.
51
 
Maddock also commented that the new aristocracy would be better than 
the present petty chiefs in Sagar and Narbada, who were treated as foreign 
princes and in consequence ‘absolved’ from having allegiance to the British 
government. They should rather be regarded as domestic subjects.
52
 Here the 
relationship between the government and the local chiefs was treated as a 
domestic, not foreign, issue, and the chief’s resistance was dealt with as a 
matter of police rather than that of war and diplomacy.
53
 By replacing the old 
hereditary sardars with the new ones, the Bengal government tried to 
domesticate its relationship with the sardars and to exercise its exclusive 
sovereignty over these chiefs. This conscious remaking of the native 
aristocracy foreshadowed the aspiration for social engineering by means of 
law which was a marked feature of the Indian ‘age of reform’ in the 1830s and 
40s. 
 
IV. Calcutta debate on emergency 
 
What should be emphasised is that, despite this difference of opinions  about 
the desirability of European settlement or the relationship between the sardars, 
tribes and sovereignty, both the Bombay and the Bengal governments were 
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convinced that the King’s Court’s expansion of jurisdiction in the mofussil 
should be limited and the hindrance of the judiciary to the executive should be 
removed. In order to look at how it was done, and how some of the concerns 
of each government were adopted or discarded, we now turn our attention to 
the government’s discussion on the legislative  council. In their discussion 
with the judges, the Bengal officials agreed with the view of Bombay on the 
need of limiting the power of the judiciary and vehemently defended their 
power of emergency intervention. 
Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, a member of the governor general’s 
council, was the central figure in this dispute. He frequently corresponded 
with Malcolm during the Bombay habeas corpus crisis in 1828 and 1829. He 
could fully sympathise with Malcolm’s sense of danger as an enlightened 
soldier-administrator of the Munro school with ample experience in dealing 
with predatory tribes as the Resident of Delhi (1811–9, 1825–7) and 
Hyderabad (1820–5).54 He also recognised the need to have ‘an influential 
portion of the population attached to our Government by common interests 
and sympathies’.55 His sense of danger was fully expressed in his minute in 
1829. It examined several legal cases including Chowdry v. Chowdry in which 
the King’s Courts committed the jurisdictional encroachment. It expressed 
Calcutta’s concern about the sovereignty and revenue: 
 
the sovereign acts of the Government in the disposal of its public 
Revenue beyond the limits of the Court’s local jurisdiction, being once 
rendered liable to subversion by the fiat of the Court, no security for the 
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Metcalfe wrote another minute specifically examining the habeas corpus cases 
in Bombay, in which he stated that the ‘Legislature cannot have intended that 
the King’s Courts should throw open all the provincial gaols, and release all 
the prisoners sentenced by the Company’s Courts; and it is quite clear that the 
exercise of such a power would effectually destroy good order in the 
Company’s territories, and render its Courts utterly useless and 
contemptible’.57 
The Bengal government found the solution in the British political 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. Mackenzie proposed it in his 
memorandum on the case of Chowdry v. Chowdry, and Bentinck and Metcalfe 
approved it.
58
 The key to their argument was that the local government 
representing the legislative power of the sovereign monarch should be 
supreme in its relation with the judiciary.
59
 They proposed that the governor 
general should be vested with an all -India legislative power in the form of the 
legislative council, whose law bound the King’s Court. In order to prevent 
future conflicts, the members of the council should include the Supreme Court 
judges as well as the governor general and the council. Enclosing these 
minutes, the government requested the judges of the Calcutta Supreme Court 
to draft the bill for establishing the legislative council.
60
 
The proposal reflected the Bengal government’s strong aspiration for 
what Metcalfe called ‘the principle of unity of command’. Besides the 
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subjugation of the Supreme Court to the governor general, Metcalfe suggested 
combining the commander in chief and the governor general, unifying the 
armies of three presidencies into one, and unifying the civil services of 
different presidencies in the new charter.
61
 Among such measures, unifying 
the judiciary into the executive was one of the most important. In 1829, the 
Bengal government abolished the circuit courts, divided the presidency into 
twenty small districts and appointed a Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit  
in each district vested with revenue, criminal and police jurisdictions.
62
 The 
government also newly appointed the collector-magistrates combining the 
duty of the collectors and the magistrates in the mofussil and strengthened 
their power of summary justice, provoking the home authorities’ censure. 63 
The judges of the Calcutta Supreme Court strongly reacted against the 
government’s censure. They were particularly critical of Metcalfe’s minutes. 
They vindicated the court’s conduct in the cases such as Chowdry v. Chowdry 
and justified their jurisdiction in the mofussil based on the doctrine of 
constructive inhabitancy. Charles Edward Grey, the chief justice, sarcastically 
stated that ‘it may be worth while to consider whether it is the Court which 
sets at naught the Regulations of the Government, or the Government which 
has forgotten the lawful powers of the Court’. 64 John Franks, the puisne judge, 
also supported the expansion of the court’s jurisdiction and positively 
advocated the plurality of jurisdictions in the mofussil by arguing that 
overlapping jurisdictions of various courts caused no inconvenience in 
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The Calcutta judges, following the Bombay judges’ opinion in the case 
of Moro Ragonath as well as that of Amerchund Bedreechund, strongly 
criticised the government’s attempt to normalise the state of exception and 
emergency. Edward Ryan, the puisne judge, called Metcalfe’s minute as ‘ legal 
hocus pocus, or legal legerdemain’ and criticised his intention as follows:  
 
I do not mean to say that some great question of state necessity or 
expediency may not make it incumbent on the Government to interpose 
its authority, and to prevent the law taking its course; but these 
emergencies are of rare occurrence, and are of course only to be justified 




The judges criticised, as John Peter Grant did, the government’s 
despotism and asserted that it was not the EIC but the King’s Court that 
represented the sovereignty of the British monarch. Their claim was based on 
the assumption that there were only the executive and the judiciary in India, 
and the cause of the problem was the former’s encroachment of the latter. 
Grey stated that Metcalfe’s minute was aimed at regularising the government’s 
interference to annul the judgements of the court which were already given. It 
was to ‘make the sovereignty of the King in Parliament only nominal in India, 
and that there shall be no law there which is not liable to be altered by the 
executive branch’. The King’s Courts, the only courts  to which the servants of 
the Company were amenable, was to be succumbed to the Company, and ‘the 
Company and their servants would at once be sovereigns in India in all but the 
name and the right, and sovereigns uncontrolled by law’. 67 Grey proposed 
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that the judges should retain the power to veto legislation and that the 
legislative council should be placed under the control of the crown and 
parliament rather than the East India Company.
68
 With these critical 
comments and proposals, the judges sent the draft of the bill to the Bengal 
government. 
The government officials were dissatisfied with the judges’ attitudes. 
Particularly, they were determined to defend the power of discretion in times 
of emergency. Their subsequent exchange centred on the governor general’s 
power to emergency legislation. Bentinck proposed inserting the following 
phrase in the bill: 
 
Provided, however, that it shall and may be lawful for the Governor 
General in Council to carry on any cases in which he may consider that 
serious mischief to the interests of the British Government would arise 
from the suspension of any law, to cause the same to be carried 
immediately into effect, … In all such cases, where any law or regulation 
may be passed on the emergency above adverted to, [a written notice 
should be sent to the judges and the Governor General should explain] 




The judges objected to the amendment as it would give unrestricted power of 
emergency legislation to the governor general,
70
 but the government was 
adamant on this point and further proposed that the governor general could 
have the power to pass any laws without sending it round to other members or 
publishing it, when ‘in the judgement of the Governor General, the safety and 
tranquillity of the British possessions in India, or the public interest’ required 
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 The judges grudgingly wrote an amended bill, but they deleted all 
instances of the word ‘emergency’ from it.72 
     This battle over the word ‘emergency’ signifies that the judges’ 
conception of Indian society was different from that of the government. As we 
have seen throughout this thesis, the government officials conceived that 
Indian society was always in a state of crisis and emergency. On the other 
hand, the judges’ view was that Indian society was in a state of peace, in 
which all civil and criminal judicatures should be governed by the ordinary 
courts of law. They always assumed the predominance of the civil over the 
political and the military. They did not deny the state of cr isis which required 
emergency measures, but they assumed that such cases of emergency were 
rare. Because of this fundamental difference of assumption, the government 
and the judges could not reach a compromise. The settlement of the conflict 
between the logic of law and the logic of emergency was brought over to the 
London debate. 
 
V. London debate on imperial constitution 
 
When the constitution of the legislative council was discussed in Calcutta, 
London was in a commotion over the emancipation of the Catholics and the 
reform of parliament. Due to these pressing political agendas, the discussion 
of the charter of the East India Company was delayed for several years.
73
 The 
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London debate can be divided into two periods. One was between 1830 and 
1831, when the Bombay dispute over habeas corpus became the main topic, 
and the other was the subsequent debate in 1832 and 1833, which was centred 
on Calcutta’s proposal of a legislative council. Historians often only focus on 
the debate in 1832 and 1833 and especially on Macaulay’s celebrated speech 
in the Commons on 10 July 1833, but I would argue that the earlier debate in 
1830 and 1831 was more important in determining the political character of 
the 1834 charter. 
The case of Moro Ragonath was a fit example for the radicals to 
criticise. In February 1830, the radicals used the letter of Ellenborough on the 
appointment of Dewar to censure the government’s dangerous attack on ‘the 
independence of the judicial order in India’. 74 A whig leader Henry 
Brougham argued that the letter threw doubt on Ellenborough’s qualification 
as the President of the Board of Control. Radical Joseph Hume lamented that 
‘the confidence of the natives was destroyed, and the letter of the noble lord 
had spread dismay throughout the whole of Bombay’ . James Mackintosh 
condemned that the administration of justice should not be treated ‘with such 
scornful negligence’. Secretary Peel and other ministers could only reply that 




Ellenborough himself responded to the criticism in the House of Lords 
with a clear logic of state necessity, and the battle between the logic of law 
and that of state necessity was rehearsed in the British parliament. 
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Ellenborough argued that it was not the matter of the judiciary’s independence 
but that of the usurpation of powers by the judge. He was fully supported by 
the Duke of Wellington and other tories. One of them, Lord Melville, even 
totally denied the independence of the judges: ‘the Judges of this country must 
not show their independence when they went to India; they must be careful 
not to commit the Governor; they … must not set up their own notions of 
law’.76 
The discussion quickly developed into a total inquiry into the cases of 
habeas corpus in Bombay. In the Commons, John Stewart, a protégé of the 
radical MP Charles Forbes, read the Bombay government’s letter to the 
Supreme Court on 3 October 1828 and criticised the decision of the Privy 
Council in favour of the government. He made a motion to inquire into the 
conduct of the Bombay government against the Supreme Court, because, he 
said, if the interference would be admitted in India, it would soon be 
attempted in Britain as well.
77
 Daniel O’Connell contrasted ‘the authority of 
law and the constitution’ and ‘the power of the Governor’ and stated that ‘[a]t 
any rate, the Governor ought not to be placed, like a dictator, above the Court, 
with power to control its proceedings, and decide what was legal for it to 
perform, and what not’. Hume said that the government’s intervention in the 
case of Moro Ragonath was ‘uncalled for by any exigency’. On the other hand, 
Malcolm was defended by tories such as Lord Ashley, who repeated 
Malcolm’s argument of state necessity almost verbatim. Peel expressed his 
decisive support for Malcolm and Ellenborough by stating that ‘this was not a 
case affecting their independence, but a question relating to the assumption of 
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authority unwarrantable and dangerous’ and that the parliament should devise 
a remedy to such cases. The House was divided, and the motion was rejected 
by a majority of 106 to 15.
78
 
This debate on the case of Moro Ragonath determined the framework of 
the following debates in select committees appointed for thinking about the 
affairs of the East India Company. The first committee was appointed by the 
Lords in early 1830. The debate in the committee was dominated by the 
concern of Ellenborough and Wellington. Not surprisingly, they chose 
Elphinstone and Chaplin, now both at home, as witnesses. 
Elphinstone and Chaplin repeated their opinion that the King’s Court’s 
extended jurisdiction hindered revenue and judicial administration in the 
mofussil and injured the respectability of the chiefs and sardars. Based on his 
experience, especially in his involvement in the Amerchund Bedreechund case, 
Elphinstone urged that public servants should be exempted from the 
prosecution in the King’s Court and that the governor and the council should 
not be summoned as witnesses or as jurors. The Supreme Cour t should not be 
allowed to pretend that it solely represented the king; the governor should 
have a commission from the king as well as from the Company. Many 
inconveniences were caused by the King’s Court’s power to veto 
regulations.
79
 Chaplin pointed out that the government’s conciliation policy 
towards the sardars was violated by the summons from the Supreme Court.
80
 
The government should have an entire control over the Europeans in the 
mofussil, or ‘otherwise they will bring the government into constant co llision 
with the courts of judicature at the presidencies’ which would degrade the 
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dignity of both the government and the court.
81
 The poor Europeans would 
produce general hostility among the Indians and ultimately ‘at no distant 
period lead to the total overthrow of our government’.82 
The opposition to the government’s view was feeble. The Lords’ 
committee also summoned the former judges of the King’s Court in India, but 
their voices were discordant. On the one hand, Edward East, the former chief 
justice at Calcutta, vindicated the conduct of the King’s Court. The doctrine of 
constructive inhabitancy was justifiable by referring to numerous cases of 
equity filed by the Indians living in Calcutta, who ‘considered it a very great 
advantage to them to have both their persons and property under the 
judgement of the Supreme Court’. The Indians wanted extended civil and 
criminal jurisdiction of the King’s Court in the provinces. 83 On the other hand, 
Ralph Rice, the former Bombay judge who had experienced a series of 
conflicts with Edward West and Charles Chambers, avoided taking a clear 
stance on the issue. The former Ceylon judge Alexander Johnstone, while 
vindicated the working of the King’s Court in the island, did not give a 
decisive support to the expansion of jurisdiction in mainland India.
84
 The 
former Madras judge, Thomas Strange, decidedly opposed the expansion of 
the King’s Court in the provinces, as he thought that the Europeans and the 
Indians should not be amenable to the same law.
85
 
In the next year, the voice in support of the King’s Court was further 
weakened in the inquiry in the Commons’ committee. The advocators of the 
King’s Court were virtually absent in the witnesses. The radicals such as 
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Robert Rickards and Charles Forbes were only questioned about free trade and 
could not express their opinion on the judicial administration. The only 
favourable voice could be found in Rammohan Roy’s answer to the Board’s 
inquiry. He commented that the present judicial system was inadequate to 
control the European settlers in the mofussil, and the extension of jurisdiction 
of the King’s Court would be beneficial for that purpose, given the cost of 
suits would be lowered.
86
 On the other hand, the government side was further 
strengthened by evidence of Chaplin and General Lionel Smith.
87
 Referring 
to the cases of Amerchund Bedreechund and Moro Ragonath, Smith criticised 
the King’s Court’s judges for not considering the ‘political circumstances’; 
their summons of the chiefs in the Deccan would disturb the country and lead 
to the ‘rebellion’.88 In this way, chiefly by the input from the former Bombay 
officials, the Bombay government’s sense of crisis and its negative opinion on 
the working of the King’s Court dominated the committees by the end of 1831. 
They formed the basis on which the subsequent debate was conducted.  
In terms of volume of evidence, the first substantial inquiry was 
conducted only in another Commons’ committee appointed in January 1832. It 
was subdivided into six branches (public, financial, revenue, judicial , military 
and political and foreign). The King’s Court’s jurisdiction was discussed in 
the public and the judicial branches.
89
 By this stage, the plan of the Bengal 
government about the legislative council was printed and distributed, and the 
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committee started to discuss it. As the consequence, the focus of the debate 
shifted from Bombay’s concern about the native aristocracy to Calcutta’s 
economic perspective on the issue of the King’s Court.  
The fall of Wellington and the appointment of Grey’s reform mini stry 
influenced the above shift of emphasis. The first Lords’ Committee in 1830 
was appointed under the Wellington government and thus naturally inclined to 
choose those who were critical of the King’s Court as its witnesses. The sense 
of crisis of Malcolm and Ellenborough was fully attended to in the inquiry. In 
addition, Bentinck, a Canningite, was disliked by Wellington.
90
 But the new 
president of the Board of Control, Charles Grant, was much more inclined to 
the reform and improvement of the Company’s Indian government, and 
especially his friendship with Bentinck and Macaulay (both evangelical 
politicians) was crucial in shifting the emphasis of debate. Now the concern of 
Calcutta began to be heard, and their proposal of the legislative council 
became the main topic of inquiry. 
But Bombay’s sense of crisis on the King’s Court’s political danger was 
occasionally expressed in the committee. Malcolm’s minute contained in the 
military department’s volume touched the King’s Court’s jurisdiction. 91 In the 
political and foreign committee Malcolm repeated that he ‘apprehended much 
danger from the extinction of the higher classes’ as they ‘absorb[ed] many 
elements of sedition and rebellion which … must come into action if their 
power was extinct’.92 The Bombay officials sought to persuade the politicians 
and the public about their points by printing pamphlets. Malcolm’s 
Government of India (1833) was one such example, which contained John 
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Peter Grant’s petition to the Privy Council and his minute rebutting it as its 
Appendix. Elphinstone and Grant Duff encouraged John Clunes, a military 
officer at Baroda and an anonymous author of An account of the Pindaris  
(1818), to write and publish A historical sketch of the princes of India  in 1833, 
which gave a detailed account of major princes, chiefs and sardars in India.
93
 
Moreover, in the committees’ inquiry, Bombay’s concern about the 
King’s Court’s injurious effect was fully attended to by a prominent witness: 
James Mill. His liberal authoritarianism well resonated with the Bombay 
government’s fear that the King’s Court weakened the authority of the EIC’s 
government in India. He was extensively examined by the public and judicial 
committees and had a definitive influence on the final shape of the legislative 
council. Mill, the examiner of the East India Company, advocated the Bombay 
government’s call for a strong and unified authority and supported the idea of 
the legislative council, as the ‘prestige’ of the government was necessary. The 
‘obedience has to be compelled’ in India , and the government could not 
protect Indians without ‘the command of obedience’, but the Supreme Court’s 
resistance against the government was generating ‘the habit and 
contemplation of disobedience’.94 The Bengal government’s proposal to 
include the judges of the King’s Courts was objectionable, for they ‘would 
overrule the members of council … and become sole legislators, making the 
laws which they themselves administer, and … rendered political organs, 
rather than what they ought to be exclusively, inst ruments for the distribution 
of justice’.95 The Indians believed in the Supreme Court’s power to check the 
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government because they thought that the Supreme Court was superior to the 
government, which was ‘altogether evil, and of great magnitude’:  
 
The existence of a double authority in the same country of two 
independent authorities, can never lead to good, must always act 
unfavourably on the willing obedience of the people, which is the strong 
arm of the government. It never can be reconciled to common sense, that 
an authority should exist in any country pretending to be superior to that 
government to which all must pay obedience, and to which all look up 
for protection. I think therefore, the existence of courts upon a footing 
different from the will of the government of the country, is altogether to 
be avoided ….96 
 
Mill’s argument overweighed other authorities who opposed the legislative 
council such as Peter Auber, T. P. Courtenay, and N. B. Edmondstone.
97
 The 
Board of Control made the plan and proposed it to the Court of Directors. The 
Board took initiative in the following negotiation with the Court.
98
 Only two, 
Robert Jenkins and Henry St. George Tucker, out of 24 directors opposed it.
99
 
The final form of legislative council was decided in the debates in the 
British parliament in June and July 1833. The outline of the East India Charter 
Bill was explained by Charles Grant. He agreed with the Calcutta government 
to argue that the legislative council was necessary to admit the free entrance 
of Europeans in India, which would bring about the agricultural as well as 
moral improvement in the country. He quoted at length from Calcutta 
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authorities—Bentinck, Metcalfe, Bayley, Mackenzie and Judge Ryan—to 
show that they were in favour of admitting Europeans in the mofu ssil if they 
were subjected to the Company’s Courts.100 Grant also fully attended to 
Bombay’s sense of crisis. He was determined to reduce the power of the 
King’s Court. Calcutta’s original proposal to include the judges in the 
legislative council was bluntly declined. Instead, he chose to deal with the 
problem of jurisdiction by giving ‘considerable power’ to the governor 
general ‘to restrict the powers of the Supreme Court’. Grant approved the 
logic of emergency: ‘[t]his was certainly intrusting great power  in the hands 
of the Governor General, but the urgency of the case demanded such a 
proposition, and on this ground he submitted it’. 101 Grant further proposed 
that a Law Commission should be appointed ‘to inquire how far it was 
possible to approach to a more uniform system—how far it was possible to 
blend the King’s Courts and those of the Company, and to amalgamate all 
systems…’.102 
In the second reading of the bill, Thomas Babington Macaulay, the 
Secretary to the Board of Control, further expressed the ministers’ 
determination to curtail the power of the King’s Court. 103 He urged ‘that the 
regulations of the Government shall bind the King’s Court as they bind all 
other Courts’, and that the King’s Court’s power to veto legislation should be 
abolished.
104
 For Macaulay, the cases of habeas corpus in Bombay indicated 
the need of a systematic solution: ‘The device of putting one wild elephant 
between two tame ones was ingenious; but it may not always be practicable. 
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Suppose a tame elephant between two wild ones, or suppose, that the whole 
herd should run wild together’.105 The reform was necessary as the European 
land holding in the mofussil would ‘produce a hundred contests between the 
council and the judicature. The Government would be paralysed at the precise 
moment at which all its energy was required. … The Europeans would be 
uncontrolled; the natives would be unprotected’. 106 In order to remove the 
judge-made law, the codification of indigenous laws was necessary.
107
 In this 
way, the charter bill fully endorsed Bombay’s idea that the British authority in 
India should be united under the government by curtailing the power of the 
King’s Court. 
The minister’s call for the strong legislative authority naturally 
provoked criticism. Charles Williams Wynn, the former President of the Board 
of Control, argued that it was the measure to give the governor general ‘a vast 
and unnecessary power’.108 Radical James Silk Buckingham pointed out that, 
the King’s Court being deprived of the power of legislative veto, hereafter the 
government could pass any regulations even if they were ‘repugnant to the 
spirit of the British Constitutions’:  
 
Now … by the unlimited power given to the Legislative Council of India, 
composed only of five persons, and these neither elective nor 
responsible in any degree to the British or Indian community, any 
regulation might be passed, without the sanction of the King’s Courts; 
the Trial by Jury, the Liberty of the Press, the Habeas Corpus, and every 
other constitutional safeguard of liberty, might be suspended or 
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Tories, and even Lord Ellenborough, the arch-enemy of the King’s Court, 
joined the opposition from a party-political perspective.
110
 However, the 
interest on the issue was not high in Britain, after all.
111
 The bill passed the 






The Charter Act of 1834 established the supremacy of the legislative over the 
judiciary. It deprived the King’s Court of its legislative function in registering 
regulations. Though a Law Member was appointed to the legislative council, 
he was rather a subordinate legal advisor, not a substitute of the King’s Court 
with the power of legislative veto.
113
 The governor general was empowered to 
make emergency legislation without the agreement of the King’s Court. The 
logic of emergency institutionalised the exceptions of the rule of law.  
At the same time, this process was accompanied by an ironic 
consequence: Bombay’s concerns about the security in the mofussil and the 
demise of the Indian aristocracy were given only a secondary importance in 
the debate in London. For Macaulay, as for the judges of the King’s Court, the 
territories and peoples of India were already settled, and the tribal raids posed 
no problem for the British rule: 
 
I see that we have established order where we found confusion. I see that 
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the petty dynasties which were generated by the corruption of the great 
Mahometan empire, and which, a century ago, kept all India in constant 
agitation, have been quelled by one overwhelming power. I see that the 
predatory tribes who, in the middle of the last century, passed annually 
over the harvests of India with the destructive rapidity of a hurricane, 
have quailed before the valour of a braver and sterner race—have been 
vanquished, scattered, hunted to their strong holds, and either 
exterminated by the English sword, or compelled to exchange the 




Mill likewise believed that British direct rule was the only way to prevent the 
raids.
115
 Consequently, the charter renewal was a turning point of British 
attitudes towards the Indian aristocracy. Lord Ellenborough and Charles Grant, 
the successive presidents of the Board of Control, had no hesitation in 
annexing the princely states in cases of maladministration.
116
 In 1836 
Macaulay objected the Madras government’s proposal to expand its exemption 
of sardars from the ordinary court.
117
 To use C. A. Bayly’s phrase, the early 
prudence was being replaced by ‘the hard edge of early Victorian dogmatism’ 
and the former princes were being deposed as ‘sham kings’ and ‘drones on the 
soil’.118 
     Nonetheless, we should not overemphasise the discontinuity in the 
government’s policy towards sardars. There were always those officers who 
preferred interventionist or non-interventionist policy and the swing from the 
one to the other was common throughout the British rule in India.
119
 Rather, 
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what should be attended to is the mechanism by which the despotism of the 
government was strengthened. The establishment of the legislative council 
shows that the existence of political crises in the mofussil became the driving 
force of the reform of Indian government. The sense of crisis held by the 
officials in the turbulent external and internal frontiers was transmitted to the 
provincial governments and hardened their attitudes, and at a particular timing 
such as the charter renewal, it reformed the structure of the government in 
India. This pattern—the sense of crisis at the fringe of empire strengthened 
the government’s logic of emergency and weakened the rule of law—was 
constantly observable throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, as we 
shall see in our Conclusion. 
                                                                                                                                          





This study has pointed out that the government’s logic of emergency in 
Bombay in the 1820s was hardened and regularised by two things. One was 
the government’s security fear in the mofussil emanating from the incessant 
political crisis. The other was the King’s Court’s counter logic of law which 
restrained the government’s discretion in times of emergency. At the hear t of 
these two factors was the agency of the Indian people who appropriated the 
conflicting British legal authorities. In order to deal with the problem, the 
government set the realm of politics and emergency outside the realm of law 
and regularity and tried to enhance administrative efficiency and security at 
the same time. Expanding our examination spatially and chronologically, I 
would like to conclude this study by observing the recurrence of the themes 
and motives which we detected in the previous chapters. I look at the later 
development of colonial governance in India after the charter renewal of 1834 
and suggest that it was characterised by a further strengthening of the 
government’s logic of state necessity. Its background was the successive wars 
of conquest and the government’s engagement in the post -war settlement and 
consolidation in the aftermath of these conquests, and its driving force was the 
judiciary’s check on the executive and the Indians’ use of the divide . Like the 
Deccan in the 1820s, the government tried to put the inner and outer frontiers 
under its exclusive control, but the judges of the King’s Court continued their 
challenge and the Indians their jurisdictional jockeying. I also suggest that 
this continuing conflict generated synthetic new conceptions of sovereignty 
and the rule of law. 
 
After Macaulay left India in 1838, India entered a new era of conquest. The 
291 
government’s attention was fixed to the emergencies at the fringes of empire, 
and the conditions in the 1820s Deccan were repeated throughout the Indian 
subcontinent in the 1830s and 40s. Each conquest strengthened the 
government’s logic of emergency. The last days of Bentinck’s administration 
showed some signs of it.
1
  But the new, aggressive imperialism was fully 
advocated by Lord Ellenborough, who presided over the Board of Control 
three times in the 1830s and 40s. It was motivated by the political concern of 
stabilising the frontiers of the Indian empire. The first manifestation was the 
Afghan War between 1838 and 1842, which was commenced for fear of the 
Russians. The result was the ‘massacre’ of more than 16,000 British soldiers 
and civilians in a battle in January 1842. The next target was Sind (1838 –43), 
the den of predatory tribes who often intruded the north -western frontiers of 
British India. Ellenborough appointed Charles Napier as the Chief 
Commissioner of Sind for its annexation. Napier expunged the chiefs (amirs) 
and put a semi-military settlement. He was convinced, like Elphinstone and 
Malcolm, that the civil and military powers should be combined in one hand 
in the disturbed region.
2
 
The government’s logic of emergency was intensified by Governor 
General Lord Dalhousie (1848–56). He annexed the Punjab in the Second Sikh 
War in 1849 and Pegu (Lower Burma) in the Second Burma War in 1852. 
These were supplemented by the annexations of princely states by his doctrine 
of lapse, dictating that ‘on all occasions where heirs natural shall fail, the 
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territory shall be made to lapse and adoption should not be permitted’. 3 The 
lapse of Satara in 1849 ushered further resumptions of Nagpur (1854)
4
 and 
Awadh (1856). Among these newly acquired territories, the Punjab in 
particular became the arena of paternal rule under the Chief Commissioner 
John Lawrence (1853–8). He advocated a strong bureaucratic hierarchy of 
district officials combining executive and judicial powers guarded by more 
than 20,000 policemen and 24,000 frontier forces.
5
 This became the model of 
‘Non-Regulation system’, in which the personal rule combining all power s in 
the hands of commissioners and district officers was, when the initial period 
of settlement was over, to be replaced by the local government of lieutenant 
governors, as the Punjab was made in 1859.
6
 Burma highlighted Dalhousie’s 
logic of emergency through his conflict with the anti-imperialism of home 
authorities and radicals such as Richard Cobden.
7
 His aggressive policy well 
resonated with the mid-nineteenth-century gun-board diplomacy of Lord 
Palmerston, who thought that the oriental despotism should be abolished and 
recalcitrant chiefs should be reformed.
8
 
Meanwhile, pressed by the financial burden of the wars of conquest,
9
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the Bombay government wanted to advance its mofussil governance from the 
stage of conquest to that of consolidation and regular ity, which had not been 
realised in the 1820s. George Arthur (1842–6), the governor who supported 
the Afghan War and the conquest of Sind, targeted the vast alienated lands in 
the presidency. In 1843, he established the Inam Commission, a special 
tribunal examining whether the landholders held proper documentation to 
prove their rightful possession.
10
 The commission was first appointed to 
investigate the tenures in the Southern Maratha Country and enlarged to the 
whole presidency in 1852. It eventually ‘recovered’ Rs 50 lakh, or 40 percent, 
out of 122 lakh of inam lands.
11
 It was known as ‘that great confiscatory 
Tribunal’, which was headed by military men ‘who were not well versed in the 
principles of law’.12 







 apprehended the excess of aggression against the local chiefs 
and sardars.
16
 They were opposed to the lapse of Satara in 1849.
17
 But even 
these paternalists were more relaxed than the officials in the 1820s; they could 
assert that the sardars should be positively remodelled as the agent of reform, 
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rather than left for their own ways. Advocating ‘the mixture of races’, 18 Frere 
articulated that the sardars should not be cut off from the rest of the world. 
They should learn English and, significantly, travel to Bombay to learn new 
things.
19
 Contrary to Malcolm, then, Frere’s empire of opinion did not 
contradict with the attempt of the chief’s Anglicisation. 20 
The spirit of intervention covered the other parts of the subcontinent. In 
the North Western Provinces, for example, the demise of the smaller talukdars 
was significantly accelerated by government policy in the late 1830s and the 
early 1840s.
21
 At an all India level, the Act I of 1849 allowed the government 
to establish ‘political courts’ with criminal jurisdiction in the territories of 
foreign princes as well as the jagirdars and sardars in British India.
22
 As John 
Stuart Mill pointed out, the princes and the chiefs lost their independence and 
became mere government servants.
23
 
But the governments’ conquests were criticised by the judges and their 
works of consolidation were hindered by the Indians’ appropriation of the 
King’s Court. There were ample examples to show that the judiciary (the 
Supreme Courts till 1862 and the High Courts since then) functioned as a 
check to the government after 1834, though its ideological outlook and mode 
of interaction with the executive was modified by the changing political 
circumstances. The creation of the legislative council in Calcutta in 1834 did 
not solve the problem of the King’s Court’s jurisdiction. Ultimately, a mere 
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structural change could not suppress the power of the colonised to appropriate 
colonial institutions. All the problems observed in 1820s Bombay were 
repeated in the Indian age of reform.
24
 This tendency was manifest in 
Bombay in the 1840s, when its chief justice Thomas Erskine Perry, once a 
radical MP in Britain,
25
 repeated what the judges did in the 1820s.  
First, Perry insisted that the government officers should assist the 
execution of the writ of the King’s Court in the mofussil. In Aga Mahomed 
Jaffer v. Mahomed Saduck in 1847, Perry held that it was in contempt of the 
court to arrest its officers executing its process and that the government 
officials who arrested them were liable to be committed.
26
 Two years later, in 
a case of swindling, he declared that the commit ting magistrate should attend 
the court during the trial of all cases committed by him. When the magistrate 
said that the Company’s regulations forbade him from doing so, Per ry replied 
that he did not care about the regulations because he was administering 




Perry also claimed that the King’s Court had jurisdiction over the 
government’s revenue administration. In Ramchund Ursamul v. H. H. Glass  in 
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1844, he held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the custom house 
officers who collected revenue under the Bombay regulations.
28
 In 
Hurkissondass v. Spooner in 1847, Perry held that the collector of the 
government in the island of Bombay was amenable to the Supreme Court, 
though this was later reversed by the Privy Council.
29
 
At the same time, Perry interpreted the power of the legislative council 
as little as possible. In a case commonly called the Dharwar process in 1849, 
he did so in regard to Act XXIII of 1840, which allowed the writ of the 
Company’s courts to be executed within the presidency towns when indorsed 
by the King’s Court. In the judgement, Perry held that the legislative  council 
did not have the power to expand the zilla court’s jurisdiction to try the 
Bombay inhabitants. He refused to indorse the judgement of the zilla court, 
vindicating the autonomy of the King’s judges to do so. 30 This shows that the 
conflict between legislation and precedent as sources of law also continued 
after the 1820s. 
These cases had the same pattern as those in the 1820s. First, the 
Indians’ use of the King’s Court led to the King’s Court’s claim of its 
extended jurisdiction over formerly limited areas. Perry admitted that 
‘undoubtedly, this Court, like every other tribunal, has an undue bias towards 
extending its jurisdiction, and is prone to grasp at any increase of powers (so 
dear to human frailty), more especially when urged upon it in the fla ttering 
and eloquent appeals of suitors at the bar’. 31 Second, the judges ruled in 
favour of the plaintiff in India, but they were overturned by the Privy Council 
in Britain. This was also true in cases of private law. In a Parsi matrimonial 
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case in 1843 (Perozeboye v. Ardaseer Cursetjee), the chief justice started to 
claim that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Supreme Court covered the 
non-Christian inhabitants in Bombay city.
32
 The defendant appealed to the 
Privy Council and the decision was reversed.
33
 
Despite these oppositions to the government in the court room, however, 
the ideological outlook of the King’s Court was transmuted in a significantly 
way after 1834. In Regina v. Shaik Boodin in 1846, the power of the King’s 
Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus against a native court martial in the 
mofussil was disputed. In his long judgement, Perry ruled that the King’s 
Court did not have such power, expressly endorsing the decision of the Privy 
Council in the case of J. P. Grant’s petition in 1828. He  articulated that 
English legal decisions could not be applied to the mofussil, where ‘race, 
history, religion, and constitution’ were totally different and, particularly, 
where the administration should follow the way of oriental despotism, in 
which the distinction between the civil court and the court martial did not 
exist.
34
 So the possibility of applying the same English law in the presidency 
town and in the mofussil and the distinction between the civilian and the 
military interpretations of Indian society, which were so vital in the court’s 
opposition in the 1820, were abandoned by what Malcolm had emphasised in 
the 1820s: the idea of insuperable difference between the inhabitants in 
Bombay city and in the mofussil.  
After Perry’s departure from Bombay in 1852, there was another case of 
habeas corpus in 1857, in which the court also succumbed to the government. 
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One Luxmon Dhejah was arrested for treason and confined to a jail in Bombay 
city. He was then transferred to a jail in Thana under the government’s order. 
The chief justice Willian Yardly (1852–8) claimed that it was illegal to arrest 
the criminal within the jurisdiction of the King’s Court and issued a writ of 
habeas corpus against the jailor of Thana. But the European bailiff who went 
there to arrest the jailor was confined by the government’s superintendent of 
the police. The King’s Court could do nothing but admit its inability to resist 
the military force of the government.
35
 Thereafter, the power of the High 
Courts to issue habeas corpus was gradually curtailed in statutes: Act X of 
1872 limited its writ jurisdiction in the presidency towns, and in Act X of 
1875 it was replaced by a new set of rules altogether. Finally, in 1898, the 
Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V) stipulated that the High Cour ts did not 




Perry continued his challenge to the government after he returned to 
Britain. He was elected a radical MP for Devonshire in 1853–9 and criticised 
Dalhousie’s annexation of Awadh. He was then appointed to the Council of 
India (1859–82), the advisory board for the secretary of state for India. During 
that period, he continued his challenge against the government, in such cases 




The age of reform was abruptly ended by the Revolt of 1857. Dalhousie’s 
principle of conquest and annexation was criticised by the post -Mutiny 
administrators as the cause of the catastrophe. The Indian government after 
                                                 
35
 Sanyal, Reminiscences, i. 102 (Friend of India, 23 Feb. 1858). 
36
 Hussain, Jurisprudence, 96. 
37
 Parl. Debs. (series 3) vol. 142, cols 1297–316 (11 June 1856). 
299 
1858 was characterised by ‘the restoration of the aristocracy’, which was led 
by India Secretary Charles Wood (1859–66). The old policy of conciliation 
returned with a renewed vigour. The minor chiefs (talukdars) who did not join 
the insurgents were rewarded by the newly created Star of India Order.
38
 Even 
those who joined the rebellion in Awadh, the centre of the revolt, were 
promised to have their lands restored, given new sanads in open Durbar, and 
vested with the revenue and police jurisdiction in their estates, as they were 
thought to be ‘a useful instrument in restoring order and tranquillity’. 39 This 
policy of conciliating landed aristocracy by vesting civil, revenue and police 
jurisdictions was also promoted in the North Western Provinces, Sind, the 
Punjab and the newly-formed Central Provinces including the Sagar and 
Narbada territories.
40
 Even in Bengal, the government strengthened the 
village police supervised by the panchayat in place of the British regular 
police, provoking local officers’ resentment.41 
The reaction was also manifest in Bombay. The work of the inam 
commission became the focus of revision. The Mutiny caused fear among the 
government officials about the too obvious similarity between the talukdars of 
Awadh and the inamdars of the Deccan. Governor John Elphinstone (1853–9) 
was inclined to halt the commission’s work as a ‘measure of healing and 
pacification’.42 He also proposed to exempt the inam lands from the sale for 
debts by the civil courts, which was opposed but partially admitted by the 
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Supreme Government. Elphinstone’s policy was supported by James Outram, 
the military member of the governor general’s council, who resented ‘the 
rapid extinction’ of the native aristocrats, ‘perhaps the most serious source of 
discontent with our rule’.43 Then the government under Bartle Frere (1862–7) 
introduced a scheme of inam commission’s ‘summary settlement’ (Acts II and 
VII of 1863) in which the collectors could confirm an inam by a summary 
assessment and only those who refused it were subjected to a full-scale 
assessment.
44
 The government also conciliated in Gujarat. In 1860, the 
Thakur of Bhavnagar was conceded the city and some villages by the acting 
governor George Clerk (1860–2). He also enacted the Ahmedabad Talukdars’ 
Relief Act of 1862 to secure the minor chiefs’ estates from attachment or sale 
for debts, which was expanded as a general Encumbered Estates Act in 1877.
45
 
Meanwhile, the sardars’ privilege of legal exemption was confirmed in the 
Code of Civil Procedure (Act VIII of 1859, c.12, s.384). The line bet ween the 
political and the legal spheres was renewed and rigidly drawn, and the 
political system of exemption was strengthened.  
But, although it is common to assume discontinuity before and after the 
Mutiny by referring to such changes,
46
 in terms of the relationship between 
the executive and the judiciary, and that between the logics of law and state 
necessity, the Mutiny changed little. The government’s logic of state necessity 
was strengthened, like in Bombay in the 1820s, by the judiciary’s interference.  
The restoration of conciliation policies after the revolt also restored the 
judge’s interference in them. The battlefield was the legislative council, which 
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was enlarged by the Charter Act of 1854 and now included the judges of the 
King’s Court as its members. The bête noir was the Calcutta chief justice 
Barnes Peacock, the Law Member of the Council (1852–9) and a member of 
the legislative council (1859–62).47 Soon after his entrance, he opposed the 
government’s policy in Bombay city such as the Licence Tax  Bill of 1859 or 
the Arms Act of 1860,
48
 but most problematic was his meddling with the 
issues of princes and sardars in the mofussil.  
First, Peacock was opposed to a large grant to the Mysore family made 
by Charles Wood’s home government in 1860. He moved in the legislative 
council for the papers and correspondence. The matter was pressed to a vote 
and his motion was carried. This raised, as Rankin explains, the full claim of 
the legislative council’s power of judicial check to ‘procure redress of 
grievances committed by the executive’. This eventually induced the 
government to deny definitively such a claim in the eventual Act of 1861.
49
 
Second, when the council discussed the proposal of the lieutenant governor of 
the North Western Provinces to exempt the alienated lands given for public 
services from the ordinary action in the courts of law, Peacock expressed his 
view that the governor general in council under the Charter Acts did not have 
any power to alienate lands by making such grants. Charles Wood and Bartle 
Frere were infuriated by this ‘monstrous’ and ‘most unjustifiable’ denial of 
‘the sole foundation of all title of landed property’. 50 
As a consequence of these oppositions, the government excluded the 
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King’s judges from the legislative council in the Indian Councils Act of 1861, 
which was ‘popularly said to be an Act to abolish Sir Barnes Peacock’. 51 In 
the same Act, the governor general’s emergency legislation was also 
strengthened by vesting him with ‘a new and extraordinary power of making 
and promulgating ordinances in cases of emergency on his own 
responsibility’.52 The insistence of the judicial check against the government 
by the judges once again led to the strengthening of the despotic character of 
the Indian government. 
The despotism of Indian government was further consolidated in the 
late 1860s by the governor general John Lawrence (1864–9) and the so-called 
Punjab school administrators. They tried to model the government of India on 
their experience in the Punjab and other Non-Regulation provinces. They 
advocated the exclusion of local Indian bosses and rigid control by the 
bureaucratic hierarchy from the governor general down to the district officers 
in the provinces.
53
 They advocated codification, though they emphasised the 
importance of customs rather than sacred texts.
54
 The practical expression of 
this policy was a series of draconian measures such as the Murderous 
Outrages Act of 1867 or the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1872, 1887 and 
1891, which infused the militarist value to the civil government.
55
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But, again, the government’s logic of state necessity was regularly 
frustrated by the judiciary’s political intervention, which was illustrated by 
the process of enactment of the Punjab Criminal Tribes Act (XXVII) of 1871. 
In 1867 the Punjab Chief Court reviewed two cases in which the government 
fined and imprisoned tribal raiders for leaving their villages without holding 
tickets of leave. The court ruled that the government’s order to hold the tickets 
was illegal. In order to take away the effect of this ruling and ‘to wage 
continual warfare’ against the tribes, the governments of the Punjab and the 
North Western Provinces attempted to enact the Criminal Tribes Act.
56
 
However, they were strongly contested by the judges of the Punjab Chief 
Court and the High Court of the North-Western Provinces, who feared that it 
would jeopardise the personal liberty of the tribal people. William Muir, the 
lieutenant governor of the North Western Provinces, lamented that the judges’ 
perspective was confined to ‘dealing with crime after it has been 
committed’.57 
The Bombay government was also persistently annoyed by the judiciary. 
In 1870, the Bombay High Court decided that the Acts of local legislatures 
were not binding on Europeans, who could only be punished by indictment in 
the High Court. On this point the Madras High Court differed. So the 
government was caught in a difficult situation: if the High Court at Calcutta 
followed the Bombay decision, there would be conflict between the 
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government and the High Courts, while if otherwise, there would be a conflict 
among the High Courts; both scenarios were detrimental to the unity of British 
authority.
58
 The court also continued meddling with the political arrangement 
with the chiefs. In 1871, for example, the Bombay High Court claimed its 
jurisdiction over the territories which were ceded by the Company to the 
princely state of Edur (Idar) in Gujarat, ‘a mountainous and jungly country, 
inhabited principally by Bheels’.59 
 
In dealing with these jurisdictional conflicts, the government officials 
developed a new conception of the rule of law, which did not contradict with 
and was even conducive to the government’s logic of state necessity. At the 
forefront of this attempt were the two successive Law Members of the 
Governor Generals’ Council, Henry Maine (1862–9) and James Fitzjames 
Stephen (1869–72). Although they did not have any first -hand experience of 
local governance, their theory of law was based on their experience of dealing 
with the practical problems in the mofussil.  So they were critical of abrupt 
reforms of Indian customs advocated by the Law Commission now sitting in 
London. Maine argued that the Commission was wrong in thinking that India 
was ‘a field for the application of a diluted Benthamism’. Stephen warned 
Prime Minister Lord Argyll that the Commission was jeopardising the 
legislative autonomy of the Indian government. He had a ‘very little belief in 
the opinion that you can properly frame the systems of … substantive law 
upon abstract principles as if they were mathematical theories at a distance 
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from the places and people affected by them’. 60 
Maine, as the Law Member John Lawrence’s Council, invented a more 
interventionist conception of sovereignty which justified the interference of 
the British government in the internal affairs of foreign princes. This was best 
captured in his famous minute on Kathiawar in 1864. He wrote it when the 
Supreme Government received a report from the Political Agent of Kathiawar 
on the lawless state of the region. The Agent proposed that, in order to keep 
law and order, Kathiawar should be divided into smaller districts presided 
over by European magistrates and that the Political Agent should be 
empowered as the sessions judge of the entire region.
61
 Maine, with the 
governor general John Lawrence, endorsed this plan of internal interference. 
He argued that the Kathiawar states were the ‘foreign territory’ sharing 
sovereignty with the British government and enjoying several sovereign rights 
such as the ‘immunity from foreign law’, but this was not inconsistent with 
the right of the British government to interfere ‘for the good order of society 
and the well-being of the people’.62 In another minute of the same year, he 
developed his idea on sovereignty and British intervention. When the Supreme 
Government received Richard Temple’s report on the chiefs of the Central 
Provinces, Maine recommended that the chiefs should be classified either as 
British subjects or as sovereigns. He explained that, if the chiefs were British 
subjects, the government did not have any power to regulate their position and 
could not give them any power or privilege unknown to the law. On the other 
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hand, if they were sovereigns, the government could interfere in their internal 
affairs for the better order of the state or the well-being of the people.
63
 In 
other words, contrary to Elphinstone and Malcolm in the 1820s, Maine argued 
that the sovereign status of the petty kings could become a legal foundation of 
the government’s interference.  
Stephen, the next Law Member under Lord Mayo, further elaborated 
this line of discussion by reconceptualising the legitimacy of government’s 
political intervention from the perspective of the rule of law. His famous 
minute of 1872 was an attempt to give a legal foundation to the discre tionary 
government in the Punjab. The primary aim was to retain the efficiency and 
authority of the government’s district officers who represented the 
government in the eyes of the Indians. He first advocated the separation of the 
district officials’ executive and judicial powers. This was because their 
executive ‘vigour’ was weakened as they were preoccupied with the 
technicality and rigidity of judicial works, which eventually resulted in 
‘converting them into lawyers’.64 But, while judges with civil jurisdiction 
should be appointed, the district officers should retain the criminal 
jurisdiction, ‘the most distinctive and most easily and generally recognised 
mark of sovereign power’: 
 
All the world over that man who can punish is the ruler. Put this 
prerogative exclusively in the hands of a purely judicial office who has 
no other relations at all to the people, and who passes his whole life in a 
Court, and I can well believe that the result would be the break down in 
their minds the very notion of any sort of personal rule or authority on 
                                                 
63
 Ibid., 40–3, Proceedings, Foreign, Political, June 1864, nos. 14–6, H. 
Maine, minute, 11 May 1864. 
64
 Minute by the Hon’ble J. Fitzjames Stephen on the administration of justice 
in British India, Selections from the records of the government of India, home 
department, 89 (Calcutta, 1872), 11. 
307 




In Stephen’s judicial system, the independent judiciary of the King’s 
Court had nothing to do with achieving the rule of law. He admitted that 
initially the King’s Court had been necessary as a check against the officials, 
the ‘irresponsible despots’, but now the time had gone by, since the Company 
was substituted by the Crown government. Accordingly, the High Courts 
should be downgraded to a provincial court at the presidency towns as 
‘exceptional institutions for an exceptional population’; it was necessary ‘to 
give up the notion of checking one part of the Government by another…’. 66 
Rather, the government could achieve the rule of law by itself if the law 
properly defined the amount of discretionary power vested in the hands of 
government officials: ‘The notion that there is an opposition in the nature of 
things between law and executive vigor, rests on a fundamental confusion of 
ideas and on traditions which are superannuated and ought to be forgotten’.67 
This means that Stephen justified the government’s political intervention in 
times of peace as well as in times of war, and in the Regulation as well as the 
Non-Regulations provinces. Soon after, he materialised this idea in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure in 1872.
68
 
Maine and Stephen reconceptualised the relationship between the 
government and the law in the mofussil. They denied the King’s Court’s claim 
that the English rule of law should be introduced (via the presidency towns) in 
the mofussil; rather, an Indian version of the rule of law should be created by 
referring to the crisis and state necessity in the mofussil. This was the 
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legalisation of the government’s political interference at the fringes of empire, 
where the government admitted the sovereignty of the chiefs and sardars in 
order to enable the government to interfere in their rule ‘for the good order of 
society and the well-being of the people’. In the same way as in the 1820s, the 
sense of crisis in the mofussil, heightened by the intervention of the judiciary, 
forged a new type of despotism. Eric Stokes explains that, after the Mutiny, 
the utilitarians and the paternalists started to depart from each other, and 
conflict ensued between legalists such as Maine and Stephen and 
administrators such as John and Henry Lawrence of the Punjab school. But, 
from our perspective, their amalgamation was further strengthened by Maine’s 
and Stephen’s attempt to legalise the government’s political interference in 
times of peace as well as in times of war.
69
 Their intervention enabled the 
British government in India to reserve the tribal frontiers as a sphere of 
‘tradition’ but simultaneously make them as an object of active intervention 




The idea of despotic rule of law climaxed with the tory governor generals in 
the late nineteenth century under the aegis of Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli. First, the government’s crisis-ridden perspective was strengthened 
under Lord Lytton’s administration (1876–80). He resumed the war of 
conquest for the first time since the Mutiny in the Second Afghan War 
(1878–80). A strategic concern about the Russian expansion was important, 
but, as his foreign secretary Alfred Lyall stated, equally important was the 
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government’s representation of authority among Indian subjects.71 Lyall’s 
belief was derived from his experience in dealing with the tribes in the Central 
Provinces and Rajputana.
72
 The devastating famine of 1876–8 only 
exacerbated the government’s concern about its authority. 73 The anxiety of 
authority found its outlet in the proclamation durbar in 1877.
74
 The 
government also enacted a series of draconian measures such as the 
Vernacular Press Act and the Indian Arms Act in 1878.
75
 
Lord Curzon (1899–1905) inherited this tory vision. He persuaded the 
Bengali zamindars ‘to abstain from drinking too deeply of the wells of 
justice’.76 They were expected to cooperate with the local judicial business as 
honourary magistrates with summary jurisdiction,
77
 and the government was 
‘to pay him and humour him when he behaves, but to lay him out flat when he 
does not’.78 He actively intervened in the internal affairs of the princely states 
in order to bring about efficiency.
79
 His subordinate, the lieutenant governor 
of Bengal John Woodburn, expressed a typical logic of emergency: ‘the union 
of executive and judicial functions in the District and Sub -Divisional Officers 
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is at present essential’, as they should be ‘a local head of the district, 
distinctly and indisputably the central figure, to whom all wi ll turn in times of 
danger and emergency, and round whom all the forces of law and order will 
rally’.80 
The new toryism was constantly challenged by the judiciary, however, 
and here we can discern a new development of the late nineteenth century: the 
Indian judges started to criticise it. Bombay led the trend. Bombay lawyers 
(later chief justices) such as Kashinath Trimbak Telang
81
 and Badruddin 
Tyabji
82
 criticised the Lytton’s tory imperialism and supported the Ilbert Bill 
of 1883 which empowered the Indian judges to try Europeans in the 
mofussil.
83
 In his speech, Telang singled out James Fitzjames Stephen, who 
was against the Bill,
84
 and criticised that his jurisprudence was ‘the gospel of 
force’ characterised by ‘obtrusive antagonism to the doctrines of modern  
liberalism ... which are embodied in the great Proclamation of 1858’. 85 
Indeed, while opinions among the European judges were divided, the Indian 
judges on the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay unanimously 
defended the Bill.
86
 In the 1880s, there was ‘a social war’ in Bombay between 
the government and the judges of the High Court.
87
 As Chandrachud argues, 
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while there were certainly notable conservative judges such as Mahadeo 
Govind Ranade (1893–1901), Narayan Ganesh Chandavarkar (1901–13), and 
D. D. Davar (1906–16), the court decided the majority of routine cases 
independently from the executive.
88
 The relationship between the government 
and the law was to enter yet another phase of interactions in the twentieth 
century. As this brief survey suggests, the judiciary’s opposition to the 
executive and the Indians’ appropriation of it in the form of jurisdictional 
jockeying remained an important driving force of the colonial government’s 
despotism in India. Further comparative studies on the relationship among the 
law, agency and emergency shall certainly enrich our historical 
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